Independent Submission D. Bates
Internet-Draft SVT Robotics
Intended status: Informational 2 November 2026
Expires: 6 May 2027
ATP Core Test Vectors
draft-bates-atp-test-vectors-01
Abstract
This document publishes golden test vectors for the Agent Transaction
Protocol (ATP). The vectors cover canonicalization (RFC 8785 JCS),
nodeId computation, and Ed25519 signature generation and
verification. ATP Core conformance requires that conformant
implementations pass all vectors in this document for
canonicalization, nodeId computation, and Ed25519 signature
verification.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Canonicalization Vectors (RFC 8785 JCS) . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Vector C1 -- empty object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Vector C2 -- object with key reordering . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Vector C3 -- null-valued field omission per ATP Core
Section 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. Vector C4 -- array order preservation . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.5. Vector C5 -- nested object key sorting . . . . . . . . . 4
4. nodeId Computation Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Vector V1 -- minimum-viable request node . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Vector V2 -- completion node with actor and parent
reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Vector V3 -- same content as V1 with mis-ordered keys . . 6
4.4. Vector V4 -- fan-in decision with two parents . . . . . . 7
4.5. Vector V5 -- node with profile field . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Ed25519 Signature Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Test Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Canonicalization Edge Cases Not Covered in -01 . . . . . 10
6.2. Canonicalization Library Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.3. Reproducing the Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Negative and Accept Vectors (Alpha ID Sync) . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
[ATP-CORE] specifies a deterministic identity and signature model for
agent-action nodes. Two independent implementations presented with
the same node content are required to compute byte-identical
canonical forms, byte-identical nodeId values, and to verify each
other's Ed25519 signatures.
This document publishes a starter set of test vectors so that
interoperability claims can be substantiated mechanically rather than
by inspection. Each vector is computed and recorded in this
document; an implementation passes a vector if and only if it
produces the exact byte sequence and hex value recorded for that
vector.
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The vectors in this -01 release cover the minimum required for ATP
Core conformance: canonicalization fixtures, nodeId computation
across representative node shapes, and one Ed25519 sign/verify vector
with deterministic key material. Future revisions will add fixtures
for validation modes, the validation result format in Section 13.6 of
[ATP-CORE], profile-field canonicalization (strict and permissive),
parent-state handling, and adversarial cases (large numbers,
surrogate pairs, deeply nested structures).
2. Conventions
Some lines in this document are too long to fit within the 72-column
limit of Internet-Draft text. Those lines are folded using the
single backslash strategy of RFC 8792. Backslash characters at the
end of a line are not part of the vector; unfold before comparing.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
All canonical byte sequences in this document are presented as UTF-8
text. All hash and signature outputs are presented as lowercase
ASCII hexadecimal characters (%x30-39 / %x61-66) unless explicitly
stated otherwise. ATP Core defines ABNF lexical productions for
nodeId, parents entries, timestamps, and payload hashes (timestamp
format and lexical token rules in [ATP-CORE]); values MUST match
those productions exactly, with no surrounding whitespace or newline.
3. Canonicalization Vectors (RFC 8785 JCS)
These vectors verify that an implementation's canonicalizer matches
RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785]. They are
intentionally minimal so that any conformant JCS implementation
produces identical output.
3.1. Vector C1 -- empty object
Input:
{}
Canonical bytes (UTF-8):
{}
Length: 2 bytes.
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3.2. Vector C2 -- object with key reordering
Input:
{"b": 1, "a": 2}
Canonical bytes (UTF-8):
{"a":2,"b":1}
Length: 13 bytes.
3.3. Vector C3 -- null-valued field omission per ATP Core Section 9
Input:
{"a": 1, "b": null}
Canonical bytes (UTF-8) per ATP Section 9 of [ATP-CORE] (null fields
omitted):
{"a":1}
Length: 7 bytes.
*Note:* Strict RFC 8785 JCS would preserve "b":null. ATP Section 9
of [ATP-CORE] modifies this rule and requires null-valued fields to
be omitted. Profiles MAY override the omission rule per Section 9 of
[ATP-CORE].
3.4. Vector C4 -- array order preservation
Input:
{"items": [3, 1, 2]}
Canonical bytes (UTF-8):
{"items":[3,1,2]}
Array order MUST be preserved as declared.
3.5. Vector C5 -- nested object key sorting
Input:
{"outer": {"z": 1, "a": 2}, "alpha": 3}
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Canonical bytes (UTF-8):
{"alpha":3,"outer":{"a":2,"z":1}}
Both top-level and nested keys MUST be sorted.
4. nodeId Computation Vectors
These vectors verify the full nodeId formula:
nodeId = SHA256(canonical(node_without_signature))
Each vector presents a node, the exact canonical bytes produced by
ATP Section 9 of [ATP-CORE] + RFC 8785 JCS, and the resulting SHA-256
hash in lowercase hex. The signature field is intentionally absent
from the input -- implementations MUST exclude it from
canonicalization per Section 10.1 of [ATP-CORE].
