Independent Submission W. Han Internet-Draft Individual Intended status: Informational 15 November 2026 Expires: 19 May 2027 AI Manifest: Site-Published Friction-Recovery Descriptors for AI Agents draft-han-ai-manifest-03 Abstract This document specifies the AI Manifest, a JSON format with which a website operator publishes an AI Friction-Recovery Manifest (AFRM): a description of the user-interface (UI) patterns on its own origin that predictably stall autonomous AI agents, together with constrained recovery steps and site-specific input hints. An agent that drives a browser on behalf of a user retrieves the manifest from a well-known URI and consults it when it encounters friction, instead of rediscovering the same site-specific behavior by trial and error. The manifest is untrusted input, interpreted by the agent's runtime and never shown to its language model. Its operative content is drawn from a closed vocabulary that cannot enter text, upload files, or reach another origin. Every action derived from a manifest passes through a policy enforcement point that is not a language model, and steps conventionally bound to a decision require the user's confirmation by default. Security controls such as access denials, rate limits, CAPTCHAs, authentication challenges, and confirmation dialogs are stop conditions, never traps to be recovered from. Optional publisher signatures and agent-configured reputation services provide authenticity but never imply safety and never relax these requirements. This -03 revision replaces the trust model of draft-han-ai-manifest- 02, removes the inline and vendor-path discovery methods from the protocol, and restructures the schema around a closed action vocabulary. Preliminary measurements are reported in an appendix. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. Relationship to Other Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4. Design Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Well-Known URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Link Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. Methods Removed in This Revision . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.4. Agent-Local Manifests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.5. Retrieval and Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Manifest Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1. Top-Level Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2. Locator Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.3. Trap Descriptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.4. Step Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.5. Field Hint Descriptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.6. Shortcut Descriptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.7. Manifest Strings and the Language Model . . . . . . . . . 14 4.8. Vocabularies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.8.1. Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.8.2. Trap Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.8.3. Rendering Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. Agent Processing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.1. Consulting the Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.2. Policy Enforcement Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.3. Sensitive Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 5.4. Security Controls Are Not Friction . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.5. Audit Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6. Authenticity and Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.1. Publisher Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.2. Reputation Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.1. Well-Known URI Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.2. Link Relation Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.3. No New Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8.1. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8.2. Prompt Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8.3. Exfiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8.4. Locator Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8.5. Publisher-Principal Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.6. Circumvention of Security Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.7. Local Configuration Supply Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.8. Information Disclosure, Reconnaissance, and Cloaking . . 25 8.9. Distinguishing Conforming Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 8.10. Resource Exhaustion and Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 11. Intellectual Property Rights Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . 27 12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Appendix A. Example Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Appendix B. Preliminary Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Appendix C. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 1. Introduction 1.1. Problem Statement AI agents increasingly operate websites on behalf of users by driving a browser through automation interfaces such as WebDriver, the Chrome DevTools Protocol, or tools exposed to a language model through the Model Context Protocol [MCP]. Such agents observe a page through its Document Object Model (DOM), its accessibility tree, or screenshots, and infer how to operate it. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 On many sites, and especially on enterprise transactional applications, that inference repeatedly fails at the same places: a cell edit that must be committed with a key gesture before the row unlocks, a list that renders only the visible window, a field whose valid values depend on configuration that is not visible on the page. Each agent rediscovers these patterns by trial and error, at a cost in actions, tokens, and failed tasks. The AI Manifest lets the operator of an origin describe these patterns once, in a form that an agent can consult and that an agent's safety machinery can check mechanically. 1.2. Applicability A manifest is appropriate only for friction that meets at least one of the following conditions: 1. The UI cannot practically be changed by the party able to describe it, for example a deployed vendor application whose source is not accessible to the deploying organization. 2. The friction remains valid for human users and exists for a reason, for example a commit gesture that protects data integrity, so that removing it would be wrong even though it stalls agents. 3. Operating the UI correctly requires site-specific knowledge that is not derivable from public or training data, for example which code values are registered for a given organizational unit. Where a site can expose a structured interface to agents -- an HTTP API, an MCP server [MCP], page-registered tools [WEBMCP], or an agent card [A2A] -- that interface is preferable and agents SHOULD use it instead of UI-level recovery. The AI Manifest addresses the residual UI that such interfaces do not cover. Friction that consists of a security control is never in scope (Section 5.4). In the first case the party that publishes the manifest is typically the deploying organization rather than the application vendor. Such an organization usually cannot change the application, but does control the web server or reverse proxy in front of it, and can serve a static file under /.well-known/ on that origin. 