Independent Submission L. P. de Melo
Internet-Draft D. M. Amaral
Intended status: Informational R. O. Albuquerque
Expires: 19 May 2027 J. J. C. Gondim
F. L. L. de Mendonca
R. T. de Sousa Junior
UnB
15 November 2026
Dynamic Authorization Protocol (DAP): Out-of-Band Visual Transaction
Authorization for Untrusted Terminals
draft-melo-dap-visual-oob-auth-00
Abstract
This document specifies the Dynamic Authorization Protocol (DAP), an
Out-of-Band (OOB) visual transaction authorization protocol, used as
a second factor, for electronic financial transactions initiated on
untrusted terminals. The terminal displays a cryptographically
protected challenge as a Quick Response (QR) code. A trusted mobile
device of the user, which needs no network connection, scans the
code, verifies it with HMAC-SHA-256, shows the transaction details
for confirmation ("What You See Is What You Sign"), and then reveals
a one-time authorizer code protected with AES-256. Each challenge is
bound to one transaction and expires within 120 seconds. The
document also describes the provisioning of the shared key through a
dual-channel XOR split-key exchange, its activation, and the
templates used to display transactions. DAP targets Man-in-the-
Middle (MITM) and Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) adversaries that control
the terminal and alter transaction parameters.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2027.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Terminology and Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. System Architecture and Functional Premises . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Architectural Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Functional and Operational Requirements . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Foundational Design Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Cryptographic Primitives and Message Format . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Primary Root Key and Ephemeral Server-Side Key
Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Customer Key Partitioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. Transaction Challenge Message Layout . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3.1. Transaction Data Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3.2. Template File Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Key Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1. Provisioning and Activation Procedure . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2. Key Exchange QR Code Format (Code 001) . . . . . . . . . 21
6. Dynamic Authorization Protocol (DAP) Transaction Flow . . . . 22
6.1. Detailed Protocol Processing Steps . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.1.1. Server Challenge Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.1.2. Out-of-Band Visual Capture and Mobile Verification . 25
6.1.3. Authorizer Code Recovery and Transaction Execution . 26
7. Key Lifecycle and Device Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.1. Loss, Replacement, and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.2. Root Key Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.1. Formal Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.2. Resistance to Customer Impersonation Attacks . . . . . . 30
9.3. Resistance to Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) Attacks . . . . . 30
9.4. Replay Protection and Challenge Expiration . . . . . . . 31
9.5. Limits on Authorizer Code Attempts . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.6. Key Exchange QR Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.7. Protection of Key Material at e-Bank . . . . . . . . . . 33
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9.8. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
9.9. Transaction Templates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9.10. Formal Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9.11. Residual Risks and Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1. Introduction
Internet banking and electronic transaction systems have evolved to
provide ubiquitous financial services, but security models relying
solely on session-level authentication have not kept pace with modern
adversarial capabilities. Requiring access exclusively from pre-
registered devices restricts user mobility, whereas relying on
conventional challenge-response mechanisms over a single channel
exposes users to session hijacking, credential harvesting, and real-
time transaction manipulation.
When a customer initiates a financial transaction from a personal
computer connected to the Internet, that terminal has to be treated
as potentially untrusted. Malware, trojans, and Man-in-the-Browser
(MITB) agents can silently modify destination accounts or transaction
amounts while displaying legitimate-looking confirmation screens to
the user. Conventional second factors such as TANs, hardware OTP
tokens, or Short Message Service (SMS) codes (which are additionally
exposed to cellular network and Signaling System No. 7 (SS7)
vulnerabilities) do not cryptographically bind the authorization code
to the actual transaction content verified by the user on an
independent trusted display.
The Dynamic Authorization Protocol (DAP) [Melo2012] [Melo2024]
addresses this gap by establishing an Out-of-Band (OOB) visual
channel between the service provider (such as the e-Bank server) and
the user's trusted mobile device. DAP applies the "What You See Is
What You Sign" (WYSIWYS) principle [Starnberger2009]: every
transaction initiated on an untrusted computer generates a
cryptographically protected challenge rendered as a two-dimensional
visual code (QR code). The user captures this QR code using the
camera of a mobile device that needs no network connection, which
verifies the integrity and authenticity of the transaction
parameters, displays the transaction details on the trusted mobile
screen, and, upon explicit user confirmation, decrypts and reveals a
6-digit transaction-specific authorizer code that the user enters
back into the untrusted terminal to complete the operation.
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Because only the holder of the key can produce a valid authentication
tag, a counterfeit site or a malicious terminal cannot create a
challenge that the mobile device accepts, which makes DAP resistant
to phishing.
This document assumes a deployment in which the customer obtains the
key through an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) of the financial
institution, which has a screen capable of showing QR codes and reads
the bank smartcard of the customer. Other channels for provisioning
the key are out of the scope of this document.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Terminology and Notation
The following actors and architectural entities are defined in this
specification:
User (Customer): The legitimate human account holder initiating a
transaction on an Untrusted Computer (UC) and authorizing it via a
Trusted Mobile Device (MD).
Untrusted Computer (UC): Any personal computer or Internet-connected
terminal used to access the e-Bank web interface. Under the DAP
threat model, UC is assumed to be potentially compromised by
malware or controlled by an adversary.
Trusted Mobile Device (MD): A portable device (such as a smartphone)
equipped with an embedded camera and running the mobile
application of the financial institution, which includes the DAP
function (the "DAP application"). MD operates out-of-band without
requiring network connectivity during transaction verification.
Automated Teller Machine (ATM): A physical terminal operated by the
financial institution and connected to its dedicated network, used
as a secondary trusted channel during split-key provisioning.
Financial Institution Server (e-Bank): The remote application server
responsible for authenticating sessions, generating transaction
challenges, and validating transaction authorizer codes.
Hardware Security Module (HSM): A tamper-resistant cryptographic
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processor within the financial institution ("HSM Bank") that
stores primary root keys and computes, on demand, the key share
k_2 of each customer, so that no complete customer key is kept in
persistent storage.
The cryptographic notation used throughout this document is
summarized below:
MK: A Primary Root Key held inside the HSM, where MK is a 512-bit
key in {0,1}^512, generated inside the HSM with a
cryptographically secure random number generator.
k: A 512-bit customer secret key (k in {0,1}^512), computed as k =
k_1 XOR k_2, shared between the HSM/e-Bank and the customer's MD.
F: A pseudorandom function implemented inside the HSM, instantiated
as HMAC-SHA-512 keyed with MK, used to generate the key share k_2.
k'_1, k'_2: The two 256-bit subkeys partitioned from k, where k'_1
in {0,1}^256 (the first 32 octets of k) is the HMAC-SHA-256
authentication key and k'_2 in {0,1}^256 (the last 32 octets of k)
is the AES-256-CBC encryption key.
k_1, k_2: Two 512-bit key shares used for symmetric key distribution
over separated channels, such that k = k_1 XOR k_2. The share k_1
is a random 512-bit string with uniform distribution that e-Bank
stores for the customer. The share k_2 is generated by the HSM
from MK and customer data, and is recomputed whenever it is
needed.
m: The transaction message containing the transaction details
(trans_data) requested by the user.
r: A 6-digit pseudorandom authorizer code uniformly distributed in
the range 000000 <= r <= 999999 (encoded for encryption as six
ASCII decimal digits, including leading zeros).
r': The protected authorizer code, r' = IV | C, where IV is a
128-bit (16-octet) initialization vector and C is the single
128-bit (16-octet) AES-256-CBC ciphertext block of r, computed as
C = CBC-Enc_{k'_2}(IV, r) (see Section 4.3). The total length of
r' is 32 octets (256 bits).
Nonce: The unique identifier that e-Bank assigns to each
transaction, a random text of 20 characters. It is carried inside
trans_data.
y: The 256-bit HMAC-SHA-256 authentication tag of the challenge, y =
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HMAC-SHA-256_{k'_1}(trans_data | r').
XOR: Bitwise exclusive-OR operation.
CONCAT (|): Bitstring or octet-string concatenation.
2. Related Work
This section compares DAP with mechanisms that are commonly used to
authorize electronic transactions. The comparison is limited to the
property that matters for an untrusted terminal: whether the
authorization code or credential depends on the transaction content
that the user has seen on an independent trusted display.