4.1. Vector V1 -- minimum-viable request node
Input node (no actor, no profile, no outputHash, empty parents --
represents an autonomous root request):
{
"timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"scope": "test-scope-001",
"issuer": {"issuerId": "test-issuer", "keyId": "test-key-1"},
"agent": {"agentId": "test-agent", "version": "1.0.0"},
"action": {
"type": "atp:request",
"inputHash": "sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000000000\
0000000000000000000000000"
},
"parents": []
}
Canonical bytes (UTF-8):
{"action":{"inputHash":"sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000\
0000000000000000000000000000000","type":"atp:request"},"agent":{\
"agentId":"test-agent","version":"1.0.0"},"issuer":{"issuerId":"\
test-issuer","keyId":"test-key-1"},"parents":[],"scope":"test-sc\
ope-001","timestamp":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"}
Expected nodeId:
77d803c2d67e6cbe893172e5676e52b8f1bb80910bcbe1ca4c9aa5273f46ce70
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4.2. Vector V2 -- completion node with actor and parent reference
Input node (completion of V1, actor present, references V1 as
parent):
{
"timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:01Z",
"scope": "test-scope-001",
"issuer": {"issuerId": "test-issuer", "keyId": "test-key-1"},
"agent": {"agentId": "test-agent", "version": "1.0.0"},
"actor": {"actorId": "psn:0000-test-actor", "authContext": "\
test:none"},
"action": {
"type": "atp:completion",
"inputHash": "sha256:00000000000000000000000000000000000000\
00000000000000000000000000",
"outputHash": "sha256:11111111111111111111111111111111111111\
11111111111111111111111111"
},
"parents": ["77d803c2d67e6cbe893172e5676e52b8f1bb80910bcbe1ca4\
c9aa5273f46ce70"]
}
Canonical bytes (UTF-8):
{"action":{"inputHash":"sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000\
0000000000000000000000000000000","outputHash":"sha256:1111111111\
111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111","type":"\
atp:completion"},"actor":{"actorId":"psn:0000-test-actor","authC\
ontext":"test:none"},"agent":{"agentId":"test-agent","version":"\
1.0.0"},"issuer":{"issuerId":"test-issuer","keyId":"test-key-1"}\
,"parents":["77d803c2d67e6cbe893172e5676e52b8f1bb80910bcbe1ca4c9\
aa5273f46ce70"],"scope":"test-scope-001","timestamp":"2026-01-01\
T00:00:01Z"}
Expected nodeId:
881b552dd7d4a8598abe44ceab49257bb63b5e6420eeaf949ac2657b5495ae5e
4.3. Vector V3 -- same content as V1 with mis-ordered keys
This vector verifies that canonicalization produces identical output
regardless of input key order. Implementations MUST produce the same
canonical bytes and the same nodeId for V3 as for V1.
Input node (logically equivalent to V1, all keys in reverse-ish
order):
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{
"scope": "test-scope-001",
"agent": {"version": "1.0.0", "agentId": "test-agent"},
"action": {
"inputHash": "sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000000000\
0000000000000000000000000",
"type": "atp:request"
},
"issuer": {"keyId": "test-key-1", "issuerId": "test-issuer"},
"timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"parents": []
}
Canonical bytes (UTF-8):
{"action":{"inputHash":"sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000\
0000000000000000000000000000000","type":"atp:request"},"agent":{\
"agentId":"test-agent","version":"1.0.0"},"issuer":{"issuerId":"\
test-issuer","keyId":"test-key-1"},"parents":[],"scope":"test-sc\
ope-001","timestamp":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"}
Expected nodeId:
77d803c2d67e6cbe893172e5676e52b8f1bb80910bcbe1ca4c9aa5273f46ce70
(Identical to V1; this is the conformance signal.)