1.3. Relationship to Other Work Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 * robots.txt [RFC9309] and the vocabulary work of the IETF AIPREF working group [AIPREF] express whether and how automated clients may use content. The AI Manifest does not grant or express permission; an agent that consults it remains subject to those mechanisms. * llms.txt [LLMSTXT] provides free-text documentation for language models. The AI Manifest is deliberately not free text: its operative content is a closed vocabulary that can be validated without a language model. * Page-registered tools [WEBMCP] let a site execute functions on behalf of an agent. The AI Manifest never executes anything; it describes how the existing UI behaves. * Agent authentication work such as the IETF Web Bot Auth working group [WEBBOTAUTH] lets a site identify agents. It is complementary (Section 8.8). 1.4. Design Principles The security model of this revision rests on six principles. Every normative requirement below derives from one of them. P1. Untrusted by construction. A manifest is authored by the site, whose interests may differ from the user's. Its delivery channel, signature, or reputation status never makes its content trusted. P2. Data, not instructions. Operative content is expressed in a closed vocabulary of actions and categories, interpreted by the agent's runtime. No manifest string reaches the language model. P3. Origin-bound. A manifest describes only the origin that serves it, and actions derived from it can act only within that origin. P4. Least authority. A manifest can inform or narrow what an agent does; it can never make an agent do something it would not otherwise be permitted to do, and never removes a user confirmation. P5. Security controls are not friction. Mechanisms that deny, challenge, throttle, or ask for human confirmation are stop conditions, not traps to be escaped. P6. Mediated outside the model. Every manifest-derived action passes, before it has any effect, through a policy enforcement point whose decision a language model cannot influence, and is recorded. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 P5 and P6 draw on the published design and defensive analysis of an open-source autonomous penetration-testing system [ARTEX]. Its defense guide identifies persistence with bypass variations after 401, 403, or 429 responses as a behavioral indicator of autonomous attack, and its tool layer classifies such responses, including WAF blocks, rate limits, and CAPTCHAs, as "blocked" so that its planner changes strategy rather than stopping. A friction-recovery mechanism that did not exclude security controls would teach benign agents the same behavior. The same system passes every tool call through a hook that evaluates priority-ordered rules with allow, deny, and ask outcomes, optionally falls back to a language-model judge, and records an audit log. Section 5.2 adopts that structure for manifest-derived actions, but excludes a language model from the decision. 2. Conventions and Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. AI Manifest; AI Friction-Recovery Manifest (AFRM) A JSON object [RFC8259] conforming to Section 4. The two terms are used interchangeably. Publisher The origin [RFC6454] that serves a manifest, and the operator responsible for it. Agent Software, typically driven by a large language model (LLM), that operates web pages through a browser on behalf of a principal. Principal The human user on whose behalf the agent acts. Task One unit of work that the principal has asked the agent to perform, from the principal's request to its completion or abandonment. Manifest-Derived Action Any browser action that the agent takes (a) as a step of a recovery or commit in a manifest, (b) entering a value that the principal chose from a manifest's allowedValues, or (c) following a shortcut, together with the submission of any form that the Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 manifest modified. A value that the agent takes from the principal's task and enters into a field it found itself is not manifest-derived, even if a field hint describes that field. Form Modified by the Manifest The form owner [HTML] of an element that was the target of a manifest-derived click or of a manifest-derived key step other than Tab, of an element whose value changed as a result of such a step, or of a field into which a value chosen from allowedValues was entered. For an element without a form owner, as in applications that save through script, the "form" is the document containing the element. Its later submission or saving by any means is a sensitive action (Section 5.3). Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) The component of an agent that decides whether a manifest-derived action is allowed, denied, or requires the principal's confirmation (Section 5.2). Sensitive Action An action enumerated in Section 5.3. Security Control A mechanism enumerated in Section 5.4. Locator A description of a UI element within the publisher's documents (Section 4.2). 3. Discovery 3.1. Well-Known URI A publisher that provides a manifest MUST serve it at the following well-known URI [RFC8615] on the origin it describes: /.well-known/ai-friction-manifest.json The response MUST be served over HTTPS [RFC9110] with media type application/json. Agents MUST retrieve it without credentials and MUST NOT follow any redirect; a redirect response is treated as absence of a manifest, so that an open redirect on the origin cannot make another resource be read as its manifest. Section 8.8 describes an optional credentialed variant. Earlier revisions used the suffix "ai-manifest.json" and the link relation "ai-manifest". Those names described the purpose of the resource more broadly than its content, and are replaced by names Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 specific to friction recovery. Agents MUST ignore any resource at /.well-known/ai-manifest.json. The earlier names were never registered with IANA. 3.2. Link Relation A publisher MAY additionally advertise the manifest with the "ai- friction-manifest" link relation [RFC8288], either in an HTTP response header or in an HTML link element [HTML]: Link: ; rel="ai-friction-manifest" The advertisement is a hint that a manifest exists, which addresses the observation that agents do not spontaneously look for one (Appendix B). Agents MUST ignore a link target that does not resolve to the well-known URI on the same origin as the document that carries the link. 3.3. Methods Removed in This Revision Earlier revisions defined an inline DOM element carrying the manifest in a data attribute, an "X-AI-Manifest" response header, and an HTML meta element pointing at an arbitrary path. They are removed: * Inline manifests are indistinguishable from content injected by third-party scripts, advertisements, user-generated content, or cross-site scripting. Agents MUST NOT treat any element in a page as a manifest. * The "X-" header prefix is deprecated [RFC6648], and the Link header above carries the same information. A hash advertised by the same server that serves the manifest adds no integrity beyond HTTPS. * A meta element with an arbitrary path weakens origin binding without adding function. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 3.4. Agent-Local Manifests Earlier revisions defined a file-system path in a specific vendor's configuration directory from which an agent loads user-curated manifests, and gave such manifests precedence over and more trust than site-published ones. That mechanism is removed from the protocol: local configuration is an implementation matter, and a file in a user's configuration directory is frequently written by tools, plug-ins, or shared packages rather than by the user. An agent MAY accept local overrides, subject to all of the following: * An override applies only to the site-published manifest that the agent has currently retrieved and validated for the same origin. If no such manifest exists, the override MUST be ignored. * An override can only remove descriptors, remove values from allowedValues, shorten scope, or bring expires earlier. Any other content MUST be ignored. * The resulting manifest is subject to every requirement of this document, without exemption. 