+====================+=========================+====================+
| Mechanism | Code bound to | Trusted display of |
| | transaction content | the transaction |
+====================+=========================+====================+
| HOTP [RFC4226] and | No | No |
| TOTP [RFC6238] | | |
+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------------+
| SMS one-time | No, unless the | Only the text of |
| password | message repeats the | the message |
| | transaction | |
+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------------+
| QR-TAN | Yes | Yes, on a mobile |
| [Starnberger2009] | | device |
+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------------+
| FIDO2 / WebAuthn | No, by the core | Not defined by the |
| [WebAuthn2] | specification | core specification |
+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------------+
| DAP (this | Yes | Yes, on a mobile |
| document) | | device that does |
| | | not need a network |
+--------------------+-------------------------+--------------------+
Table 1: Comparison of DAP with Existing Mechanisms
HOTP and TOTP derive a password from a shared secret and a counter or
the time. The password does not depend on the transaction, so
malware on UC that changes the transaction after the user has
authenticated can still use a valid password. SMS one-time passwords
have the same property, and they are additionally exposed to
weaknesses of the cellular network.
QR-TAN [Starnberger2009] is the closest approach: the mobile device
scans a code from the terminal and shows the transaction before
producing the authorization. DAP differs in the following aspects:
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the shared key is provisioned by a split-key exchange over two
separate channels (Section 5); the transaction is shown through
templates selected by a transaction code; the challenge is
authenticated with HMAC-SHA-256 over the transaction data and the
protected code; the challenge is valid for 120 seconds, and the
mobile device checks the generation timestamp; and the user returns a
6-digit code through UC.
FIDO2 / WebAuthn [WebAuthn2] authenticates the user to a relying
party with public-key credentials and resists phishing. The core
specification does not define a display of the transaction on a
separate trusted device. It addresses a different problem from DAP,
and both can be used together.
The Regulatory Technical Standards under the European Payment
Services Directive [PSD2RTS] require, for remote electronic payments,
that the authentication code be dynamically linked to the amount and
the payee (Article 5). DAP addresses the same concern by binding the
authorizer code to a single transaction. This document makes no
claim of compliance with any regulation.
3. System Architecture and Functional Premises
3.1. Architectural Overview
In the DAP model, a session authenticated via static or conventional
credentials is never trusted to authorize financial transactions
implicitly. Instead, every transaction message exchanged on the
Internet banking channel is treated as an independent operation that
MUST be explicitly authorized by the customer via an Out-of-Band
channel strictly bound to that transaction's data.
The system architecture comprises the remote financial institution
(e-Bank backed by HSM) and the customer interacting across three
distinct environments and communication channels, as illustrated in
Figure 1:
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+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Financial Institution Domain |
| |
| +------------------+ +----------------------+ |
| | HSM Bank |<=============>| e-Bank Server | |
| | (Root Keys MK_i, | Internal Bus | (Session & Challenge | |
| | Key Derivation) | | Management) | |
| +------------------+ +----------------------+ |
+-----------|--------------------------------------|------------+
| |
Channel 1: | Dedicated Bank Net Channel 2: | Untrusted Net
Trusted | (Key Share k_2) (HTTPS) | (k_1, QR,
ATM Link | | r_hat)
v [Channel Boundary] v
+--------------------+ +----------------------+
| ATM Terminal | | Untrusted Computer |
| (Smartcard + PIN, | | (UC) |
| Visual QR Screen) | | (Web Browser / UI) |
+--------------------+ +----------------------+
| |
| Channel 3a: QR | Channel 3b: QR
| (Camera: k_2) | (Camera: k_1/Tx)
+------------------+-------------------+
|
v
+--------------------+
| Trusted Mobile |
| Device (MD) |
| (DAP App, |
| Camera, Key k) |
+--------------------+
|
| Visual Confirmation (WYSIWYS)
| & Display of 6-digit Code (r_hat)
v
[ Legitimate Customer ]
|
| Entry of r_hat into UC (Channel 2)
Figure 1: DAP Multi-Channel Architecture
This channel separation provides five core security properties:
1. _Channel Segmentation:_ Transaction initiation occurs over the
primary Internet channel (UC), whereas transaction verification
and authorizer code recovery occur on a physically separate
device (MD) via an optical channel.
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2. _Visual Verification (WYSIWYS):_ By decoding and displaying
transaction parameters on MD after cryptographic integrity
verification, the user confirms the exact recipient, account,
date, and value that the server will execute.
3. _Integrity of the Transaction Against a Compromised Terminal:_ An
adversary that controls UC, including On-Path (MITM) and Man-in-
the-Browser (MITB) attackers, cannot alter the transaction
payload inside the challenge without invalidating the HMAC tag
verified by MD. This property does not protect against a
legitimate user who confirms a fraudulent transaction (see
Section 9.11).
4. _No Network Dependency:_ MD does not need cellular, Wi-Fi, or
Bluetooth connectivity to verify a transaction and to display the
authorizer code. The network is therefore not an attack path in
the protocol, and the protocol remains available in unstable
connectivity environments. The protocol does not require MD to
be disconnected, and it does not address malware running on MD
itself, which is outside the adversary model of Section 9.1.
5. _Isolation of Cryptographic Secrets:_ The cryptographic key k is
stored inside MD and is never known or viewable by the human
user, preventing inadvertent disclosure of the secret key under
social engineering.
3.2. Functional and Operational Requirements
Compliant implementations of the Dynamic Authorization Protocol MUST
satisfy the following nine functional premises:
1. _Message Lifespan:_ Every generated challenge message, including
encrypted payloads, MUST have a maximum lifespan (Time-To-Live)
of 120 seconds, counted from the instant at which e-Bank
generated it. This instant is carried in the message as a
timestamp, so that both e-Bank and MD can verify the lifespan.
2. _Mandatory Authentication:_ Every challenge message MUST be
authenticated with the HMAC tag y, and every transaction MUST be
authorized with the authorizer code r that is bound to it.
3. _Timeout Cancellation:_ Failure to receive a valid authorization
response within 120 seconds MUST result in the automatic
cancellation of the ongoing transaction by the server.
4. _Response Time:_ Under normal operating conditions, the
cryptographic processing and response time for transaction
authentication and authorization SHOULD be less than 2 seconds.
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5. _Offline Mobile Execution:_ No active network connection to or
from the Trusted Mobile Device (MD) SHALL be needed during
transaction authorization.
6. _Attack Countermeasures:_ The protocol implementation MUST
include the mechanisms specified in this document to counter
brute-force attempts on the authorizer code (Section 9.5),
customer impersonation and phishing (Section 9.2), On-Path (MITM)
and Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) alteration of the transaction
(Section 9.3), and replay (Section 9.4).
7. _Key Protection:_ All cryptographic keys MUST be protected
against unauthorized extraction at rest and in use; the keys that
e-Bank handles in memory are protected as described in
Section 9.7. The key k on MD MUST be stored in the protected
storage of the mobile application of the financial institution,
and MUST NOT be exported, copied, or included in backups. The
mobile application MUST be protected by a local password that the
user enters to open it, so that the key k cannot be used by
someone who only has physical access to an MD that is switched
on.
8. _Cryptographic Strength:_ Implementations MUST utilize symmetric
encryption with keys of at least 256 bits (AES-256) [FIPS197] and
message authentication based on HMAC-SHA-256 [RFC2104] [RFC6234].
9. _Modular Architecture:_ The system SHOULD be built with a modular
cryptographic architecture so that security updates and algorithm
migrations can be applied without interrupting service
availability.
3.3. Foundational Design Hypotheses
The DAP security model is built upon three foundational hypotheses
regarding real-world Internet banking environments:
Hypothesis 1: The personal computer (UC) where the transaction is
initiated and executed can be fully compromised by malicious code.
Hypothesis 2: It is infeasible to guarantee the integrity of the
client application (e.g., web browser or plugins) running on UC.
Hypothesis 3: It is difficult to protect the human customer from
social engineering; therefore, security mechanisms need to
minimize reliance on user-memorized secrets and require explicit
per-transaction visual confirmation on an uncompromised device.