4.4. Vector V4 -- fan-in decision with two parents
Input node (decision synthesis with parents=[V1, V2], signed by a
different issuer):
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{
"timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:02Z",
"scope": "test-scope-001",
"issuer": {"issuerId": "test-issuer-2", "keyId": "test-key-2"\
},
"agent": {"agentId": "synth-agent", "version": "1.0.0"},
"action": {
"type": "atp:decision",
"inputHash": "sha256:22222222222222222222222222222222222222\
22222222222222222222222222",
"outputHash": "sha256:33333333333333333333333333333333333333\
33333333333333333333333333"
},
"parents": [
"77d803c2d67e6cbe893172e5676e52b8f1bb80910bcbe1ca4c9aa5273f4\
6ce70",
"881b552dd7d4a8598abe44ceab49257bb63b5e6420eeaf949ac2657b549\
5ae5e"
]
}
Canonical bytes (UTF-8):
{"action":{"inputHash":"sha256:222222222222222222222222222222222\
2222222222222222222222222222222","outputHash":"sha256:3333333333\
333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333","type":"\
atp:decision"},"agent":{"agentId":"synth-agent","version":"1.0.0\
"},"issuer":{"issuerId":"test-issuer-2","keyId":"test-key-2"},"p\
arents":["77d803c2d67e6cbe893172e5676e52b8f1bb80910bcbe1ca4c9aa5\
273f46ce70","881b552dd7d4a8598abe44ceab49257bb63b5e6420eeaf949ac\
2657b5495ae5e"],"scope":"test-scope-001","timestamp":"2026-01-01\
T00:00:02Z"}
Expected nodeId:
25abc84ddbd4ca932502e83e92050f00b1ecb70b4e3cf071d5823b3d3d23de4c
Parent array order is canonicalization-significant per Section 8 of
[ATP-CORE]: V1 before V2 produces a different nodeId than V2 before
V1 would. Implementations MUST preserve declared parent order.
4.5. Vector V5 -- node with profile field
This vector verifies that the profile field participates in
canonicalization and nodeId computation per Section 10.1 of
[ATP-CORE] and Section 19.4 of [ATP-CORE] (Profile Framework;
profile-field canonicalization).
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*Note:* The profile value urn:ietf:params:atp:profile:test:1.0 is
used only to test canonicalization; it is not a registered
identifier, and ATP defines no urn:ietf:params namespace. Published
golden bytes are retained for comparability with the -00 vectors.
New emissions use absolute https profile identifiers as specified in
Section 19.1 of [ATP-CORE].
Input node:
{
"timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:03Z",
"scope": "test-scope-001",
"issuer": {"issuerId": "test-issuer", "keyId": "test-key-1"},
"agent": {"agentId": "test-agent", "version": "1.0.0"},
"action": {
"type": "atp:request",
"inputHash": "sha256:444444444444444444444444444444444444444\
4444444444444444444444444"
},
"parents": [],
"profile": "urn:ietf:params:atp:profile:test:1.0"
}
Canonical bytes (UTF-8):
{"action":{"inputHash":"sha256:444444444444444444444444444444444\
4444444444444444444444444444444","type":"atp:request"},"agent":{\
"agentId":"test-agent","version":"1.0.0"},"issuer":{"issuerId":"\
test-issuer","keyId":"test-key-1"},"parents":[],"profile":"urn:i\
etf:params:atp:profile:test:1.0","scope":"test-scope-001","times\
tamp":"2026-01-01T00:00:03Z"}
Expected nodeId:
2356e89a5e787e9312287dfa4b3440d823b7fac59e401f060d42757e8f452803
If an implementation produces a different nodeId for V5, the most
likely cause is that the profile field has been excluded from
canonicalization. ATP Section 10.1 of [ATP-CORE] requires it to be
included whenever present.
5. Ed25519 Signature Vector
This section publishes one Ed25519 sign/verify vector using
deterministic key material. ATP Section 10.3 of [ATP-CORE] requires
that the signature be computed over the nodeId as the 32-octet
SHA-256 digest itself (not its hexadecimal encoding). The signature
is encoded as base64 with padding per RFC 4648 Section 4.
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5.1. Test Key Material
The vectors in this document use a fixed Ed25519 keypair derived from
a deterministic 32-byte seed. Implementations MUST use the same seed
to reproduce these vectors. *This key material is for test use only
and MUST NOT be used in production deployments.*
Message (hex, 32 bytes):
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
aa
Signature (hex, 64 bytes):
3f4d9fb756aba9bca11cfac15d65d82441dbf6f69adc9ba527b506c3379855\
50
0a2ef1a4e471323f2e8c8d190868e4f5ef303bef1e3e57e1988b1b46d83d55\
09
Signature (base64 with padding):
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
aa
Figure 1: S1 Signature Material
A conformant implementation MUST:
1. Reproduce the public key bytes from the seed.
2. Reproduce the signature bytes from the seed and message.
3. Verify the signature against the public key and message and
return success.
4. Reject the signature if any byte of the message, signature, or
public key is altered.
Ed25519 is deterministic per [RFC8032] Section 5.1.6: signing the
same message under the same key MUST produce the same signature
bytes. Implementations that produce different signature bytes for
this vector are not interoperable with [ATP-CORE].
6. Implementation Notes
6.1. Canonicalization Edge Cases Not Covered in -01
This release deliberately uses simple JSON values (strings, integers,
arrays of strings, plain objects) that all conformant RFC 8785
implementations handle identically. The following edge cases are not
covered in -00 and will be added in subsequent revisions:
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* Floating-point and exponent-form numbers (RFC 8785's ECMAScript
number serialization rules).