3.5. Retrieval and Caching * An agent SHOULD retrieve the manifest at most once per origin per task, and MAY use it for the rest of that task until its "expires" member. Across tasks, an agent MUST stop reusing a stored manifest at the earliest of its HTTP freshness lifetime [RFC9111], its "expires" member, and 90 days after retrieval. * An agent MUST reject a manifest larger than 262144 octets, a manifest that is not an I-JSON message [RFC7493], and a manifest whose version member is not "2.0". * Failure to retrieve or validate a manifest MUST result in the agent's baseline behavior, as if no manifest existed. 4. Manifest Format 4.1. Top-Level Members version (string, REQUIRED) "2.0" for manifests conforming to this document. Manifests with any other value, including the "1.0" of earlier revisions, are ignored (Section 3.5). Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 origin (string, REQUIRED) The ASCII serialization of the publisher's origin [RFC6454], for example "https://erp.example.com". Agents MUST ignore a manifest whose origin member does not equal the origin of the URL from which it was retrieved. expires (string, REQUIRED) A date-time [RFC3339] after which the manifest MUST NOT be used. Publishers SHOULD keep this within 30 days of publication, so that stale descriptors expire after UI changes. scope (array of strings, OPTIONAL) Path prefixes, each beginning and ending with "/". A document's path is in scope if it starts with one of them. If absent, the manifest applies to all paths of the origin. frameworkHints (object, OPTIONAL) A "name" member (string) naming the UI framework family, and a "renderingModel" member (string) from Section 4.8.3. Publishers SHOULD NOT include version numbers (Section 8.8). knownTraps (array, REQUIRED) Trap descriptors (Section 4.3). May be empty. fieldHints (array, OPTIONAL) Field descriptors (Section 4.5). shortcuts (array, OPTIONAL) Shortcut descriptors (Section 4.6). signatures (array, OPTIONAL) Publisher signatures (Section 6.1). Unknown top-level members are ignored. Within a descriptor, a locator, or a step, an unknown member or value makes the containing descriptor invalid, and the agent MUST ignore that descriptor while it MAY use the rest of the manifest. Ignoring a member of a locator would make it match more elements, so locators always fail closed. The members "publisher", "manifestId", and "registry_url" of earlier revisions are removed. In particular, a manifest can no longer name the service that vouches for it (Section 6.2). 4.2. Locator Object A locator identifies a UI element. It contains one or more of the following members; an element matches only if it satisfies all members present. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 role (string): A non-abstract role defined in WAI-ARIA 1.2 [WAI-ARIA]. Other role values make the descriptor invalid. name (string): The element's accessible name [ACCNAME], compared exactly after collapsing whitespace. column (string): For an element in a grid or table, the accessible name of its column header. focused (boolean true): The element that currently has focus. within (locator): An ancestor that the element must have, itself resolved under the same rules. testId (string): The value of the element's "data-testid" attribute. css (string): A selector [SELECTORS4], as a fallback. Publishers SHOULD prefer role, name, and column, which survive build- time class-name mangling and are what accessibility-tree-based agents observe, and SHOULD use css only when no accessible name exists. On pages that contain user-generated or third-party content, publishers SHOULD anchor every step locator with "within" to an application container identified by testId, so that injected elements outside that container cannot match (Section 8.4). An agent MUST resolve a locator against the live document at the time of use, only within documents of the manifest's origin whose path is in scope, and never inside a cross-origin frame. If the locator matches no element, more than one element, or an element that is not being rendered [HTML], the agent MUST NOT perform the associated action. The locator of a field hint is different: it identifies a class of elements and MAY match more than one. It is used only to recognize that an element the agent is already editing belongs to the field, never to choose a target, and the exactly-one rule does not apply to it. 4.3. Trap Descriptor trapId (string, REQUIRED) Unique within the manifest. category (string, REQUIRED) A value from Section 4.8.2. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 locator (object, conditional) The element at which the trap manifests. REQUIRED except for the category native-alert, which has no element. condition (object, conditional) Exactly one of "visible" (a locator that must match), "absent" (a locator that must not match), or "dialog" (the value "alert"). REQUIRED if recovery contains a wait step or the category is native-alert. recovery (array, REQUIRED) An ordered list of one to eight step objects (Section 4.4). Steps are identified by trapId and zero-based position. description (string, OPTIONAL) Display text, at most 280 characters (Section 4.7). 4.4. Step Object action (string, REQUIRED) A value from Section 4.8.1. locator (object, conditional) REQUIRED for click, focus, key, scroll, and assert. key (string, conditional) REQUIRED for key. One of "Enter", "Tab", "Escape", "ArrowUp", "ArrowDown", "PageUp", "PageDown". target (string, conditional) REQUIRED for navigate. A path-absolute URI reference [RFC3986] with neither a query nor a fragment component. timeoutMs (integer, conditional) REQUIRED for wait; from 1 to 30000. An agent MUST resolve a navigate target against the manifest's origin with the URL parser of [URL], and MUST treat the step as invalid if the resulting URL's origin differs from the manifest's origin or its path is not in scope. The same rules apply to every redirect: before following one, the agent MUST check its target, and MUST abort the navigation if the target has a different origin, a query or fragment component, or a path outside scope. Because browsers follow redirects automatically, this requires intercepting navigation requests, for example through the request interception facility of the automation interface. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 There is no step that enters text, selects an option, or supplies any value. Steps cannot carry data. 4.5. Field Hint Descriptor Field hints convey site-specific knowledge about valid input, the third case of Section 1.2. Their design is motivated by the measurement in Appendix B, in which the information the agent lacked was of this kind. fieldId (string, REQUIRED) Unique within the manifest. Several field hints MAY have the same locator with different "when" members. locator (object, REQUIRED) The input element. allowedValues (array of strings, OPTIONAL) Values the site will accept in this field, at most 64 entries, each of at most 32 characters drawn from ASCII letters, digits, ".", "_", and "-". when (object, OPTIONAL) A map from the fieldId of another field hint to a value. The field hint applies only if, for every entry, the current value of that other field, as exposed in its accessibility tree, equals the given value. If the other field's locator matches more than one element, the agent uses the one that shares the nearest ancestor with role row with the element being edited; if there is no such element or more than one, the entry is unsatisfied. commit (object, OPTIONAL) A single step object with action "key", identified by fieldId, required to commit an entry in this field. description (string, OPTIONAL) Display text, at most 280 characters. Even short tokens can spell instructions, so allowedValues are never shown to a language model (Section 4.7). They are used as follows: 1. When the model proposes a value for a field that an applicable field hint describes, the PEP checks the value against allowedValues and returns to the model only whether it matched. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 2. If it did not match, the agent MUST NOT substitute a listed value. It MAY show the listed values to the principal, who may choose one or abandon the entry; otherwise it reports the mismatch. 3. A value that the principal chose from the list is entered by the agent's runtime, not by the model, so that the model does not see it. The choice is the principal's confirmation, and the form that contains the field counts as modified (Section 5.3). A field hint therefore constrains which value is acceptable and can inform the principal; it never chooses a value, and never informs the model's reasoning beyond a match result. 4.6. Shortcut Descriptor shortcutId (string, REQUIRED) Unique within the manifest. target (string, REQUIRED) As for the navigate action (Section 4.4). label (string, REQUIRED) Display text naming the destination, at most 80 characters. A shortcut replaces a sequence of menu clicks with a GET request. Shortcuts are offered to the principal, not to the language model: an agent MAY list shortcut labels to the principal, who may choose one. Because a server can perform state changes on GET, following a shortcut is still subject to the PEP like any other navigation (Section 5.2). A site that wants agents to perform operations directly SHOULD expose a structured interface (Section 1.2). 4.7. Manifest Strings and the Language Model No string taken from a manifest reaches a language model. This covers description, label, allowedValues, trapId, fieldId, shortcutId, locator members, and navigation targets. An agent MUST NOT place any of them in a model's context, quoted or otherwise. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 What an agent MAY give a model about a manifest is limited to values from the closed vocabularies of Section 4.8 (trap categories, action names, and rendering models), small integers that the agent itself assigns to descriptors, and the match results of Section 4.5. A model can thus learn, for example, "trap 2, category commit-gesture, is active; recovery is available", and can ask the agent to run recovery 2, but cannot read anything the publisher wrote. Description and label are shown only to the principal and recorded in logs. No PEP decision depends on their content. The same limit applies to everything the agent returns to the model about manifest-derived actions, including PEP outcomes, reasons, error messages, and audit records: these MUST contain only the items permitted above. An agent that feeds tool output or logs back to its model MUST filter them accordingly. 4.8. Vocabularies The vocabularies below are closed for version "2.0". A future version of this document may extend them; values unknown to an agent are handled as specified in Section 4.1. 4.8.1. Actions click: Activate the located element. focus: Move focus to the located element. key: Press one key while the located element has focus. scroll: Scroll the located container by at most one viewport height. wait: Wait up to timeoutMs for the trap's condition to stop holding. assert: Verify that the located element is present; otherwise stop the recovery. navigate: Load a same-origin target with GET. dismissAlert: Dismiss a window.alert() dialog [HTML], which offers no choice. The actions "fill", "select", and "upload" of earlier revisions are removed. None of the trap categories requires a manifest to supply a value, and without them a manifest has no means to place data into a page or send it anywhere. There is deliberately no action that accepts a confirmation dialog or answers a prompt dialog. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 4.8.2. Trap Categories commit-gesture: An entry must be confirmed with a key gesture before the UI proceeds or unlocks. shadow-dom: The target is rendered inside a shadow tree. virtual-scroll: Only visible items are rendered. same-origin-frame: The target is inside a frame of the same origin. delayed-render: The target appears only after an asynchronous operation. hidden-required: A required input is not visible until another control is operated. native-alert: A window.alert() dialog blocks the page. Compared with earlier revisions, the cross-origin case of the iframe category is removed (Section 4.2), and the native dialog category is narrowed to alert(), because confirm() and prompt() exist to obtain a human decision (Section 5.4). 4.8.3. Rendering Models "server-rendered", "client-rendered", "hybrid", "canvas". 5. Agent Processing Requirements 5.1. Consulting the Manifest A manifest is reference data, consulted by the agent's runtime rather than read by its model. The runtime evaluates trap conditions against the live document; when one holds, it reports the trap to the model as described in Section 4.7, and runs the recovery through the PEP when the model asks for it. Field hints are applied as in Section 4.5, and shortcuts are offered to the principal (Section 4.6). The agent remains free to use its own inference at any time, and a manifest never overrides the principal's instructions or the agent's own policy. An agent MUST perform manifest-derived actions as trusted input through the browser's own input pipeline, for example WebDriver actions, as a user would. It MUST NOT dispatch events from script, modify page script state, or remove or disable page elements in order to recover from a trap. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 5.2. Policy Enforcement Point An agent that consumes manifests MUST track which of its actions are manifest-derived, and MUST route every manifest-derived action through a PEP before execution. A language model MUST NOT take part in the PEP's decision, so that manifest content cannot influence it. For each action the PEP: 1. validates the descriptor against Section 4; 2. re-resolves any locator against the live document (Section 4.2); 3. denies the action if it is directed at a security control that the agent has detected (Section 5.4); 4. assigns the default outcome below; 5. applies the agent's own policy, which can only make the outcome stricter, except for standing approvals as described below; and 6. records the outcome (Section 5.5). In the default outcomes below, an activatable element is a button, an "a" or "area" element with an href attribute, a summary element, an input element whose type is submit, image, reset, button, checkbox, or radio, or an element whose role is button, link, menuitem, menuitemcheckbox, menuitemradio, option, tab, switch, checkbox, or radio. A value-bearing control is a select element, an input or textarea element, an editing host (contenteditable), or an element whose role is combobox, listbox, radiogroup, slider, spinbutton, textbox, or tablist, or that is a descendant of one. * allow: focus, scroll, assert, and dismissAlert; * allow: wait with timeoutMs of at most 5000; otherwise ask; * allow: key Tab; * allow: key ArrowUp, ArrowDown, PageUp, or PageDown on an element that is neither activatable nor a value-bearing control; otherwise ask, and the control counts as modified for Section 5.3; * ask: key Enter and key Escape, on any element; * allow: entering a value that the principal has just chosen from allowedValues (Section 4.5); * ask: click, navigate, and following a shortcut; Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 * ask, never subject to standing approval: any sensitive action (Section 5.3); * ask or deny: anything the PEP cannot classify. Enter and Escape always ask because page script can bind any effect to a key event on any element, whatever its tag or role, and these two keys are the ones conventionally bound to commit and dismiss. The same is true in principle of every input event; the actions allowed by default are those whose conventional meaning is navigation within the