SCHC Working Group Q. Lampin Internet-Draft Orange Intended status: Informational 28 July 2026 Expires: 29 January 2027 VOICI draft-lampin-schc-voici-00 Abstract The Static Context Header Compression (SCHC) framework identified the need for a minimal transport encapsulation that provides Session multiplexing when extrinsic Discriminators are insufficient. This document specifies a Link Multiplexer (VOICI) that addresses those SCHC-driven requirements while remaining general enough to accommodate other compression mechanisms and uncompressed payloads. The encapsulation is designed for minimal overhead, reducing to 1 byte in the common case (7 inline Session IDs), while supporting optional integrity protection and original EtherType/port recovery. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 29 January 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Key problem solved by VOICI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Requirements driven by SCHC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Requirements driven by multi-mechanism and uncompressed payloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Gap Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. MPLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. UDP Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. IP Protocol Number and SCHC Ethertype . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4. QUIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.5. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.6. Encoding Within SCHC Data Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Integration within SCHC framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2. Minimal Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.3. Header Size Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.4. Header Field Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. VOICI Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1. Transmit Path (Egress) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.2. Receive Path (Ingress) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.3. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. Session ID Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.1. P2P Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.2. Star Topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.3. Mesh and Other Topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.4. Relay Remapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8. Content Mechanism Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.1. Registration of New Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 9. Integrity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 9.1. CRC Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 9.2. CRC Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 9.3. Relationship to ULP Checksums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9.4. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10. Interaction with Protocol Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10.1. Over Ethertype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10.2. Over IP Protocol Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10.3. Over UDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 11.1. Session Hijacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 11.2. Integrity Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 11.3. Flag Bit Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 11.4. CI Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 11.5. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 11.6. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 12.1. Content Identifier Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 12.2. Session ID Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 12.3. Future Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 1. Introduction The SCHC framework [SCHC] provides header compression and optional fragmentation based on static contexts shared between Endpoints. In the common deployment -- a single Instance per Endpoint over a single link -- the mapping between the link and the Instance is trivial: all Data Units on the link belong to that one Instance, and no multiplexing mechanism is needed. However, two deployment scenarios require a mechanism to distinguish multiple Sessions over a shared link: * An Endpoint hosts multiple Instances serving different Domains or tenants. * Multiple Sessions share an Ethernet segment or IPv6 link. These requirements were first identified by the SCHC architecture [SCHC-ARCH] for the case of SCHC-compressed Data Units. But the need is broader than SCHC alone. Operator and industrial deployments often carry a mix of traffic types on the same constrained link: SCHC-compressed Data Units from devices that use static Contexts; Data Units from other mechanisms; and uncompressed management or diagnostic traffic that bypasses compression. In all of these cases, transport-level multiplexing, and optional integrity are desirable. This document specifies a Link Multiplexer (VOICI) that satisfies the requirements identified for SCHC while remaining general enough for other compression mechanisms. The VOICI header carries a Session ID for multiplexing, a Content Identifier for dispatching the Data Unit to the correct handler, and optional integrity protection. The encapsulation is designed for minimal overhead, reducing to 1 byte in the common case (inline Session IDs 0-6 with 2-bit Content Identifier). Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2. Requirements 2.1. Key problem solved by VOICI Endpoint +---------------------------------+ | | Session A | | Session B | +------------+ +------------+ | | | Instance A | | Instance B | | | +------------+ +------------+ | | ^ ^ | | | | | | +-------+-------+ | | | how to | | | discriminate? | | | | +----------------|----------------+ | | | +----------------------------+----------------+ | Lower Layer headers | SCHC Data Unit | | no content discriminating | e.g. Rule ID + | | Sessions A&B | residue | +----------------------------+----------------+ Figure 1: Key problem solved by VOICI Figure 1 illustrates the fundamental problem addressed by VOICI. When an Endpoint hosts multiple SCHC Instances -- each serving a different Domain, tenant, or application -- their compressed Data Units must share a single link. The lower layer headers (Ethernet, IPv6, etc.) carry no information to distinguish which Instance a Data Unit belongs to, because the compression residue elides those distinguishing fields. Without an explicit discriminator, the receiver cannot route the incoming Data Unit to the correct handler. VOICI solves this by prepending a compact header that carries a Session ID, bridging the gap between the compression layer and the link layer. Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 The requirements below are organized into two groups. Requirements 1-3 were first identified by the SCHC architecture [SCHC-ARCH] for the specific case of SCHC-compressed Data Units. Requirements 4-5 were added when the scope was broadened to encompass other compression mechanisms and uncompressed payloads. 2.2. Requirements driven by SCHC 1. *Session identification*: A mechanism to distinguish Sessions and route Data Units to the correct processing handler (for example, a SCHC Instance). The identifier (Session ID) is locally significant to the link. 2. *Original EtherType/port recovery (optional)*: A mechanism to carry the original EtherType or UDP port number when the carrier uses the SCHC EtherType or SCHC UDP port. This is needed when the payload is decompressed so that the receiver can restore the original framing layer after decompression. 3. *Integrity protection (optional)*: A mechanism to detect corruption of the Data Unit, including the Session ID and the compressed residue. 2.3. Requirements driven by multi-mechanism and uncompressed payloads 1. *Content identification*: A mechanism to identify how the Data Unit is encoded when the link carries Data Units from multiple mechanisms (for example, SCHC, uncompressed). This allows the receiver to dispatch the Data Unit to the correct decompressor without inspecting its contents. 2. *Layer independence*: The encapsulation MUST operate over any link layer that carries compressed traffic, whether identified by an Ethertype, IP Protocol Number, or UDP port [SCHC-PROTO-NUMS]. 3. Gap Analysis Several existing mechanisms can provide multiplexing or labeling. This section analyzes their suitability for SCHC and identifies the gap that VOICI fills. 3.1. MPLS MPLS labels provide efficient multiplexing and are widely deployed in operator networks. However: * MPLS adds 4 bytes per label, which may be excessive for highly constrained deployments. Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 * MPLS is not available on all link types relevant to SCHC (LPWAN, PPP, low-speed serial links). * MPLS provides no integrity protection. 3.2. UDP Encapsulation UDP is commonly used for Internet traversal and NAT traversal. The UDP source port can carry a Session ID: * The UDP header is 8 bytes. * Features a 16 bits Checksum. * Using the UDP source port as Session ID is fragile in the presence of NAT (port remapping) and port exhaustion (65535 limit shared with other applications). * UDP is only available above IP. 3.3. IP Protocol Number and SCHC Ethertype The SCHC IP Protocol Number and Ethertype [SCHC-PROTO-NUMS] identify SCHC traffic at the respective layers but do not provide: * Session multiplexing (one protocol number or Ethertype per link, not per Session). * Integrity protection. They are necessary to identify SCHC traffic but insufficient for multiplexing. 