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4. Cryptographic Primitives and Message Format
4.1. Primary Root Key and Ephemeral Server-Side Key Recovery
Storing millions of complete static per-user symmetric keys in a
standard application database introduces significant operational
risk. In the DAP architecture, the financial institution's HSM holds
a set of high-entropy primary root keys MK_1 through MK_n, where each
MK is generated inside the HSM with a cryptographically secure random
number generator. For each customer, e-Bank stores only the random
key share k_1; the complete key k is never stored by e-Bank.
For each enrolled customer, the HSM generates the 512-bit key share
k_2 in {0,1}^512 deterministically as:
k_2 <- F_MK(ID | key_timestamp)
where F is HMAC-SHA-512 [RFC2104] [RFC6234] implemented inside the
HSM and keyed with the 512-bit root key MK (the key MK_i identified
by key_id), so that the output has 512 bits. In other words, k_2 is
a 512-bit keyed hash of the data that identify the customer and of
the instant at which k_2 is generated; the HSM applies the HMAC
directly to these data, and there is no separate encryption step.
The instant is stored as key_timestamp in the internal database of
the financial institution. The function input x is the following
octet string, in which all integers are unsigned and in network byte
order (big-endian):
x = label | key_id | key_version | len(ID) | ID | key_timestamp
* label: the 9 ASCII octets "DAP-k2-v1", which provide domain
separation for this derivation. It is not the DAP protocol
version carried in the Version field of a challenge.
* key_id: a 4-octet identifier of the root key MK_i held in the HSM
that is used for this customer. It enables root key rotation.
* key_version: a 4-octet key version counter, starting at 1 and
incremented each time the customer key is provisioned again (for
example, after a suspected compromise of a provisioning session).
* len(ID): a 2-octet length, in octets, of ID.
* ID: the unique identifier of the customer, not of an account, for
example the national taxpayer registry number or an internal
unique customer identifier, encoded in UTF-8 [RFC3629]. A
customer with several accounts has a single ID and a single key k.
The ID is kept on the server and is never carried in a challenge.
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* key_timestamp: an 8-octet value with the server-assigned
enrollment time (not to be confused with the generation timestamp
of a transaction challenge), in seconds since
1970-01-01T00:00:00Z.
The values key_id, key_version, ID, and key_timestamp are kept in the
customer record together with k_1. In the remainder of this
document, F_MK(ID | key_timestamp) denotes the computation of F over
the complete input x. The customer key is then k = k_1 XOR k_2.
Because k_2 can be recalculated on demand inside the HSM from the
customer data and key_timestamp, the HSM is used only to compute k_2.
For each challenge, e-Bank requests k_2 from the HSM, combines it
with the stored share k_1 to obtain k = k_1 XOR k_2, partitions k
into k'_1 and k'_2, performs the other cryptographic operations of
the protocol itself, and immediately discards k_2 and k from working
memory. e-Bank MUST NOT permanently store k or k_2 in cleartext. The
root key MK never leaves the HSM, and the HSM never receives k_1.
The stored share k_1 alone reveals nothing useful about k. Because
k_2 and k are handled in the working memory of e-Bank, the HSM
protects MK but not the key k of a customer whose challenge is being
processed: a compromise of the e-Bank process at that moment exposes
that key.
The only persistent copy of k is in the protected storage of the
mobile application of the customer (Section 3.2). The share k_2 is
the output of a keyed function whose key MK never leaves the HSM, and
e-Bank keeps only k_1 and the data needed to request k_2. An
adversary who obtains the customer database, its backups, or its logs
therefore cannot compute k: it also needs the HSM to compute k_2 for
that customer. This does not hold against an adversary who can send
requests to the HSM, for example by controlling the e-Bank process.
For this reason e-Bank SHOULD restrict, rate-limit, and audit the
requests for k_2 (see Section 9.7).
4.2. Customer Key Partitioning
The 512-bit key k in {0,1}^512 is partitioned into two independent
256-bit (32-octet) subkeys, k'_1 and k'_2, as follows:
* k'_1 in {0,1}^256 (32 octets): Used exclusively with HMAC-SHA-256
to guarantee message integrity and authenticity.
* k'_2 in {0,1}^256 (32 octets): Used exclusively with AES-256 in
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode [FIPS197] [SP800-38A] to protect
the confidentiality of the authorizer code r. The integrity of r'
is provided by the HMAC tag y.
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4.3. Transaction Challenge Message Layout
A DAP challenge is the octet string trans_data | r' | y, laid out as
shown in Figure 2. The field trans_data carries the transaction in
cleartext, as described in Section 4.3.1.
The fields r' and y have fixed lengths of 32 octets each, so
trans_data comprises all octets of the challenge except the last 64.
The challenge is encoded in Base64 [RFC4648], using the standard
alphabet with padding, and the resulting text is the content of the
QR code [ISO18004].
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
+ Transaction Data (trans_data), variable length +
| (Nonce; Version; Code; Field_1; ...; Field_n) |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Protected Authorizer Code (r'), 32 octets |
+ IV (128 bits) | C (128 bits, one AES-256-CBC block) +
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
+ Authentication Tag (y), 256 bits / 32 octets +
| y = HMAC-SHA-256_{k'_1}(trans_data | r') |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Fields are concatenated in the order shown, and the resulting octet
string is Base64-encoded before QR code generation. The fields
are not aligned to 32-bit words.
Figure 2: Challenge Payload Encoded in Visual QR Code
4.3.1. Transaction Data Encoding
The field trans_data is a text string made of fields separated by the
character ";" (0x3B). It uses only printable US-ASCII characters
(0x20 to 0x7E), which are a subset of UTF-8 [RFC3629]. Accented
letters and other non-ASCII characters are not accepted:
trans_data = Nonce ; Version ; Code ; Field_1 ; ... ; Field_n
* Nonce: the unique transaction identifier assigned by e-Bank, a
random text of 20 characters taken from the uppercase letters "A"
to "Z" and the digits "0" to "9". It is generated with a
cryptographically secure random number generator [RFC4086], and
e-Bank MUST ensure that it is unique (Section 6.1.1).
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* Version: the version of DAP used to build the challenge, 3 octets
long. The current version is "099". MD MUST reject a challenge
whose version it does not support.
* Code: the transaction code, 3 octets long (for example, "818"),
which selects the template. The code "001" is reserved for the
key exchange (Section 5.2). The code "000" is reserved for the
activation challenge (Section 5.1).
* Field_1 to Field_n: the field values, in the order defined by the
template. Their lengths are not fixed, but each template defines
a type (numeric or alphanumeric) and a maximum length for each
field. Numeric fields contain only digits. Alphanumeric fields
contain only uppercase letters "A" to "Z", digits, the space, and
the punctuation characters that the template permits. The
timestamp has 12 digits, in the format YYMMDDHHMMSS (two-digit
year, month, day, hour, minute, and second), expressed in
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The monetary amount is
expressed as digits only, without decimal separator; the template
defines the currency (for example, BRL) and the number of decimal
places. The data type of each field in the template
(Section 4.3.2) defines the formatting shown to the user.
The character ";" MUST NOT appear inside any field value. e-Bank MUST
convert names to uppercase ASCII before building trans_data. MD MUST
reject a challenge that contains a character outside the permitted
set (including control characters and non-ASCII octets) or a field
that does not match the type and the maximum length defined by the
template.
A template defines, for one transaction code, the ordered list of
fields and the mask that the DAP application on MD uses to present
them. A template lists only the fields that the user needs to see to
confirm the operation; other data of the transaction stay in e-Bank.
Credentials such as account passwords or PINs MUST NOT be part of any
template or of trans_data. Table 2 shows two examples, inspired by
the transaction layouts used by Brazilian banks. The set of codes,
the set of operations that require DAP, and the complete list of
templates are defined by each financial institution.