page rather than a decision, and their residual risk is discussed in Section 8.4. A principal MAY grant, for an origin that the principal names, a standing approval that turns ask into allow for key Enter only, after the agent has told the principal that the page can bind any effect to that key, including submitting a form. Standing approval MUST NOT apply to key Escape, to a key step on an activatable element, to an arrow or page key on a value-bearing control, or to click, navigate, shortcuts, values, or long waits. An ask MUST show the principal the action and, for actions on an element, the role and accessible name of the element actually resolved on the live page, together with the page's origin and path. Any description or label shown with it MUST be visibly marked as written by the publisher, so that publisher text cannot pass for the agent's own explanation. The same marking applies when shortcut labels or allowedValues are shown to the principal. When the principal declines, or the PEP denies, the agent MUST abandon the descriptor rather than attempt a variant of it. 5.3. Sensitive Actions The following are sensitive actions. An agent MUST obtain the principal's confirmation before a manifest-derived action performs or triggers one, regardless of any manifest content, signature, reputation status, or standing approval: * submitting, by any means, a form modified by the manifest (Section 2), or a form that contains personal data or credentials; * a purchase, payment, transfer, or other financial commitment; * deleting data, or any operation the site presents as irreversible; * accepting terms, consents, cookie or tracking choices, or subscriptions; Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 18] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 * sending a message or publishing content; and * changing account, security, or notification settings. A manifest cannot declare an action to be non-sensitive. A PEP cannot reliably determine the effect of an element whose role, name, and handlers a hostile publisher controls; the defaults of Section 5.2 therefore ask for confirmation of every effectful action rather than depend on that determination. 5.4. Security Controls Are Not Friction The following are security controls. They are never traps. An agent MUST NOT use a manifest to avoid, dismiss, or circumvent them, and MUST ignore a descriptor whose locator or condition targets one that it detects: * HTTP 401, 403, and 429 responses and equivalent in-page denials; * CAPTCHAs and other challenges that distinguish humans from automation; * authentication, re-authentication, and multi-factor or step-up challenges; * window.confirm(), window.prompt(), and beforeunload dialogs, and site-built dialogs that ask the user to confirm or decline an action; * consent and cookie-choice interfaces; and * locks, holds, or timers that a site applies to give a human the opportunity to reconsider. Native confirm(), prompt(), and beforeunload dialogs block the page's event loop, so DOM interactions hang until the dialog is closed; an agent detects them through its automation interface and hands them to the principal. Detection of site-built controls is best effort; the confirmation defaults of Section 5.2 are the backstop for controls that go undetected. On detecting a security control, an agent MUST stop the manifest- derived recovery and either hand control to the principal or end the task. It MUST NOT retry with altered inputs. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 19] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 5.5. Audit Record An agent SHOULD keep, for each manifest-derived action, a record containing the origin; the SHA-256 [RFC6234] digest of the JCS canonical form [RFC8785] of the manifest; the descriptor identifier and step position; the PEP outcome and its reason; the text of any alert dismissed; and the time. The record SHOULD be available to the principal. It allows the principal, and the publisher's defenders, to distinguish manifest-guided recovery from other automated behavior (Section 8.9). 6. Authenticity and Reputation 6.1. Publisher Signatures HTTPS already authenticates a manifest retrieved from its origin. Signatures are useful when a manifest is authored by a party acting for the origin, such as the organization that deploys a vendor application, or when it is held outside the origin, such as in an agent's cache. Each element of the signatures member is a JSON Web Signature [RFC7515] in compact serialization with a detached payload (Appendix F of [RFC7515]). The payload is the JCS canonical form [RFC8785] of the manifest with the signatures member removed. The protected header MUST contain "alg" and "kid". Agents that verify signatures MUST support "ES256" [RFC7518], MAY support "Ed25519" [RFC9864], and MUST reject "none", every symmetric algorithm, and every algorithm that [RFC9864] deprecates. This document does not define how keys are discovered. An agent MUST verify signatures only against keys that its own configuration or its principal designates for the origin; a key or key location named by the manifest MUST NOT be used. If such a key is designated for the origin, a manifest without a signature that verifies under it MUST be ignored. If no key is designated, signatures are ignored. A valid signature establishes who published the manifest bytes. It does not establish that the manifest is safe, and MUST NOT relax any requirement of Section 5. 6.2. Reputation Services Earlier revisions defined a "Central Trust Registry" whose location each manifest declared in a registry_url member, and whose "white" status permitted execution. Because the party being vouched for chose the voucher, a malicious publisher could name a registry it controlled. That design is withdrawn. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 20] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 An agent MAY consult reputation services that its own configuration designates. A manifest MUST NOT be able to select, add, or override such a service. A reputation service: * keys its information by origin, because a digest of manifest bytes changes with any edit; * reports abuse history and the results of any static analysis it performs on manifests it has observed; an unfavorable status MUST cause the manifest to be ignored, and a favorable status MUST NOT relax any requirement of Section 5; * cannot certify safety, because a manifest's effect depends on the live page that its locators resolve against, which a service evaluating manifest bytes never sees (Section 8.4); * SHOULD sign its responses, so that an agent can verify cached responses; and * SHOULD be queried in a way that does not disclose the principal's browsing to the service, for example by downloading a list or by hash-prefix queries, rather than with a per-visit lookup (Section 9). 7. IANA Considerations 7.1. Well-Known URI Registration IANA is requested to register the following in the "Well-Known URIs" registry [RFC8615]: URI Suffix: ai-friction-manifest.json Change Controller: Won-pyo Han (pk102h@naver.com) Reference: This document Status: provisional Related Information: None 7.2. Link Relation Type Registration IANA is requested to register the following in the "Link Relation Types" registry [RFC8288]: Relation Name: ai-friction-manifest Description: Refers to the AI Friction-Recovery Manifest of the link context's origin, which describes UI patterns that stall automated agents and constrained steps to recover from them. Reference: This document Notes: None Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 21] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 7.3. No New Registries Earlier revisions requested two new registries with the Specification Required policy. Registries created by an Independent Submission cannot use that policy [RFC8726], and the vocabularies are closed in this version. The vocabularies are therefore defined in Section 4.8, and no new registry is requested. 