3.4. QUIC QUIC [RFC9000] is a multiplexed, UDP-based transport that provides stream multiplexing, reliability, flow control, and mandatory encryption via TLS 1.3. While QUIC satisfies multiplexing and integrity requirements, it is generally infeasible for SCHC target deployments: * QUIC operates exclusively over UDP, requiring a full IP stack. * The mandatory TLS 1.3 handshake and AEAD encryption require cryptographic hardware or sufficient memory that constrained endpoints may not possess. Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 * The minimum AEAD ciphertext size (16 bytes for AES-128-GCM) combined with the TLS record and QUIC headers results in a per- packet overhead over 32 bytes. 3.5. Summary +=============+==============+===========+==========+===============+ | Mechanism | Multiplexing | Integrity | Overhead | Link | | | | | | Coverage | +=============+==============+===========+==========+===============+ | Ethertype | No | No | 0 bytes | IEEE 802 | | | | | | only | +-------------+--------------+-----------+----------+---------------+ | MPLS | Yes | No | 4+ bytes | Ethernet, | | | | | | IP | +-------------+--------------+-----------+----------+---------------+ | IP Protocol | No | No | 0 bytes | IP only | | Num | | | | | +-------------+--------------+-----------+----------+---------------+ | UDP Port | Yes | Yes | 8 bytes | over UDP | | | | | | only | +-------------+--------------+-----------+----------+---------------+ | QUIC | Yes | Yes | 32+ | over QUIC | | | | | bytes | only | +-------------+--------------+-----------+----------+---------------+ | *VOICI* | *Yes* | *Opt.* | *1 byte* | *Any* | +-------------+--------------+-----------+----------+---------------+ Table 1: Comparison of multiplexing mechanisms VOICI fills the gap by providing multiplexing, integrity, content mechanism identification, and original EtherType/port recovery with minimal overhead. The comparison is summarized in Table 1. 3.6. Encoding Within SCHC Data Unit Encoding session or version information inside the SCHC rules or rule results would couple transport-layer concerns (multiplexing, version negotiation) to compression-layer concerns (what to compress, how to parse the residue). A separate encapsulation keeps the SCHC Data Unit focused on compression results and allows the transport header to be added or removed without modifying the compression strategy or the Context/Rules. Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 Furthermore, when multiple compression mechanisms share the same link, an inner-field approach would require every mechanism to reserve space for the same routing metadata, reducing compression efficiency. VOICI places this metadata in a single, mechanism- agnostic header. 4. Integration within SCHC framework VOICI integrates at the carrier layer using the SCHC Ethertype and IP/UDP protocol numbers defined in [SCHC-PROTO-NUMS]. When multiplexing is required, these values identify VOICI traffic on the wire. On deployments where explicit multiplexing is not needed, i.e., provided by the supporting lower layers, VOICI is optional. The use of VOICI is part of the Endpoint configuration. On the sender side, the VOICI module prepends its header to the Data Unit and replaces the original EtherType, IP Protocol Number, or UDP port number with the corresponding SCHC Ethertype or IP/UDP protocol number. If the original framing information must be preserved for later restoration, the Original EtherType/Port flag (O) is set and the field is populated. On the receiver side, packets identified by the SCHC Ethertype or IP/ UDP protocol number are handed to the VOICI dispatcher. The VOICI module parses the header, uses the Session ID and CI field to route the Protocol Data Unit to the correct processing handler, strips its own header, and optionally restores the original EtherType, IP Protocol Number, or UDP port number before passing the reconstituted frame to upper layers. The detailed processing procedures are specified in Section 6. 5. Header Format 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 bits +-+-+-+---+-----+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + |V|O|I|CI | SSS | Session ID (long) | +-+-+-+---+-----+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + +- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | CRC | (optional, present if I=1) +- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ +- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ (optional, present if O=1, | Original EtherType/Port | 2B for Ethertype or UDP port, +- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ 1B for IPv6 Next Header) Figure 2: VOICI Header Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 The V-O-I flags (3 bits), CI field (2 bits), and the SSS field (3 bits) are always present. The SSS field uses a uniform encoding rule: values 0-6 represent an inlined value in the first byte, while 7 triggers a LEB128 variable-length integer in the following byte(s) with offset +7. For Unprocessed/Raw and SCHC, SSS encodes the Session ID (SID = SSS or SID = LEB128_val + 7). For the Extended CI mechanism, SSS encodes the Extended CI value. For Reserved CI values, the interpretation is defined by the future profile. The CRC (2 bytes) is present when I=1. The Original EtherType/Port (1-2 bytes) is present when O=1. The Data Unit follows immediately after the last header field. *Parsing order:* 1. Read byte 0; extract V, O, I, CI, SSS. 2. If CI indicates Reserved: a. The Data Unit MUST be discarded. 