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+======+============+=======================================+
| Code | Operation | Fields, in order |
+======+============+=======================================+
| 818 | Transfer | Destination branch (5 digits), |
| | between | destination account (12 digits), |
| | current | check digit (1), beneficiary name (up |
| | accounts | to 30 characters), amount (13 digits, |
| | | 2 decimal places, BRL), timestamp |
+------+------------+---------------------------------------+
| 867 | Payment of | Beneficiary bank (3 digits), bar code |
| | a bank | (48 digits), document value, |
| | collection | discount, rebate, increase, fine, and |
| | slip | amount charged (13 digits each, 2 |
| | | decimal places, BRL), timestamp |
+------+------------+---------------------------------------+
Table 2: Examples of Transaction Templates
In both templates the date and the time shown to the user are derived
from the timestamp. Illustrative trans_data values for the code
"818", which transfers 1,500.00 to the account 000000123456-7 of
branch 01234, are:
7QK2M9XW4HD1R8TZ5PB3;099;818;01234;000000123456;7;MARIA SILVA;
0000000150000;261102133000
(The value is split over two lines in this document for presentation
only; in a real challenge it is a single string.) The timestamp
field carries the exact instant at which e-Bank generated the
transaction challenge. Every template of a code that is carried in a
challenge (all codes except "001") MUST include this field and
identify it as the generation timestamp, because MD uses it to check
the validity of the challenge (see Section 6.1.2). The templates are
embedded in the DAP application as an XML file [XML] (Section 4.3.2)
and are selected by the transaction code and by the Version. The
application updates this file each time it is opened and the user is
authenticated. The XML file is digitally signed by the financial
institution as a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) SignedData
structure [RFC5652] (the successor of PKCS #7), using its private
key. The application verifies the signature before using the file,
using the corresponding X.509 public certificate [RFC5280] embedded
in the application.
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4.3.2. Template File Format
The template file is an XML document [XML] whose root element is
templates. It contains one template element for each transaction
code. A template element has the attributes code (the transaction
code) and version (the DAP version to which the template belongs,
with the same value and the same 3-octet format as the Version field
of trans_data; MD MUST use the template whose version equals the
Version of the challenge), and the following child elements:
* name: the name of the operation.
* field, one or more: a field of trans_data. The order of the field
elements is the order of the fields in trans_data after Code. The
attributes are id (identifier used by the mask), label (the text
shown to the user), type ("N" for numeric or "A" for
alphanumeric), max (the maximum length), and datatype, which
defines how MD formats the value for display: "text" (shown as
received; the default for type "A"), "digits" (shown as received;
the default for type "N"), "amount" (the last decimals digits are
the decimal places, the leading zeros of the integer part are
removed, the thousands and decimal separators follow the language
of the user, and the code in currency is shown; a field of this
data type has the attributes currency and decimals), "datetime"
(twelve digits in the format YYMMDDHHMMSS, in UTC, shown as a date
and a time in the format of the language of the user and in the
time zone of the device), and "barcode" (digits shown in groups of
the size given by the attribute group, 12 by default). In a
template of a code that is carried in a challenge, exactly one
field has the attribute role="timestamp", which identifies the
generation timestamp and has the data type "datetime".
* mask: the text that MD shows to the user, where {id} is replaced
by the value of the field with that identifier, formatted
according to its data type.
All transaction codes have a template in the file, including "000"
and "001". The template of "000" has the generation timestamp and
the activation message. The template of "001" has only the name and
the mask text that MD shows while it captures a key share; it has no
field elements and no timestamp, because the QR codes of Section 5.2
are not challenges.
The labels and the mask are used only for display and can be written
in the language of the user; the file is encoded in UTF-8. The
values in trans_data are always restricted to US-ASCII
(Section 4.3.1). A template contains only the data needed for the
display and the validation of the fields. Fields that e-Bank needs
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only for its own processing, and credentials such as passwords, MUST
NOT be part of a template. As an example, the template of the code
"818" of Table 2 is:
Transfer between current accounts
Branch {branch}, account {account}-{digit}
Beneficiary: {payee}
Amount: {amount}
Date and time: {time}
5. Key Provisioning
DAP establishes the shared security context between e-Bank and MD
through a dual-channel split-key exchange based on XOR-based two-
share splitting of the key, followed by an activation challenge. The
perfect secrecy of a single share follows from the one-time pad
argument [Shannon1949].
The core challenge is provisioning the 512-bit key k to the
customer's MD when the primary Internet channel (UC) is assumed to be
monitored or controlled by an adversary. DAP solves this by defining
k as the XOR of two 512-bit shares, k_1 and k_2, transmitted over two
separated channels so that k is never transmitted in full over any
communication channel:
1. The server generates a random 512-bit string k_1 with uniform
distribution in {0,1}^512 and stores it for the customer.
2. The HSM computes the share k_2 <- F_MK(ID | key_timestamp),
whenever it is needed, in {0,1}^512.
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3. The customer key is k = k_1 XOR k_2, where |k_2| = |k_1| = |k| =
512 bits. The value k is not stored.
Because k_1 is uniformly distributed in {0,1}^512, an adversary who
observes k_2 alone (for example, on the ATM screen) gains no
information about k, as in a one-time pad: for every value x in
{0,1}^512,
Pr[k = x | k_2 = s] = Pr[k_1 = x XOR s] = 1 / (2^512)
An adversary who observes k_1 alone (for example, on the untrusted
computer UC) gains no computational advantage in learning k, because
k_2 is the output of a pseudorandom function keyed with MK inside the
HSM. The secrecy of k therefore holds as long as the adversary
obtains at most one of the two shares.
This argument rests on two assumptions. First, F is a pseudorandom
function: without knowledge of MK, its outputs on distinct inputs x
are computationally indistinguishable from independent uniform
512-bit strings. Second, MK never leaves the HSM. If either
assumption fails, an adversary who learns k_1 alone may be able to
learn information about k.
5.1. Provisioning and Activation Procedure
The provisioning procedure consists of five operational steps across
three phases:
Step 1 (Service Request and App Installation): The customer
authenticates to e-Bank over the Internet channel using UC,
requests enrollment of their mobile device as a second-factor
authorizer, and installs the DAP application on MD.
Step 2 (Generation and Delivery of k_1): The e-Bank server generates
and stores the random share k_1, and assigns key_id, key_version,
and key_timestamp to the enrollment. The share k_2 is not
computed yet: the HSM computes it when it is needed (Step 4). The
e-Bank server returns k_1 to UC, which displays k_1 as a visual QR
code on the computer screen (format in Section 5.2).
Step 3 (Mobile Capture of k_1): Using the DAP application on MD, the
customer captures the visual QR code containing k_1 from UC and
stores k_1 temporarily in MD. The customer is then instructed to
complete the provisioning at an ATM terminal.
Step 4 (Out-of-Band Capture of k_2 and Key Reconstruction): The
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customer authenticates physically at a bank ATM using their bank
smartcard and Personal Identification Number (PIN). Upon
verification, e-Bank requests k_2 from the HSM and the ATM
displays the second key share k_2 as a visual QR code on the ATM
screen. The customer captures k_2 using MD. The MD application
computes k = k_1 XOR k_2, partitions k into k'_1 and k'_2,
securely stores k in the protected storage of the mobile
application of the financial institution, and immediately zeroizes
(deletes) both k_1 and k_2.
Step 5 (Activation): Right after MD receives k_2 and computes k,
e-Bank generates an activation challenge with the transaction code
"000" and shows it as a QR code on the ATM screen. This challenge
has the format of Section 4.3 and is verified by MD as in
Section 6.1.2. Its template has no financial fields: it has only
the generation timestamp and an activation message. The user
confirms the activation on MD, which displays the authorizer code
r_hat, and the user enters r_hat at the ATM. If r_hat is correct
and is received within the 120-second window (with at most three
attempts), e-Bank marks MD as enabled. DAP is activated for the
customer only after this verification: before it, e-Bank MUST NOT
treat MD as a valid authorizer. If the code is not correct, or
the window expires, the activation fails and the customer repeats
the procedure. e-Bank SHOULD discard enrollments that are not
activated after a period defined by the financial institution. A
successful activation shows that e-Bank and MD hold the same key
k, so a share that was altered during the provisioning is
detected.
Figure 3 illustrates the end-to-end interaction between the Customer,
UC, ATM, e-Bank, and HSM during symmetric key generation,
provisioning, and activation.