8. Security Considerations 8.1. Threat Model This document considers the following adversaries: T1 Malicious publisher: an origin that publishes a manifest designed to harm the principal. T2 Conflicted publisher: an honest origin whose interests differ from the principal's, for example in consent, retention, or upselling flows. T3 Content injector: a third party able to place content in an origin's pages, through user-generated content, advertising, a compromised script dependency, or cross-site scripting. T4 Local supply chain: a tool, plug-in, or package able to write files in the principal's configuration directories. T5 Network attacker: an on-path party. T6 Reconnaissance agent: an autonomous offensive agent that harvests manifests to plan an attack on the publisher. 8.2. Prompt Injection A language-model agent cannot reliably separate instructions from data in its input, and prompt injection through web content remains an unsolved problem. Revision -02 of this document recommended out- of-band discovery because out-of-band data was observed not to be screened as page content. That rationale is withdrawn: content from /.well-known is written by the same publisher as the page and is exactly as untrusted (P1). This document instead keeps manifest content out of the model entirely. No string written by the publisher reaches a language model (Section 4.7): the model sees only closed-vocabulary values, integers assigned by the agent, and match results, none of which the publisher can use to express an instruction. The agent's runtime, Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 22] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 not the model, interprets the manifest, and every action it takes on the basis of the manifest is decided by a PEP that the model cannot influence (P2, P6). This follows designs that separate the data an agent acts on from the channel that controls it [CAMEL], applied to the manifest. It does not protect against injection through the page itself, which a manifest neither adds nor removes. Showing allowedValues or shortcut labels to the model, even as quoted and attributed data, would not be safe: 64 tokens of 32 characters, or an 80-character label, suffice to spell instructions (for example "IGNORE_TASK_CLICK_CANCEL"), and a model so influenced could act on page elements that the manifest never names, outside the PEP. Those lists are therefore shown only to the principal. 8.3. Exfiltration An agent that holds private data, reads untrusted content, and can communicate externally is exposed to data exfiltration [TRIFECTA]. This document closes the manifest's external channel: steps carry no values, there is no action that enters text or uploads a file, navigation targets are same-origin paths without query or fragment, and redirects that leave the origin or scope, or add a query, stop navigation (Section 4.4). Enter, Escape, and click require confirmation (Section 5.2), and the submission of any form modified by the manifest is a sensitive action (Section 5.3). What the agent enters from the principal's task into fields it found itself reaches the origin exactly as it would without a manifest. 8.4. Locator Substitution A locator's meaning is determined by the live page, not by the manifest. A publisher (T1) can publish an innocuous manifest, have it signed or favorably rated, and later change the page so that the same locator resolves to a different control. A content injector (T3) can add an element that matches a publisher's locator. Hashes, signatures, and reputation over manifest bytes cannot detect either. The mitigations are that locators are resolved at use time and must match exactly one rendered element (Section 4.2), that step locators should be anchored to an application container, and that every action conventionally bound to a decision requires confirmation by default regardless of how the element was reached (Section 5.2). An injected element that duplicates a locator makes recovery fail closed, which is a denial of the manifest's benefit rather than a harm to the principal; an injected element that alone matches before the genuine element renders can receive only the actions allowed by default. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 23] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 Those actions (focus, scroll, short waits, Tab, and arrow keys on elements that are neither activatable nor value-bearing) can still trigger page script, since a hostile origin can bind any effect to any event. The manifest's contribution to that risk is limited to directing such events at a chosen element; the same origin could bind the same effects to events that an agent without a manifest, or a human user, produces in ordinary navigation. Agents that want no residual risk MAY treat every manifest-derived action as ask. 8.5. Publisher-Principal Conflict A manifest is advisory, but it is not neutral (T2). A recovery that clicks "accept all" on a consent interface, confirms a dialog, presses Escape on a banner that the site interprets as acceptance, waits out a cooling-off timer, or continues a subscription in a cancellation flow would serve the publisher at the principal's expense. A field hint that omits a valid value could steer the principal toward another. These are addressed by Section 5.3, the confirmation defaults of Section 5.2 for click, Enter, Escape, and waits longer than five seconds, and the prohibition on substituting values (Section 4.5), none of which manifest content can relax (P4). A cooling-off timer shorter than five seconds is protected only by the agent's best-effort detection of security controls (Section 5.4) and by confirmation of whatever sensitive action follows it. 8.6. Circumvention of Security Controls A mechanism that teaches agents to recover from friction is dual-use if it applies to security controls: it would give benign agents the persistence after denial that defenders use to recognize autonomous attacks [ARTEX], and could be used to defeat anti-automation measures, rate limits, and human confirmation. Section 5.4 therefore defines these as stop conditions, and future versions of this document will not define trap categories that correspond to a security control. 8.7. Local Configuration Supply Chain Earlier revisions exempted user-curated local manifests from prompt- injection screening and gave them precedence. A tool or package able to write one file (T4) would thereby obtain a persistent, unscreened, highest-precedence instruction channel for any origin. Section 3.4 limits local overrides to narrowing a site-published manifest that is actually present, so that a local file can only reduce what an agent does. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 24] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 8.8. Information Disclosure, Reconnaissance, and Cloaking A manifest retrieved without credentials is public and is read by attackers as well as by agents (T6). Framework versions help an attacker select known vulnerabilities for which a deployment is unpatched, and shortcuts or field hints can reveal paths and code values that are not otherwise discoverable. Publishers: * SHOULD NOT include framework or component version numbers; and * MUST NOT include, in a manifest retrievable without credentials, any path, value, or element that is not reachable without credentials. A publisher MAY serve a more detailed manifest at the same URI to requests that carry the credentials the UI itself requires, and MAY additionally require agent authentication [WEBBOTAUTH]. An agent MAY make such a credentialed request using only credentials it already holds for that origin in the current task. Such a manifest is subject to every requirement of this document. If an agent retrieves both, the credentialed manifest replaces the uncredentialed one for the rest of the task, and any local override applies to the manifest in use. Because a publisher can serve different manifests to different requesters, a reputation service or reviewer can be shown a benign manifest while agents receive another (cloaking). This is a further reason that no favorable status relaxes the requirements of Section 5. 