3. If CI indicates Unprocessed/Raw or SCHC (CI in {0, 1}): a. Decode SSS as the Session ID: * If SSS < 7: SID = SSS (1-byte header). * If SSS == 7: read a LEB128 integer from following byte(s); SID = LEB128_val + 7. 4. If CI indicates Extended CI (CI == 3): a. Decode SSS as the Extended CI value: * If SSS < 7: Ext_CI = SSS + 3 (1-byte header so far). * If SSS == 7: read a LEB128 integer from following byte(s); Ext_CI = LEB128_val + 10. b. Read the Session ID as a LEB128 integer from the following byte(s). 5. If I=1, read the 2-byte CRC value. 6. If O=1, read the Original EtherType/Port field (2 bytes for Ethernet/UDP, 1 byte for IPv6 Next Header). 7. If I=1, compute the expected CRC over all preceding bytes read so far (flag byte, Extended CI bytes if CI=3, Session ID, Original EtherType/Port if O=1), and the Data Unit payload. The CRC field appears before the Original EtherType/Port on the wire but covers it; the receiver reads both before verifying. Drop frame if CRC is invalid. Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 8. Pass remaining buffer to the identified handler and recover original/content. 9. If O=1, restore original EtherType or Port number and return processed frame to original handler. 5.1. Fields * *V (1 bit):* VOICI header format version. V=0 for this draft. V=1 for future VOICI revisions. * *O (1 bit):* Original EtherType/Port present. When set, the Original EtherType/Port field is present, carrying the EtherType, IP Next Header, or UDP port number that was replaced by the VOICI EtherType, VOICI IP Protocol Number, or VOICI UDP port. The field is interpreted as an EtherType when VOICI is carried over a link- layer transport (for example, IEEE 802 Ethertype), as a Next Header if carried over IP, and as a UDP port when VOICI is carried in a UDP payload. This restoration is an VOICI responsibility; the Content Mechanism does not need to manage framing recovery and dispatching to original handler. * *I (1 bit):* Integrity flag. When set, a CRC-16 field is present and covers the Session ID through the end of the Protocol Data Unit. When clear, no integrity check is carried. * *CI (2 bits):* Content Identifier. Identifies the mechanism used for the Protocol Data Unit. VOICI profiles register new CI values as needed. The initial CI assignments are: +====+================================+ | CI | Content Mechanism | +====+================================+ | 0 | Unprocessed / raw | +----+--------------------------------+ | 1 | SCHC | +----+--------------------------------+ | 2 | Reserved for future mechanisms | +----+--------------------------------+ | 3 | Extended CI | +----+--------------------------------+ Table 2: Initial CI assignments Profiles that register a new CI value MUST specify the mechanism and its parameters. Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 * *SSS (3 bits):* Session ID prefix (for Unprocessed/Raw and SCHC) or Extended CI value (for Extended CI). The SSS field uses an inline/extended encoding: - *SSS in 0..6:* The value is inlined in the first byte. o For Unprocessed/Raw or SCHC: SID = SSS. Header is 1 byte (unless O=1 or I=1). o For Extended CI: Ext_CI = SSS + 3. A Session ID follows as a LEB128 integer. - *SSS = 7:* A LEB128 variable-length integer follows. o For Unprocessed/Raw or SCHC: read LEB128 value; SID = LEB128_val + 7. o For Extended CI: read LEB128 value; Ext_CI = LEB128_val + 10. If SSS was inline (0-6), the Session ID follows immediately after the first byte. If SSS was 7, the Session ID follows immediately after the LEB128 integer. This gives 7 inline values in the 1-byte form, with continuous extension to 16-bit values via LEB128. * *Session ID (variable length):* Identifies the logical session that owns this Protocol Data Unit. When a mechanism is registered with VOICI, the mechanism profile assigns Session IDs and registers them with the VOICI instance. The receiver VOICI uses the Session ID to dispatch the Protocol Data Unit to the correct handler -- for SCHC, the handler is an SCHC Instance; for Unprocessed/Raw, the handler is the raw dispatch path. The Session ID space (0-65535) is local to the link over which VOICI is carried and to the Content Mechanism. For CI values 00, 01 (Unprocessed/Raw and SCHC), the Session ID is derived from the SSS field as described in the parsing order (SID = SSS for inline values, SID = LEB128_val + 7 for extended values). For Extended CI, the Session ID follows the Extended CI value as a LEB128 integer. The LEB128 encoding follows [DWARF]: - If the value is less than 128, a single byte is used (MSB = 0). - If the value is 128 or greater, two bytes are used (first byte MSB = 1). - No values larger than 16 bits (65535) are supported. Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 The receiver reads the Session ID by inspecting the most significant bit of each LEB128 byte: if the MSB is 1, the next byte is part of the value; if 0, the byte is the last. * *CRC (16 bits, optional):* Present when I=1. CRC-16/CCITT-FALSE over the flag byte (V-O-I-CI-SSS), the Extended CI value bytes (if CI=3), the Session ID, the Original EtherType/Port field (if O=1), and the entire Protocol Data Unit. * *Original EtherType/Port (1-2 bytes, optional):* Present when O=1. Carries the EtherType or UDP port number that was replaced by the VOICI carrier. The field is interpreted as an EtherType when VOICI is carried over a link-layer transport (for example, IEEE 802 Ethertype) and as a UDP port when VOICI is carried in a UDP payload. 5.2. Minimal Header When no optional fields are needed (V=0, O=0, I=0) and the SSS field encodes an inline value (0-6), the VOICI header reduces to a single byte: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bit +-+-+-+---+-----+ |V|O|I|CI |S S S| (inline value, 1 byte) +-+-+-+---+-----+ Figure 3: Minimal VOICI Header (1 byte) 5.3. Header Size Summary VOICI header sizes for various configurations (Unprocessed/Raw and SCHC): Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 +====================+===+===+===+================+=======+======+ | Configuration | V | O | I | Session ID 0-6 | 7-133 | 134+ | +====================+===+===+===+================+=======+======+ | Session ID only | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 B | 2 B | 3 B | +--------------------+---+---+---+----------------+-------+------+ | + CRC | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 B | 4 B | 5 B | +--------------------+---+---+---+----------------+-------+------+ | + Orig. | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 B | 4 B | 5 B | | EtherType/UDP Port | | | | | | | +--------------------+---+---+---+----------------+-------+------+ | + Orig. IP Next | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 B | 3 B | 4 B | | Header | | | | | | | +--------------------+---+---+---+----------------+-------+------+ | All fields | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4-5 B | 5-6 B | 6-7 | | | | | | | | B | +--------------------+---+---+---+----------------+-------+------+ Table 3: VOICI header size summary (Unprocessed/Raw, SCHC) Extended CI (CI=3) adds the Extended CI value and a LEB128 Session ID; the minimum is 2 bytes (flag byte + 1-byte Session ID, SSS inline), growing to 6 bytes (SSS=7 with 2-byte LEB128 Ext_CI + 2-byte LEB128 SID). 5.4. Header Field Reference +=============+========+===========================================+ | Field | Size | Description | +=============+========+===========================================+ | V | 1 bit | VOICI header version | +-------------+--------+-------------------------------------------+ | O | 1 bit | Original EtherType/Port presence | +-------------+--------+-------------------------------------------+ | I | 1 bit | CRC presence | +-------------+--------+-------------------------------------------+ | CI | 2 bits | Content Identifier | +-------------+--------+-------------------------------------------+ | SSS | 3 bits | Inline value (SID or Extended CI, 0-6) | +-------------+--------+-------------------------------------------+ | Extended CI | 0-2 B | Extended CI value (inline or LEB128 + 10) | +-------------+--------+-------------------------------------------+ | Session ID | 0-2 B | Session identifier (inline, LEB128+7, or | | | | raw) | +-------------+--------+-------------------------------------------+ | Original | 1-2 B | EtherType, Next Header, or UDP port (if | | ET/Port | | O=1) | +-------------+--------+-------------------------------------------+ | CRC | 2 B | Integrity check (if I=1) | Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 +-------------+--------+-------------------------------------------+ Table 4: VOICI header field summary 6. VOICI Operation This section specifies the normative processing procedures for the VOICI module on both the transmit (egress) and receive (ingress) paths. 