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Customer/MD UC e-Bank/HSM ATM
| | | |
--- Phase 1: Internet channel (Steps 1 to 3 of Section 5.1) ---
|-- 1. Enroll ---->| | |
| |-- 2. Enroll ------->| |
| | | |
[3. e-Bank: random k_1, stored;
key_id, key_version, key_timestamp]
| | | |
| |<- 4. QR k_1/001 ----| |
|<= 5. Scan =======| | |
[6. MD: store k_1]
| | | |
--- Phase 2: ATM channel (Step 4 of Section 5.1) ---
|-- 7. Smartcard + PIN ------------------------------------->|
| | |<- 8. Get k_2 -----|
[HSM: k_2 = F_MK(ID | key_timestamp)]
| | |-- 9. QR k_2/001 ->|
|<= 10. Scan (optical, no network) ==========================|
| | | |
[11. MD: k = k_1 XOR k_2; (k'_1, k'_2) = k;
store k; zeroize k_1 and k_2]
| | | |
--- Phase 3: Activation (Step 5 of Section 5.1) ---
[12. e-Bank: activation
challenge, code 000]
| | |-- 13. QR(000) --->|
|<= 14. Scan (optical) ======================================|
[15. MD: verify y, Version, Code 000, timestamp;
user confirms; MD shows r_hat]
|-- 16. Enter r_hat at ATM --------------------------------->|
| | |<- 17. r_hat ------|
[18. e-Bank: within 120 s? r_hat = r?
(at most 3 attempts); if yes,
MD is enabled]
| | |-- 19. Enabled --->|
|<- 20. Activated -------------------------------------------|
Figure 3: Symmetric Key Generation and Dual-Channel Exchange (k_1
and k_2)
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5.2. Key Exchange QR Code Format (Code 001)
The QR codes that carry k_1 (Step 2) and k_2 (Step 4) use the
transaction code "001". They are not challenges in the sense of
Section 4.3: MD does not yet hold a key, so the QR codes carry no tag
y and no encrypted authorizer code. The content of each QR code is a
US-ASCII text string, used directly without Base64 encoding of the
whole string, with fields separated by ";" (0x3B):
key_share = Version ; Code ; Share ; Enroll ; Value ; Check
* Version: 3 octets, as in Section 4.3.1 (currently "099").
* Code: 3 octets, the value "001".
* Share: 1 octet, "1" for k_1 (displayed on UC) or "2" for k_2
(displayed on the ATM).
* Enroll: an enrollment identifier of 20 characters, generated by
e-Bank in the same way as the Nonce (Section 4.3.1). Both shares
of one enrollment carry the same value. It is not secret and is
not derived from ID.
* Value: the 512-bit share (64 octets) encoded in Base64 [RFC4648]
with padding (88 characters).
* Check: 8 uppercase hexadecimal digits, the first four octets of
the SHA-256 hash of the text that precedes the last ";" (from
Version to Value, inclusive). It detects reading and
transcription errors only and gives no protection against an
adversary.
For example (with an invented value, split over two lines for
presentation only):
099;001;1;7QK2M9XW4HD1R8TZ5PB3;<88 Base64 characters>;<8 hex digits>
MD accepts the two QR codes in any order. For each one, MD MUST
check that the text has exactly the six fields above, that Version is
supported, that Code is "001", that Value decodes to exactly 64
octets, and that Check is correct. MD MUST compute k = k_1 XOR k_2
only when it holds one QR code with Share "1" and one with Share "2"
that have the same Enroll; otherwise it MUST reject the second QR
code. The stored share SHOULD be discarded if the second share is
not captured within a period defined by the financial institution.
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Since the QR codes are not authenticated, a share that is substituted
or altered on the way is not detected by MD at this point. It is
detected by the activation (Step 5), because MD and e-Bank would hold
different keys and the activation challenge would fail. e-Bank MUST
make each share QR code valid for a single display, SHOULD expire it
after a short period defined by the financial institution, and MUST
NOT display k_2 for an enrollment that was not started by the
customer through the Internet channel.
6. Dynamic Authorization Protocol (DAP) Transaction Flow
Once the customer's Trusted Mobile Device (MD) has been provisioned
with key k = (k'_1, k'_2) and activated (Section 5.1), every
financial transaction initiated on an Untrusted Computer (UC) MUST
execute the DAP challenge-response authorization flow shown in
Figure 4. In the figure, challenge denotes the message (trans_data,
r', y) encoded in the QR code (Figure 2). Steps 1 to 3 are the usual
authentication of the customer at e-Bank. Steps 4 to 7 are described
in Section 6.1.1, steps 8 to 12 in Section 6.1.2, and steps 13 to 20
in Section 6.1.3. The optical channel, shown with "=", needs no
network connection.
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MD Customer UC e-Bank
| | | |
| |-- 1. Login ----->| |
| | |-- 2. Auth --------->|
| | |<- 3. Auth OK -------|
| |-- 4. Issue Tx -->| |
| | |-- 5. Tx request --->|
| | | |
[6. e-Bank: build trans_data (Nonce,
Version, timestamp); k_2 from HSM, then
k = k_1 XOR k_2; new r; r' = IV |
CBC-Enc_k'2(r); y = HMAC_k'1(trans_data |
r'); start the 120 s timer]
| | | |
| | |<- 7. QR(challenge) -|
| |<- 8. Display QR -| |
|<- 9. Open+pwd --| | |
|<= 10. Scan QR (optical) ===========| |
| | | |
[11. MD: y' = HMAC_k'1(trans_data | r');
reject if y' != y; check Version, Code,
template; discard if now - timestamp > 120 s
or timestamp > now + 60 s; else show Tx]
| | | |
|-- 12. Show Tx ->| | |
|<- 13. Confirm --| | |
[14. MD: r_hat = CBC-Dec_k'2(r')]
|-- 15. r_hat --->| | |
| |-- 16. r_hat ---->| |
| | |-- 17. r_hat ------->|
| | | |
[18. e-Bank: within 120 s? r_hat = r?
(at most 3 attempts); if yes, execute
the Tx and invalidate r]
| | | |
| | |<- 19. Tx OK --------|
| |<- 20. Receipt ---| |
Figure 4: End-to-End Transaction Authorization Sequence
6.1. Detailed Protocol Processing Steps
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6.1.1. Server Challenge Generation
When an authenticated customer submits a transaction request from UC,
the e-Bank server builds the message m (trans_data) from the fields
of the request that the template of the transaction code requires.
The Nonce, the Version, and the generation timestamp are always
assigned by e-Bank; a value for any of them that is sent by UC MUST
be ignored. The server then proceeds as follows:
1. The e-Bank server requests the share k_2 from the HSM, computes
the customer's 512-bit key k = k_1 XOR k_2, partitions it into
k'_1 and k'_2, records the current time as the generation
timestamp of the challenge, and starts a strict 120-second
transaction validity timer. The generation timestamp MUST be the
value carried in the timestamp field of trans_data.
2. The server assigns a unique transaction identifier Nonce (20
random characters, see Section 4.3.1), checks that it differs
from the Nonce of every pending or recent challenge (generating a
new one in the event of a collision), and sets the Version field
(3 octets) to the DAP version in use. Both are carried inside
trans_data. The server generates a pseudorandom authorizer code
r uniformly distributed in the integer sample space 0 <= r <=
999999 using a cryptographically secure random number generator
[RFC4086] and rejection sampling (to avoid modulo bias), encoded
as six ASCII decimal digits with leading zeros (6 octets). The
server keeps r for the pending challenge until the challenge is
accepted, invalidated, or expired (at most 120 seconds), and then
deletes it.
3. The server generates a fresh 128-bit IV from a cryptographically
secure random number generator, pads r (six ASCII digits) to one
16-octet block using the PKCS#7 padding scheme [RFC5652], and
encrypts the block using AES-256 in CBC mode [SP800-38A] with
subkey k'_2: C = CBC-Enc_{k'_2}(IV, r). The server then sets r'
= IV | C. The server MUST NOT reuse an IV with the same key
k'_2.
4. The server computes the message authentication tag y over the
concatenation of the transaction details trans_data (which
include the Nonce) and the encrypted authorizer code r' using
HMAC-SHA-256 with subkey k'_1: y = HMAC-SHA-
256_{k'_1}(trans_data | r').
5. The server forms the challenge trans_data | r' | y, encodes it in
Base64 [RFC4648], renders the text as a two-dimensional QR code
image [ISO18004], and transmits it to UC for display on the
customer's screen.