* Unicode surrogate-pair handling and codepoints in the
supplementary planes.
* Strings containing escapes for control characters not in the basic
ASCII range.
* Very large nested structures (depth > 16, breadth > 256 keys).
* Empty arrays and empty strings as values.
Implementations passing the -01 vectors satisfy the floor for ATP
Core conformance per Section 13.7 of [ATP-CORE]. Implementations
claiming broader RFC 8785 conformance SHOULD additionally pass the
test data published by [JCS-TESTDATA].
6.2. Canonicalization Library Choices
Implementations MAY use any RFC 8785 conformant canonicalization
library. The reference implementation by the RFC 8785 author is
available in multiple languages at [JCS-TESTDATA] and provides
additional test data covering the edge cases listed above.
ATP Core does not endorse a specific implementation. The
deterministic-output guarantee of Section 9 of [ATP-CORE] makes the
choice immaterial provided the chosen library is RFC 8785 conformant.
6.3. Reproducing the Vectors
The vectors in this document are reproducible from the inputs shown.
A conformant implementation given the same input MUST produce the
canonical bytes and nodeId exactly as recorded. The Python script
that generated these vectors is available alongside the published
draft for cross-checking.
7. Negative and Accept Vectors (Alpha ID Sync)
Vector identifiers below are taken from vectors/atp-core-test-
vectors.json on branch alpha/draft-01-code at commit 412fdd8. The
Core draft's worked examples use examples/appendix-a/bundle.json from
that same commit (byte-identical to the earlier 8b5b411 pin for that
bundle).
Reject (one or more vectors per MUST), Alpha IDs: J1/J2 duplicate
member name; J3 unpaired surrogate; H1/H6 bare-hex hash; H2/H7
uppercase-hex hash; H3/H8 unknown hash prefix; T3 lowercase "t"; T4
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lowercase "z"; T7 "+00:00" offset; T6 fractional seconds; T5 space
instead of T; T8 seconds = 60; T9 invalid date (2026-02-30); T10 non-
ASCII digits (Arabic-Indic year digits); P1 parents absent; P4
parents not an array; P2 parents entry not 64 lowercase ASCII hex
(uppercase); P5 parents entry wrong length; P6 parents entry with
trailing newline; N1 hex-string signing; N5 non-canonical S (S >= L);
N6/N7 non-canonical A or R (y >= p); N8 small-order A; N9 small-order
R; J4 integer above 2^53-1 (9007199254740993); J5 overflow / non-
finite (1e400); J7 underflow of a non-zero literal (1e-400); N10
missing base64 padding; N11 embedded line break in signature; N12
trailing line break; N13 leading space; N14 trailing space; N15 URL-
safe base64 characters; N16 extra padding; N17 signature length 87;
N18 signature length 89; N19 non-canonical trailing bits (86th
character Q to R).
Accept: C6 nested null removed; C11 null array element kept; C12
object emptied to {} kept; P3 empty parents array; H4/H5 valid
sha256: hash form; T1/T2 valid timestamps; J6 ordinary decimal 1.5;
J8 literal zero with extreme exponent (0e-400); J9 subnormal non-zero
double (5e-324); R2/R12 tip mode never reports lineageIncomplete; R7/
R11 parent present but fails yields child lineageIncomplete (full /
redacted); R4 withheld parent MUST NOT by itself yield
lineageIncomplete.
8. Security Considerations
The test key material in Section 5.1 is deterministic and public. It
MUST NOT be used to sign production ATP nodes. Doing so would expose
those nodes to forgery by anyone who has read this document.
These vectors are integrity tests, not security tests. Passing them
confirms that an implementation produces correct deterministic output
for the inputs shown. It does not, by itself, establish that the
implementation is free of cryptographic implementation bugs that
would only manifest on different inputs (timing side channels in
Ed25519 signing, malleability in canonicalizer parsing, hash-
truncation bugs in nodeId computation, and similar). Implementations
SHOULD additionally adopt the security practices recommended by the
underlying primitive specifications [RFC8032] [RFC8785].
9. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
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[ATP-CORE] D. Bates, "Agent Transaction Protocol (ATP)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bates-atp-01, 2026,
.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997,
.
[RFC8032] S. Josefsson, I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, January 2017,
.
[RFC8174] B. Leiba, "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119
Key Words", RFC 8174, May 2017,
.
[RFC8785] A. Rundgren, B. Jordan, S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization
Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, June 2020,
.
10.2. Informative References
[JCS-TESTDATA]
A. Rundgren et al., "JSON Canonicalization Scheme --
multi-language reference implementations and test data",
2025,
.
Author's Address
David A. Bates
SVT Robotics
Email: david.bates@svtrobotics.com
URI: https://www.svtrobotics.com/
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