6.1. Transmit Path (Egress) On the sender side, VOICI operates as an encapsulator. A Data Unit is passed to the VOICI module by an upper-layer handler together with metadata that determines the header fields. The inputs are: * the *Data Unit* (payload), which may be compressed (for example, an SCHC residue), unprocessed, or encoded by another mechanism; * a *Session ID*, identifying the logical session that owns the Data Unit; * a *Content Identifier*, indicating the mechanism that encoded the Data Unit; * an *Original Framing* value (EtherType, IP Next Header, or UDP port) when the carrier framing has been replaced by the VOICI carrier and the receiver must restore it; * an *Integrity* flag indicating whether a CRC is required. The VOICI module constructs the header as follows: 1. *V field*: Set to 0 (current version). 2. *O field*: Set to 1 if an Original Framing value is provided and must be carried to the receiver for restoration; otherwise set to 0. 3. *I field*: Set to 1 if integrity protection is required; otherwise set to 0. 4. *CI field*: Set to the Content Identifier associated with the Data Unit. For Unprocessed/Raw traffic, CI=0. For SCHC- compressed traffic, CI=1. For mechanisms registered under Extended CI, CI=3 (see below). 5. *SSS field and Session ID*: Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 * For CI=0 (Unprocessed/Raw) or CI=1 (SCHC): - If Session ID is in the range 0-6: set SSS to the Session ID value (inline encoding). No additional Session ID bytes are emitted. - If Session ID is 7 or greater: set SSS to 7. Encode Session ID - 7 as a LEB128 integer following the first byte. * For CI=3 (Extended CI): - The SSS field encodes the Extended CI value rather than the Session ID. If the Extended CI value is in the range 3-9: set SSS to Extended CI - 3 (inline). Otherwise: set SSS to 7 and encode Extended CI - 10 as a LEB128 integer following the first byte. - After the Extended CI value (inline or LEB128), encode the Session ID as a LEB128 integer. 6. *CRC field* (if I=1): Compute CRC-16/CCITT-FALSE over the following bytes in wire order: the base header byte (V-O-I-CI- SSS), any Extended CI LEB128 bytes, the Session ID bytes, the Original EtherType/Port value (if O=1), and the entire Data Unit payload. The CRC field itself is NOT included in the computation. Append the 2-byte CRC field. 7. *Original EtherType/Port field* (if O=1): Append the Original Framing value. For Ethernet or UDP carriers, the field is 2 bytes (EtherType or UDP port). For IPv6, the field is 1 byte (Next Header value). 8. *Prepend* the complete VOICI header to the Data Unit to form the VOICI-encapsulated frame. 9. *Carrier framing*: Replace the outgoing frame's carrier identifier (EtherType, IP Protocol Number, or UDP port) with the VOICI carrier value defined in [SCHC-PROTO-NUMS]. 10. Submit the encapsulated frame to lower layers for transmission. 6.2. Receive Path (Ingress) On the receiver side, VOICI operates as a dispatcher. Frames arriving with the VOICI Ethertype, IP Protocol Number, or UDP port ([SCHC-PROTO-NUMS]) are handed to the VOICI module. Processing is as follows: Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 1. *Parse the base header*: Read the first byte; extract V, O, I, CI, and SSS. 2. *Version check*: If V indicates a version other than 0, the header format is unsupported. The frame MUST be discarded. 3. *Reserved CI check*: If CI=2 (Reserved), the Data Unit MUST be discarded. 4. *Decode SSS*: * For CI=0 (Unprocessed/Raw) or CI=1 (SCHC): - If SSS is 0-6: Session ID equals SSS. - If SSS is 7: read a LEB128 integer from the following byte(s); Session ID equals LEB128_val + 7. * For CI=3 (Extended CI): - If SSS is 0-6: Extended CI equals SSS + 3. - If SSS is 7: read a LEB128 integer; Extended CI equals LEB128_val + 10. - Read the Session ID as a LEB128 integer from the bytes following the Extended CI value (or following the first byte, if SSS was 0-6). 5. *Read CRC field* (if I=1): Read the 2-byte CRC value. 6. *Read Original EtherType/Port field* (if O=1): Read the Original EtherType/Port field. The field is 2 bytes for Ethernet/UDP carriers, 1 byte for IPv6 Next Header. 7. *CRC verification* (if I=1): Compute the expected CRC over all preceding bytes (base header byte, Extended CI bytes if CI=3, Session ID bytes, Original EtherType/Port if O=1), and the Data Unit payload. Note that the CRC field appears before the Original EtherType/Port field on the wire but covers it; the receiver reads both fields before verifying. If the computed CRC does not match the received CRC, the frame MUST be discarded. Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 8. *Dispatch*: Pass the Data Unit payload to the processing handler identified by the CI value and Session ID. For CI=1 (SCHC), the handler is the SCHC Instance corresponding to that Session ID. For CI=0 (Unprocessed/Raw), the handler is the raw dispatch path. 9. *Handler processing*: The handler processes the Data Unit (decompression, pass-through, etc.) and returns the result to VOICI. 10. *Restore original framing* (if O=1): Write the Original EtherType/Port value read in step 6 into the carrier framing of the outgoing frame (EtherType, IP Next Header, or UDP port as appropriate). 