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6.1.2. Out-of-Band Visual Capture and Mobile Verification
Upon seeing the QR code challenge on UC, the customer activates the
DAP application on MD and captures the visual code using the device's
camera:
1. MD decodes the QR code and the Base64 text, and splits the
resulting octet string into y (the last 32 octets), r' (the
preceding 32 octets), and trans_data (all remaining octets). If
the text is not valid Base64, or the decoded string has fewer
than 64 octets plus the minimum trans_data (Nonce, Version, Code,
and their separators), MD MUST reject the challenge before
computing the tag.
2. Using its locally stored authentication subkey k'_1, MD
independently computes: y' = HMAC-SHA-256_{k'_1}(trans_data |
r').
3. MD compares y' with the received tag y in constant time. If y'
!= y, MD MUST immediately reject the challenge, display an
integrity/authenticity error alert to the user, and terminate
without decrypting r'.
4. If y' equals y, the challenge is proven to be authentic and
unmodified since leaving e-Bank. MD parses trans_data into its
fields, checks that the Version is supported, looks up the
template selected by the transaction code and by the Version, and
checks that the code is known, that the number of fields matches
the template, and that every field has the type, the maximum
length, and the character set defined by the template. If any
check fails, MD MUST reject the challenge.
5. MD reads the generation timestamp from the timestamp field of
trans_data and compares it, in UTC, with the current time of its
own clock. If more than 120 seconds have elapsed since the
generation timestamp, MD MUST discard the challenge, MUST NOT
display the transaction or decrypt r', and MUST inform the user
that the challenge has expired and that a new transaction must be
initiated. If the generation timestamp is later than the current
time of MD by more than 60 seconds (the tolerance for the
variation of the clocks of mobile phones, which are not always
synchronized with a reliable time source), MD MUST also discard
the challenge and ask the user to check the date and time of the
device. This check is complementary: e-Bank remains the
authority on the lifespan of the challenge and enforces the
120-second limit independently (see Section 6.1.3 and
Section 9.4).
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6. If the challenge is still valid, MD applies the template mask to
display the transaction on its trusted screen (for example,
source and destination accounts and names, amount, and date) and
prompts the user with explicit Confirm and Cancel controls.
6.1.3. Authorizer Code Recovery and Transaction Execution
1. The user visually compares the transaction details displayed on
MD against the intended operation (WYSIWYS). If the details do
not match what the user intended, the user selects Cancel, and MD
discards the challenge. Because MD does not communicate with
e-Bank, the pending transaction expires at e-Bank after at most
120 seconds, unless the user cancels it on UC.
2. If the user selects Confirm, MD decrypts the authorizer code by
parsing r' = IV | C and decrypting it with AES-256 in CBC mode
and subkey k'_2: r_hat = CBC-Dec_{k'_2}(IV, C). If the padding
is invalid or the result is not six ASCII decimal digits, MD MUST
reject the challenge and MUST NOT display any code. Otherwise,
MD displays the 6-digit authorizer code r_hat (e.g., 431287) on
the mobile screen.
3. The user types the 6-digit code r_hat into the web interface on
UC, which transmits r_hat to e-Bank.
4. e-Bank checks whether the 120-second validity window has expired.
If the timer has expired, the transaction MUST be cancelled.
Otherwise, e-Bank verifies whether r_hat equals r for that
specific pending transaction m, using a constant-time comparison.
If and only if they match, e-Bank commits and executes the
transaction and invalidates r immediately so it cannot be reused.
If they do not match, e-Bank counts a failed attempt and SHOULD
allow at most three attempts for the same challenge within the
120-second window. After the third failed attempt, e-Bank SHOULD
invalidate the challenge and cancel the transaction (see
Section 9.5).
7. Key Lifecycle and Device Management
This section describes how e-Bank handles the loss or replacement of
MD, the revocation of the DAP enrollment of a customer, and the
rotation of root keys.
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7.1. Loss, Replacement, and Revocation
If the customer loses MD, has it stolen, or stops using the DAP
application, the customer revokes the enrollment at an ATM,
authenticating with the bank smartcard and the PIN, or at a branch of
the financial institution. After the revocation, e-Bank:
* MUST delete the stored share k_1 of the customer, which makes k
unrecoverable on the server;
* MUST stop generating DAP challenges for the customer, and MUST
reject any authorizer code related to a pending challenge of the
customer; and
* SHOULD record the revocation and notify the customer through a
channel registered by the customer.
There is no alternative way to authorize a transaction when MD is
lost: the recovery of the service is possible only at an ATM or at a
branch. A recovery procedure MUST NOT weaken DAP; in particular,
e-Bank MUST NOT offer a fallback authentication channel (such as SMS
or a static code) for an operation that requires DAP, because it
would allow an attacker to downgrade the protocol.
A customer who replaces MD enrolls the new device with the
provisioning and activation procedure of Section 5. The new
enrollment MUST generate a new k_1 and a new key_timestamp, and MUST
increment the key_version counter of the key, so that the key of the
previous device is no longer valid. The key k is stored in the
protected storage of the mobile application of the financial
institution and is not exportable (see the Key Protection premise in
Section 3.2), so it cannot be moved to another device: a new device
always needs a new enrollment and a new activation.
7.2. Root Key Rotation
The root key MK_i is identified by key_id. Because k_2 is derived
from MK_i, a change of the root key of a customer changes k, and the
customer has to be re-provisioned. For this reason, e-Bank SHOULD
keep each MK_i in the HSM while at least one active customer record
refers to its key_id, and SHOULD use a new key_id for new enrollments
after a rotation. If an MK_i is suspected to be compromised, e-Bank
MUST revoke all enrollments that use it and re-provision the affected
customers.
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8. Operational Considerations
The following points concern the deployment of DAP:
* _QR code size._ The size of the QR code grows with the length of
trans_data and with the Base64 encoding [RFC4648] of the
challenge. Templates SHOULD limit the number and the length of
the fields, so that the code stays readable on common screens and
cameras [ISO18004].
* _Clock of MD._ The check of the generation timestamp
(Section 6.1.2) depends on the clock of MD. The clocks of mobile
phones vary (for example, manual settings or drift), so MD
tolerates a generation timestamp that is ahead of its own clock by
up to 60 seconds. The DAP application SHOULD tell the user to
check the date and time of the device when it discards a challenge
for this reason.
* _Availability of the HSM._ The HSM recomputes k_2 for each
challenge (including the activation challenge), so its capacity
and availability limit the number of transactions that e-Bank can
authorize.
* _Templates._ The signed template file is updated when the
application is opened and the user is authenticated
(Section 4.3.2). A challenge whose transaction code is not in the
installed file is rejected, so a new transaction code needs to be
distributed before e-Bank starts to use it. The codes "000"
(activation) and "001" (key exchange) are reserved and are present
in every installed file.
* _Operations that require DAP._ The financial institution defines
which operations require DAP, for example transfers, payment of
bank collection slips, and changes to registration data.
Operations of low risk can be left out.
* _Monitoring._ e-Bank SHOULD monitor expired challenges, failed
attempts, and revocations per customer (Section 9.5), because an
unusual number of them may indicate an attack in progress.
9. Security Considerations
9.1. Formal Adversary Model
The security of DAP is evaluated against an active adversary, in the
spirit of [Bellare1994], capable of interacting with the three system
environments under the following assumptions. DAP has not been
analyzed in the model of that reference.
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* _Full Control of Untrusted Computer (UC):_ The adversary has
complete control over the customer's personal computer via malware
or trojans. The adversary can read, modify, inject, suppress, or
delay any message exchanged over the Internet channel between UC
and e-Bank, and can capture all keystrokes and screen contents on
UC.
* _Limited Observation of ATM Terminal:_ The adversary can observe
information entered via the ATM keypad (e.g., via cameras or
skimmers) during physical interactions, but is assumed not to have
internal logical control over the ATM hardware or its dedicated
bank network link, nor physical possession of the customer's
smartcard. The adversary is also assumed not to observe the ATM
screen while the key share k_2 is displayed; see the key share
independence assumption below.
* _Isolation of Trusted Mobile Device (MD):_ The adversary does not
control the customer's MD and cannot extract or modify the
cryptographic key k = (k'_1, k'_2) stored in the mobile
application's protected storage.
Note that if an adversary compromises the ATM itself while also
capturing the customer's smartcard and PIN, the adversary could
already execute arbitrary transactions directly at the ATM
independently of Internet banking. Similarly, if the adversary gains
full root control over MD and extracts k, the second-factor
assumption is violated. A compromise of the e-Bank servers is
outside this adversary model; Section 9.7 describes the exposure and
the controls that reduce it.