8.9. Distinguishing Conforming Agents The defense guide cited above advises anchoring the detection of autonomous attacks on behavioral fingerprints rather than on static ones such as User-Agent strings, and lists persistence with bypass variations after denials among them [ARTEX]. An agent conforming to this document acts on manifest guidance only through declared steps on located elements, and stops at denials. A publisher can therefore use its own manifest as a positive baseline in behavioral detection: automated activity that follows declared recovery steps and stops at controls is consistent with a conforming agent, and activity that persists past controls is not, whatever the client claims to be. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 25] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 8.10. Resource Exhaustion and Transport Size limits (Section 3.5), the bound of eight steps per recovery (Section 4.3), bounded wait and scroll actions, and the absence of any reference from one manifest to another bound the cost of processing. HTTPS and the prohibition of cross-origin redirects (Section 3.1) protect against T5. 9. Privacy Considerations Requesting /.well-known/ai-friction-manifest.json tells the origin that the client is likely an AI agent, in addition to the visit that prompted it. Agents that do not want to disclose this MAY refrain from retrieving manifests. Reputation lookups are a larger exposure: a per-visit query reveals the principal's browsing to a third party, which is why Section 6.2 recommends list-based or hash-prefix designs. Manifests contain no personal data, since steps carry no values. Audit records (Section 5.5) contain the principal's browsing history and SHOULD be held under the principal's control. Local overrides listing origins reveal those origins if synchronized or shared. 10. Implementation Status Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication, as described in [RFC7942]. A reference implementation is available at https://github.com/11pyo/ AINavManifest under the MIT License. It implements the version "2.0" format of this document: a JSON Schema and a validator; a policy enforcement point with the default outcomes, standing-approval limits, and ask display of Section 5.2 and an audit record; tracking of forms modified by the manifest; a model interface that exposes only the items permitted by Section 4.7; the field-hint flow of Section 4.5; discovery without redirects and per-hop redirect checks for navigation (Section 4.4); example publishers serving manifests at the well-known URI with the Link advertisement; and tests, including browser tests, that exercise these. It computes the JCS signing payload but does not yet verify signatures (Section 6.1), and does not implement reputation services. The measurements in Appendix B were made with an earlier version of the implementation that used the version "1.0" format, which is preserved for reproducibility. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 26] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 11. Intellectual Property Rights Disclosure The technology described in this document is the subject of Korean Patent Applications No. 10-2026-0071716 (filed 2026-04-21) and No. 10-2026-0097280 (filed 2026-05-29), both by the author. The applicant commits to offer any essential claims under Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms to implementers of this specification, as declared in the project repository. 12. Acknowledgments The author thanks the Claude Code, Model Context Protocol, and OpenAI function-calling communities for the empirical observations that motivated this work. The threat model of Section 8 draws on the publicly documented design and defensive analysis of ARTEX, originally developed as Autumn-27/ARTEX, as published in its global edition [ARTEX]. 13. References 13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, . [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, . [RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, . [RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454, DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011, . [RFC7493] Bray, T., Ed., "The I-JSON Message Format", RFC 7493, DOI 10.17487/RFC7493, March 2015, . Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 27] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, . [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, . [RFC9864] Jones, M.B. and O. Steele, "Fully-Specified Algorithms for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", RFC 9864, DOI 10.17487/RFC9864, October 2025, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, . [RFC8288] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 8288, DOI 10.17487/RFC8288, October 2017, . [RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019, . [RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020, . [RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022, . [RFC9111] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111, DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, June 2022, . Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 28] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 [WAI-ARIA] W3C, "Accessible Rich Internet Applications (WAI-ARIA) 1.2", W3C Recommendation wai-aria-1.2, June 2023, . [ACCNAME] W3C, "Accessible Name and Description Computation 1.2", . [HTML] WHATWG, "HTML Living Standard", . [URL] WHATWG, "URL Living Standard", . [SELECTORS4] W3C, "Selectors Level 4", . 13.2. Informative References [RFC6648] Saint-Andre, P., Crocker, D., and M. Nottingham, "Deprecating the "X-" Prefix and Similar Constructs in Application Protocols", BCP 178, RFC 6648, DOI 10.17487/RFC6648, June 2012, . [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, . [RFC8726] Farrel, A., "How Requests for IANA Action Will Be Handled on the Independent Stream", RFC 8726, DOI 10.17487/RFC8726, November 2020, . [RFC9309] Koster, M., Illyes, G., Zeller, H., and L. Sassman, "Robots Exclusion Protocol", RFC 9309, DOI 10.17487/RFC9309, September 2022, . [MCP] Model Context Protocol, "Model Context Protocol Specification", . [WEBMCP] W3C Web Machine Learning Community Group, "WebMCP", . Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 29] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 [A2A] A2A Project, "Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol", . [LLMSTXT] Howard, J., "The /llms.txt file", September 2024, . [AIPREF] IETF, "AI Preferences (aipref) Working Group", . [WEBBOTAUTH] IETF, "Web Bot Auth (webbotauth) Working Group", . [CAMEL] Debenedetti, E., "Defeating Prompt Injections by Design", arXiv 2503.18813, March 2025, . [AGENTDOJO] Debenedetti, E., "AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents", arXiv 2406.13352, June 2024, . [TRIFECTA] Willison, S., "The lethal trifecta for AI agents: private data, untrusted content, and external communication", June 2025, . [ARTEX] artex-global maintainers (upstream: Autumn-27/ARTEX), "ARTEX Global Edition: docs/defense-en.md, guard/guard.go, and intercept/intercept.go", 2026, . [DRAFT02] Han, W., "AI Manifest: Site-Published Friction-Recovery Descriptors for AI Agents", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-han-ai-manifest-02, 2 June 2026, . Appendix A. Example Manifest The following manifest describes a table-maintenance screen on which a cell entry must be committed with Enter before the row unlocks, and on which the valid account-category reference codes depend on the selected company code. Under Section 8.8, its fieldHints would be served only in response to requests authenticated to the ERP system. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 30] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 { "version": "2.0", "origin": "https://erp.example.com", "expires": "2026-12-01T00:00:00Z", "scope": ["/maint/"], "frameworkHints": { "name": "webdynpro", "renderingModel": "server-rendered" }, "knownTraps": [ { "trapId": "row-commit", "category": "commit-gesture", "locator": { "role": "gridcell", "focused": true }, "condition": { "visible": { "role": "status", "name": "Row locked" } }, "recovery": [ { "action": "key", "key": "Enter", "locator": { "role": "gridcell", "focused": true } }, { "action": "wait", "timeoutMs": 3000 } ], "description": "Commit each entry with Enter to unlock." } ], "fieldHints": [ { "fieldId": "companyCode", "locator": { "role": "combobox", "name": "Company Code" } }, { "fieldId": "acctCatRef-1000", "locator": { "role": "gridcell", "column": "Account Category Ref" }, "when": { "companyCode": "1000" }, "allowedValues": ["Z051", "Z063", "Z072"], "commit": { "action": "key", "key": "Enter", "locator": { "role": "gridcell", "focused": true } }, "description": "Only codes registered for the company code." } ], "shortcuts": [ { "shortcutId": "acct-cat-maint", "target": "/maint/account-category", "label": "Account category maintenance" } ] } Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 31] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 The locator of acctCatRef-1000 matches every cell of its column, which is permitted for field hints (Section 4.2). The model never sees the list. When it proposes a code from the principal's task, the PEP answers only whether the code is accepted. If the model proposes a standard code such as one it knows from public documentation, the answer is no; the agent then shows Z051, Z063, and Z072 to the principal, who chooses one or abandons the entry (Section 4.5). The shortcut is likewise offered to the principal, not to the model. The Enter steps ask the principal by default (Section 5.2). A principal who maintains many rows can grant a standing approval for Enter on this origin, after being told that the page can bind any effect to that key. This example assumes that the focused element is the grid cell itself; on pages that place an input element inside the cell, the publisher would use { "role": "textbox", "focused": true, "within": { "role": "gridcell" } }. Appendix B. Preliminary Measurements This appendix reports measurements made with the version "1.0" format of [DRAFT02]. They are preliminary; their limitations are stated with each. None evaluates security. 1. Proprietary-knowledge enterprise task (2026-05-29). An SAP S/4HANA-style table-maintenance screen on which valid account-category references depend on company-code registration, and on which a cell entry must be committed before the row unlocks. One run per condition with one agent (Claude Sonnet 4.6). Both conditions completed. The manifest condition used 6 interaction actions versus 13 and about 47.8K versus 87.3K input tokens (estimated). Wall-clock time was closer, 275 s versus 353 s, because at this difficulty the agent's own reasoning time dominates both conditions; actions and tokens reflect the efficiency difference more directly. Limitations: a single run per condition; one model; site, manifest, and evaluation all prepared by the author; token counts estimated. 2. Reference benchmark. A two-step order-entry task repeated 30 times, input tokens counted with the cl100k_base tokenizer: the manifest-aware agent used 341 input tokens on average with 30 of 30 successes, and a DOM-analysis baseline used 1887.6 tokens with 6 of 30 successes. Limitations: both agents were implemented by the author; the tokenizer differs from that of the model in item 1. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 32] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 3. Spontaneous discovery (Phase 1, n=30, 2026-04-28). No agent spontaneously looked for an unannounced manifest in 30 trials. Consumption therefore depends on agents implementing discovery, which motivates the link relation (Section 3.2). An effect size of Cohen's d = 5.00 reported in earlier revisions was an artifact of a near-zero-variance idealized baseline and is withdrawn. 4. Cross-agent consumption (Phase 2, 2026-05-11). Given a manifest in its conversation context, one agent applied individual trap entries, a second recognized the document type without applying entries, and a third did not extract manifest- specific content. This tested interpretation, not discovery. Version "2.0" removes the dependence on interpretation: the agent's runtime, not its model, interprets the manifest. Earlier single-trial figures (a 5.0 s "Tier C" time and 19- to 31-fold speedups in draft-han-ai-manifest-01) remain withdrawn. The most needed next measurement is adversarial: placing malicious descriptors in manifests and measuring whether conforming and non- conforming agents act on them, using an injection benchmark methodology such as [AGENTDOJO]. Candidate attack manifests include automatic consent clicks, instruction-bearing allowedValues, same- origin redirects out of scope, key events bound to purchases, and deletion prompts; the measure of interest is the attack success rate with and without the requirements of Section 5. Appendix C. Document History Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication. draft-han-ai-manifest-03 (2026-11) Replaces the trust model. Principal changes: * The manifest is untrusted regardless of channel; the -02 rationale that out-of-band data escapes prompt-injection screening is withdrawn. Added design principles, applicability criteria, a threat model, provenance tracking of manifest- derived actions, a policy enforcement point with confirmation defaults, sensitive actions, and the exclusion of security controls from recovery. No manifest string reaches the language model; value lists and shortcuts are shown only to the principal. Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 33] Internet-Draft AI Manifest November 2026 * Discovery: removed the inline DOM element, the X-AI-Manifest header, the meta element, and the vendor-path local method; local overrides may only narrow a site manifest that is present. Added origin binding and the Link header form of the link relation. Renamed the well-known suffix to "ai-friction- manifest.json" and the link relation to "ai-friction-manifest". * Schema version "2.0": closed action vocabulary of value-free steps; removed fill, select, and upload; multi-strategy locators with ARIA role, name, and column; fieldHints for site- specific knowledge; same-origin shortcuts without query; expires and scope members; removed publisher, manifestId, and registry_url; narrowed the dialog category to alert() and removed cross-origin frames. * Integrity: replaced the manifest-declared Central Trust Registry with agent-configured reputation services and optional JWS signatures over the JCS canonical form. * IANA: no new registries (RFC 8726); the well-known URI and link relation registrations are kept. * Measurements moved to an appendix with stated limitations, including one run per condition for the enterprise task. draft-han-ai-manifest-02 (2026-06-02) Realigned the document with the advisory friction-recovery model; relaxed the deterministic runtime to OPTIONAL; withdrew the "Tier C" figures and Cohen's d = 5.00; added the enterprise measurement. draft-han-ai-manifest-01 (2026-05-15) Extended the schema to the three-part model (frameworkHints, knownTraps, shortcuts); added Method E and the native-dialog-trap category. draft-han-ai-manifest-00 (2026-04-21) Initial version. Author's Address Won-pyo Han Individual Korea, Republic of Email: pk102h@naver.com Han Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 34]