11. *Egress to upper layers*: Pass the reconstituted frame to the appropriate upper-layer handler. If O=1, the upper-layer handler is the one identified by the reconstructed carrier header. 6.3. Error Handling If the receiver cannot identify a handler for a given (CI, Session ID) pair -- for example, the Session ID is not associated with any configured handler, or the CI value is not supported -- the frame MUST be discarded. 7. Session ID Allocation The Session ID is locally significant to the link. Allocation strategies depend on the deployment topology: 7.1. P2P Deployments Session IDs MAY be negotiated between peers during Session establishment, or assigned by the Domain Manager during provisioning. Session ID 0 is a valid Session ID (no reserved values). 7.2. Star Topologies The Network Gateway assigns Session IDs and communicates them to Devices during provisioning. The Gateway maintains the Session ID to handler mapping. 7.3. Mesh and Other Topologies Session IDs MAY be assigned by a Network or Domain Manager, or negotiated between peers. Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 7.4. Relay Remapping A relay or gateway translating between links MAY remap Session IDs. The Session ID space is local to each link segment; there is no requirement for global uniqueness. 8. Content Mechanism Identification The CI field provides content mechanism identification. VOICI at the receiver uses the CI and Session ID values to dispatch the Data Unit to the correct handler without inspecting the Data Unit contents. This is needed when a link carries Data Units from multiple mechanisms simultaneously. Common scenarios include: * A gateway that receives both SCHC-compressed Data Units and Management and diagnostic traffic that bypasses compression entirely. * Future registrations of additional mechanisms via new CI values. 8.1. Registration of New Mechanisms Profiles that register a new CI value MUST specify the mechanism and its parameters. Implementations that encounter a CI value they do not recognize MUST drop the Data Unit. 9. Integrity Protection The I flag and CRC field provide optional integrity protection for the Data Unit. 9.1. CRC Scope The CRC covers the VOICI header and the Data Unit payload, excluding the CRC field itself. Specifically, the CRC is computed over the base header byte (V-O-I-CI-SSS), the Extended CI LEB128 bytes (if CI=3 and SSS=7), the Session ID, the Original EtherType/Port field (if O=1), and the entire Data Unit payload. 9.2. CRC Algorithm CRC-16/CCITT-FALSE (polynomial 0x1021, initial value 0xFFFF, no reflection, no final XOR) is used. This is the same algorithm used in many constrained network protocols (for example, Bluetooth, CAN bus). Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 18] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 9.3. Relationship to ULP Checksums Some compression strategies elide Upper Layer Protocol (ULP) checksums (for example, UDP checksum) to reduce residue size. On links where the underlying transport does not guarantee Data Unit integrity, this makes the VOICI CRC the sole integrity mechanism. Profiles MUST specify whether ULP checksum elision is permitted and, if so, whether the VOICI CRC is mandatory to compensate. 9.4. Limitations The CRC provides integrity (corruption detection) but NOT authentication. An attacker can compute a valid CRC for a forged Data Unit. Authentication must be provided by the underlying transport or a higher-layer security mechanism. 10. Interaction with Protocol Numbers The protocol numbers defined in [SCHC-PROTO-NUMS] identify VOICI traffic on the wire. The VOICI header follows the carrier header and provides Session multiplexing, Content Mechanism dispatch, and optional integrity protection. +--------------------+ | Protocol Data Unit | (content mechanism determined by CI) +--------------------+ | VOICI Header | (variable length, 1-7 bytes) +--------------------+ | Carrier Header | (Ethertype / IP Protocol / UDP) +--------------------+ | ... | (link layer or lower IP) +--------------------+ Figure 4: VOICI Layer Stack The CI field identifies the mechanism (CI=0: unprocessed; CI=1: SCHC; other values: future registrations). 10.1. Over Ethertype The SCHC Ethertype identifies VOICI-encapsulated traffic. When O=1, the Original EtherType/Port field carries the replaced EtherType value. Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 19] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 10.2. Over IP Protocol Number The SCHC IP Protocol Number identifies VOICI-encapsulated traffic. The VOICI header follows the IPv6 header (or the IPv6 extension containing the protocol number). When O=1, the Original EtherType/ Port field carries the replaced IPv6 Next Header value. 10.3. Over UDP The SCHC UDP port identifies VOICI-encapsulated traffic carried in the UDP payload. The UDP header provides its own checksum, which may make the VOICI CRC redundant. When O=1, the Original EtherType/Port field carries the replaced UDP destination port number. 