_Key share independence assumption:_ The secrecy of k in the key
provisioning procedure (Section 5) holds only if the adversary
obtains at most one of the two shares k_1 and k_2. Because an
adversary controlling UC learns k_1 by definition, an adversary that
also captures the ATM screen at the time k_2 is displayed (for
example, with a hidden camera) can compute k = k_1 XOR k_2 and would
defeat the scheme. Deployments therefore need to treat the ATM
display of k_2 as sensitive:
* The ATM SHOULD display the QR code of k_2 only after successful
smartcard and PIN verification, only once per provisioning
session, and for a short time, and it SHOULD use a privacy-
shielded display.
* If a provisioning session is suspected of having been observed,
the financial institution SHOULD invalidate the key k and repeat
provisioning.
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9.2. Resistance to Customer Impersonation Attacks
In a classic Customer Impersonation Attack (via phishing, pharming,
or credential-stealing trojans), the adversary captures the static
credentials of the customer (account identifiers, static
authentication secrets, and a device or hardware fingerprint). Even
when an adversary successfully harvests these credentials and clones
the device fingerprint to establish a fraudulent session with e-Bank,
the adversary is not able to authorize any transaction under the
adversary model of Section 9.1, because:
1. Every transaction generates a fresh challenge encrypted under
k'_2 and authenticated under k'_1.
2. The key k is never stored on UC and is unknown to the customer
(preventing phishing of k).
3. Without k'_2, the authorizer code r cannot be recovered from r',
so the adversary can only guess it. The probability of a correct
guess is 10^-6 per attempt and, when e-Bank applies the limit of
three attempts per challenge within the 120-second window, at
most 3 x 10^-6 per challenge (see Section 9.5).
4. Only the holder of k'_1 can produce a valid tag y, so a phishing
site cannot create a challenge that MD accepts.
9.3. Resistance to Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) Attacks
In a Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) attack, malware residing on UC waits
for the legitimate customer to log in and either (a) silently
initiates background transactions using the customer's active session
or (b) substitutes the beneficiary account and amount of a customer-
initiated transaction while displaying the original legitimate
details on the UC browser screen (an "unverified signature" attack).
Under the adversary model of Section 9.1, DAP is designed to prevent
both attack variants:
* If the malware attempts to modify trans_data inside the QR code on
UC so that the mobile screen shows the legitimate beneficiary
while e-Bank executes the fraudulent transaction, the HMAC-SHA-256
verification y' = HMAC_{k'_1}(trans_data | r') on MD will fail
because the adversary does not possess k'_1.
* If the malware passes the unmodified fraudulent challenge QR code
from e-Bank to the screen of UC, MD will verify the HMAC and
display the _actual_ (fraudulent) beneficiary account and amount
on the trusted mobile screen. By inspecting MD's screen
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(WYSIWYS), the customer immediately detects that the transaction
parameters do not match their intent and cancels the
authorization.
* Even if the adversary intercepts the 6-digit response r_hat
entered by the customer on UC for a legitimate transaction m_1,
the adversary cannot reuse r_hat to authorize a different
transaction m_2, because r is generated for a single challenge and
is bound on the server to m_1 and to its Nonce.
9.4. Replay Protection and Challenge Expiration
Each challenge incorporates a fresh Nonce (inside trans_data),
transaction parameters trans_data, and a single-use random code r
with a strict server-enforced lifespan of at most 120 seconds. Once
an authorizer code r is verified or its 120-second timer expires or
the attempt limit is reached, the server immediately invalidates the
challenge context, preventing replay attacks.
The generation timestamp is inside trans_data and is therefore
covered by the HMAC under k'_1: an attacker cannot refresh an old
challenge by changing its timestamp without knowing k'_1. A QR code
that was photographed, captured, or retained and presented to MD more
than 120 seconds after its generation is discarded by MD before the
transaction is shown and before the authorizer code is revealed.
This reduces the opportunity for social-engineering attacks that
persuade the user to scan an old QR code. The check on MD depends on
the device clock, which is not trusted by the protocol, and it does
not include the time the user needs to review the data and type the
code. For these reasons it is complementary, and the server-side
120-second limit remains mandatory. A device with a wrong clock may
reject valid challenges, in which case MD asks the user to check the
date and time of the device.
MD does not communicate with e-Bank, so it cannot know whether a
challenge has already been used. Within the 120-second lifespan, the
same QR code can therefore be scanned and its authorizer code
displayed more than once. This does not weaken the protocol, because
e-Bank accepts the code of a challenge only once and invalidates it
afterwards (Section 6.1.3). To make a repeated presentation visible
to the user, MD SHOULD keep the Nonce of each challenge whose
authorizer code it has displayed for at least 120 seconds, and SHOULD
warn the user when it receives a challenge with the same Nonce again.
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9.5. Limits on Authorizer Code Attempts
The authorizer code r has only 10^6 possible values (000000 to
999999). An adversary that controls UC can submit candidate codes
automatically, and can do so for a transaction that the adversary
itself initiated in a fraudulent session, without any action of the
customer. With N attempts for one challenge, the probability of
success is N / 10^6, so the number of attempts needs to be bounded.
To keep this probability low, e-Bank SHOULD:
* accept at most three attempts to submit the code for a challenge
within its 120-second lifespan, and invalidate the challenge and
cancel the transaction after the third failed attempt;
* limit the number of pending transactions per customer, and limit
the number of failed or cancelled challenges per customer in a
time window, taking a further action (such as a temporary block of
financial transactions, a new customer authentication, or an alert
to the customer) when the limit is reached; and
* compare the submitted code with r in constant time.
The cumulative limit per customer is a recommendation of this
document and no value is specified; a deployment may also choose not
to block the customer after failed or cancelled challenges, and to
rely on monitoring instead. The specific limits are a policy of the
financial institution. A lower limit reduces the probability of a
successful guess but cancels more transactions because of typing
mistakes by the customer.
9.6. Key Exchange QR Codes
The QR codes of the code "001" (Section 5.2) carry the shares k_1 and
k_2 without a tag or a signature, because MD does not yet hold a key.
An adversary that controls UC can therefore replace the QR code of
k_1 by one of its own choice. MD does not detect the substitution
when it captures the share, nor when it computes k, but the key of MD
then differs from the key of e-Bank. The activation (Step 5 of
Section 5.1) fails, because MD either cannot verify the tag of the
activation challenge or, when only the second half of k differs,
cannot decrypt r' into six decimal digits, and e-Bank does not mark
MD as enabled. The same holds for a modified k_2. The check value
of the QR code detects only reading errors and does not protect
against an adversary. The enrollment identifier prevents the
combination of shares of different enrollments but is not secret.
For these reasons, e-Bank MUST NOT treat MD as a valid authorizer
before a successful activation, and the user needs to be told to
repeat the enrollment if the activation fails.
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9.7. Protection of Key Material at e-Bank
The HSM computes only k_2 (Section 4.1). The key k and the subkeys
k'_1 and k'_2 exist in the working memory of e-Bank while a challenge
is built. The data stored by e-Bank do not allow the computation of
k without the HSM, but an adversary who controls the e-Bank process,
or the service that sends requests to the HSM, can obtain k_2 for any
customer. With k and the credentials of the customer, that adversary
can start a transaction, recover r from r', and authorize the
transaction without MD, for as long as it holds the keys. To reduce
this exposure, e-Bank:
* SHOULD run the code that requests k_2 and handles k in a service
isolated from the components that face UC, with no direct access
from the Internet;
* SHOULD allow requests for k_2 only on behalf of a pending
challenge or activation, limit their rate per customer and in
total, and audit them, raising an alert for requests that have no
corresponding transaction;
* SHOULD erase k_2, k, k'_1, and k'_2 from memory immediately after
use, prevent them from reaching swap space and memory dumps, and
MUST NOT write them, or r, to logs;
* SHOULD keep the database of the shares k_1 under an access control
that is distinct from that of the service that requests k_2, so
that the compromise of one of them does not give k; and
* MAY perform the operations that use k inside the HSM (the e-Bank
sends k_1, r, the IV, and trans_data to the HSM, which returns r'
and y), so that k never leaves it.