11. Security Considerations 11.1. Session Hijacking If Session IDs are predictable, an attacker could inject Protocol Data Units with a forged Session ID to redirect traffic to a different handler. Session IDs SHOULD be randomly generated or derived from a secure key exchange. In star topologies where the Domain Manager assigns Session IDs, the assigned values SHOULD be cryptographically random rather than sequential or otherwise predictable. 11.2. Integrity Limitations The CRC provides corruption detection but not authentication. An attacker with link access can forge Protocol Data Units with valid CRCs. Authentication must be provided by the underlying transport (for example, IPsec, TLS) or a higher-layer mechanism (for example, OSCORE). 11.3. Flag Bit Manipulation When the I flag is set, the CRC covers the flag byte, making flag bit flipping detectable at the cost of a CRC failure. When I=0, flipping the O flag (0 to 1) would cause the receiver to consume payload bytes as an Original EtherType/Port field. Higher-layer authentication is recommended for adversarial environments. Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 20] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 11.4. CI Manipulation When the I flag is set, the CRC covers the CI field, making manipulation detectable. When I=0, an attacker can flip the CI field to dispatch the Protocol Data Unit to a wrong handler, causing decompression errors or potential information leakage if the wrong decompressor produces interpretable output. 11.5. Denial of Service An attacker could inject Protocol Data Units with invalid Session IDs, causing the receiver to waste resources on lookup failures. Implementations SHOULD rate-limit Session ID lookup failures. 11.6. Replay Attacks VOICI carries no sequence number or timestamp. An attacker with link access could replay previously captured Protocol Data Units. For SCHC's primary use cases (sensor telemetry, periodic reporting), replayed Protocol Data Units carry stale data that is not harmful. Deployments requiring replay protection SHOULD use a higher-layer mechanism (for example, OSCORE, DTLS) or the underlying transport. 12. IANA Considerations 12.1. Content Identifier Registry This document requests the creation of a "Content Identifier (CI)" registry. The initial entries are: +=======+===================+===============+ | Value | Content Mechanism | Reference | +=======+===================+===============+ | 0 | Unprocessed / raw | This document | +-------+-------------------+---------------+ | 1 | SCHC [SCHC] | [SCHC] | +-------+-------------------+---------------+ | 2 | Reserved | -- | +-------+-------------------+---------------+ | 3 | Extended CI | This document | +-------+-------------------+---------------+ Table 5: Initial CI registry entries New CI values are assigned per [RFC8126] "Specification Required" policy. Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 21] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 12.2. Session ID Space The Session ID space is locally significant to the link and Content Mechanism. No IANA assignment is required. 12.3. Future Extensions The VOICI header allows for future extensions. New flags or fields would be introduced through a subsequent revision of this document, with IANA registry updates. Existing implementations that encounter unrecognized flag combinations MUST treat the unrecognized flags as zero and process the header according to their supported flags. For the CI field, implementations that encounter a CI value they do not recognize MUST drop the Protocol Data Unit. 13. References 13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [SCHC] Minaburo, A., Toutain, L., Gomez, C., Barthel, D., and JC. Zuniga, "SCHC: Generic Framework for Static Context Header Compression and Fragmentation", RFC 8724, DOI 10.17487/RFC8724, April 2020, . 13.2. Informative References [DWARF] Dwarf Standards Committee, "DWARF Debugging Information Format", Web https://dwarfstd.org/documentation/, . Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 22] Internet-Draft VOICI July 2026 [RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000, DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021, . [SCHC-ARCH] Pelov, A., Thubert, P., Minaburo, A., Lampin, Q., and M. Dumay, "Static Context Header Compression (SCHC) Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- ietf-schc-architecture-06, 6 July 2026, . [SCHC-PROTO-NUMS] Moskowitz, R., Thubert, P., Gomez, C., Minaburo, A., and M. Blanchet, "Protocol Numbers for SCHC", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-schc-protocol- numbers-06, 23 December 2025, . Author's Address Quentin Lampin Orange Orange 3 Massifs - 22 Chemin du Vieux Chene 38240 Meylan France Email: quentin.lampin@orange.com Lampin Expires 29 January 2027 [Page 23]