9.8. Denial of Service
An adversary that controls UC, or that has the static credentials of
a customer, can start transactions and exhaust the three attempts,
which cancels legitimate transactions of the customer. The adversary
can also create many pending transactions, which consumes resources
of e-Bank, including the HSM, that recomputes k_2 for each challenge.
e-Bank SHOULD limit the number of pending transactions and the rate
of challenges per customer and per source, and SHOULD dimension the
HSM for the expected load.
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9.9. Transaction Templates
The templates embedded in the DAP application determine how MD
presents the authenticated trans_data to the user, so they are part
of the trusted base of MD. A modified template could display values
in the wrong positions even when the HMAC verification succeeds. The
template file is digitally signed by the financial institution as a
CMS SignedData structure [RFC5652]. The DAP application MUST verify
this signature, using the public certificate of the financial
institution embedded in the application, before installing or using
the file, and MUST reject a file whose signature is missing or
invalid. Because ";" is the field delimiter, e-Bank MUST NOT include
";" in any field value, and MD MUST reject challenges whose
transaction code is unknown or whose number of fields does not match
the template.
9.10. Formal Verification
An earlier version of the DAP protocol was formally verified with
respect to smartphone, agent, and server operations using Paulson's
inductive method [Paulson1998] in Isabelle/HOL [Oliveira2019]
[DAPRepo2024]. That verification does not cover the elements
specified in this document that were added or refined afterwards,
namely the transaction templates, the generation timestamp and its
check on MD, the Nonce, and the signed template file. Those elements
have not been formally verified.
9.11. Residual Risks and Human Factors
Because, under the adversary model of Section 9.1, DAP does not allow
automated technical forgery of transaction authorizations on UC,
adversaries are forced to resort to active social engineering,
persuading the human customer to scan a challenge QR code, ignore the
fraudulent transaction details displayed on MD, and read back the
resulting 6-digit code r_hat. While this requires continuous, real-
time human cooperation for every single transaction (making large-
scale automated fraud considerably harder), financial institutions
SHOULD combine DAP with clear User Interface (UI) warnings on MD
emphasizing that the user needs to verify the beneficiary and amount
before pressing Confirm.
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Malware on MD itself is outside the adversary model of Section 9.1
and remains a residual risk. Such malware could cover the screen of
the DAP application with an overlay, use the accessibility services
of the operating system to read or press controls, or share the
screen with the adversary, which would expose the transaction details
and the authorizer code. The DAP application SHOULD use the
protections of the operating system against overlays and screen
capture, and the user needs to keep the device free of untrusted
applications.
10. Privacy Considerations
This section follows the guidance of [RFC6973].
* _Data in the QR code._ The field trans_data is sent in cleartext
and can contain account numbers, names, and amounts. Anyone who
can see or photograph the screen of UC when the code is displayed
can read them. The transaction details are already known to UC,
but they are also exposed to observers. The confidentiality of
the transaction data on the visual channel is not a goal of DAP,
which protects the integrity of trans_data and the confidentiality
of the authorizer code r. Templates SHOULD include only the
fields that the user needs to verify the transaction.
* _Data stored on MD._ MD stores the key k and the signed template
file. The DAP application SHOULD NOT keep the contents of
trans_data after the transaction ends, and SHOULD NOT write them
in logs.
* _Data stored on e-Bank._ For each customer, e-Bank keeps k_1,
key_id, key_version, ID, and key_timestamp. These values are
identifiers and key material, and e-Bank SHOULD protect them and
limit their retention to the period in which the enrollment is
active, subject to the legal requirements that apply to the
financial institution.
* _Customer identifier._ The ID of the customer is personal data.
It is kept on the server and is never carried in a challenge or
shown in a QR code.
* _Applicable law._ The processing of personal data by the financial
institution is subject to the data protection law that applies to
it. This document does not define legal requirements.
11. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
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12. References
12.1. Normative References
[FIPS197] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS 197, May 2023,
.
[ISO18004] International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
"Information technology - Automatic identification and
data capture techniques - QR Code bar code symbology
specification", ISO/IEC 18004:2024, August 2024. This
specification is available for purchase from ISO.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, .
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, .
[SP800-38A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Methods and Techniques", NIST Special Publication 800-38A,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38A, December 2001,
.
[XML] World Wide Web Consortium, "Extensible Markup Language
(XML) 1.0 (Fifth Edition)", W3C Recommendation, November
2008, .
12.2. Informative References
[Bellare1994]
Bellare, M. and P. Rogaway, "Entity Authentication and Key
Distribution", Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '93 pp.
232-249, 1994, .
[DAPRepo2024]
de Oliveira, F. R., "Formal Verification Repository for
DAP", July 2024,
.
[Melo2012] de Melo, L. P., "DAP (Dynamic Authorization Protocol):
Secure Approach Out-of-Band for E-Bank with a Two-Factor
Visual Authentication", Ph.D. Thesis University of
Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil, 2012.
[Melo2024] de Melo, L. P., Amaral, D. M., Albuquerque, R. O., de
Sousa Junior, R. T., Sandoval Orozco, A. L., and L. J.
Garcia Villalba, "A Secure Approach Out-of-Band for e-Bank
with Visual Two-Factor Authorization Protocol",
Cryptography Vol. 8, No. 4, 51,
DOI 10.3390/cryptography8040051, November 2024,
.
[Oliveira2019]
de Oliveira, F. R., "Verification of the Dynamic
Authorization Protocol", M.Sc. Thesis University of
Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil, 2019.
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[Paulson1998]
Paulson, L. C., "The Inductive Approach to Verifying
Cryptographic Protocols", Journal of Computer
Security Vol. 6, pp. 85-128, 1998,
.
[PSD2RTS] European Commission, "Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
2018/389 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/2366 with
regard to regulatory technical standards for strong
customer authentication and common and secure open
standards of communication", November 2017,
.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
.
[RFC4226] M'Raihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and
O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password
Algorithm", RFC 4226, DOI 10.17487/RFC4226, December 2005,
.
[RFC6238] M'Raihi, D., Machani, S., Pei, M., and J. Rydell, "TOTP:
Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 6238,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6238, May 2011,
.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
.
[Shannon1949]
Shannon, C. E., "Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems",
Bell System Technical Journal Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 656-715,
October 1949,
.
[Starnberger2009]
Starnberger, G., Froihofer, L., and K. M. Goeschka, "QR-
TAN: Secure Mobile Transaction Authentication",
Proceedings of ARES 2009 pp. 578-583, March 2009,
.
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[WebAuthn2]
World Wide Web Consortium, "Web Authentication: An API for
accessing Public Key Credentials Level 2", W3C
Recommendation, April 2021,
.
Authors' Addresses
Laerte Peotta de Melo
University of Brasilia
Department of Electrical Engineering
Campus Universitario Darcy Ribeiro, Asa Norte
Brasilia-DF
70910-900
Brazil
Email: laerte.melo@unb.br
URI: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2075-6601
Dino Macedo Amaral
University of Brasilia
Department of Electrical Engineering
Campus Universitario Darcy Ribeiro, Asa Norte
Brasilia-DF
70910-900
Brazil
Email: dino.macedo@gmail.com
URI: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8023-1057
Robson de Oliveira Albuquerque
University of Brasilia
Department of Electrical Engineering
Campus Universitario Darcy Ribeiro, Asa Norte
Brasilia-DF
70910-900
Brazil
Email: robson@redes.unb.br
URI: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6717-3374
Joao Jose Costa Gondim
University of Brasilia
Department of Electrical Engineering
Campus Universitario Darcy Ribeiro, Asa Norte
Brasilia-DF
70910-900
Brazil
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Email: gondim@unb.br
URI: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5873-7502
Fabio Lucio Lopes de Mendonca
University of Brasilia
Department of Electrical Engineering
Campus Universitario Darcy Ribeiro, Asa Norte
Brasilia-DF
70910-900
Brazil
Email: fabio.mendonca@unb.br
URI: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7100-7304
Rafael Timoteo de Sousa Junior
University of Brasilia
Department of Electrical Engineering
Campus Universitario Darcy Ribeiro, Asa Norte
Brasilia-DF
70910-900
Brazil
Email: desousa@unb.br
URI: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1101-3029
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