Network Working Group E. Karelina, Ed. Internet-Draft InfoTeCS Intended status: Informational September 2023 Expires: 17 March 2024 Generating the Transport Key Containers Using the GOST Algorithms draft-pkcs12-gost-04 Abstract This document specifies how to use "PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax v1.1" (RFC 7292) to generate the transport key containers for storing keys and certificates in conjunction with the Russian national standard GOST algorithms. PKCS #12 v1.1 describes a transfer syntax for personal identity information, including private keys, certificates, miscellaneous secrets, and extensions. This specification has been developed outside the IETF. The purpose of publication being to facilitate interoperable implementations that wish to support the GOST algorithms. This document does not imply IETF endorsement of the cryptographic algorithms used here. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 March 2024. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 1] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Basic Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. PFX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Structure of PFX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. AuthenticatedSafe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2.1. Unencrypted Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2.2. Password-encrypted data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3. SafeContents and SafeBag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. GOST R 34.10–2012 key representation . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. Masking GOST R 34.10–2012 keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. KeyBag structure for GOST R 34.10–2012 key . . . . . . . 10 5.3. OneAsymmetricKey structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.4. EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structure for GOST R 34.10–2012 key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. GOST R 34.10–2012 certificate representation . . . . . . . . 11 7. Security Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A.1. Test data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A.1.1. Test certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A.1.2. Test key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A.2. The example of a PFX with a password-protected key and unencrypted certificate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A.2.1. PFX in BASE64 format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 A.2.2. PFX in ASN.1 format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 A.2.3. Decrypted key value in BASE64 format . . . . . . . . 21 A.2.4. Decrypted key value in ASN.1 format . . . . . . . . . 21 A.3. The example of a PFX with a password-protected key and a password-protected certificate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A.3.1. PFX in BASE64 format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 A.3.2. PFX in ASN.1 format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 A.3.3. Decrypted key value in BASE64 format . . . . . . . . 25 A.3.4. Decrypted key value in ASN.1 format . . . . . . . . . 25 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 2] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 1. Introduction This document provides a specification of the usage of GOST algorithms with PKCS #12 v1.1. 2. Conventions Used in This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 3. Basic Terms and Definitions Throughout this document, the following notation is used: Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 3] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 +==========+====================================================+ | Notation | Definition | +==========+====================================================+ | P | a password encoded as a Unicode UTF-8 string | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+ | S | a random initializing value | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+ | V^(*) | a set of all binary row vectors of finite length | | | (hereinafter referred to as vectors) including | | | empty string | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+ | V_s | a set of all binary row vectors of length s, s >= | | | 0; if s = 0, then the set V_s consists of an empty | | | string of length 0 | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+ | |A| | a number of components (a length) of the vector A | | | belonging to V^(*) (if A is an empty string, | | | then |A| = 0) | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+ | A||C | a concatenation of two octet strings A, C, i.e., a | | | vector from V_(|A|+|C|), where the left subvector | | | from V_(|A|) is equal to the vector A and the | | | right subvector from V_(|C|) is equal to the | | | vector C: A = (a_(n_1),...,a_1) in V_(n_1) and C = | | | (c_(n_2),..., c_1) in V_(n_2), res = | | | (a_(n_1),...,a_1,c_(n_2),..., c_1) in V_(n_1+n_2)) | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+ | F_q | a finite prime field represented as a set of q | | | integers {0,1,..., q - 1}, where q > 3 – prime | | | number | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+ | b mod q | a minimum non-negative number comparable to b | | | modulo p | +----------+----------------------------------------------------+ Table 1: Terms and Definitions This document uses the following abbreviations and definition: Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 4] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 +================+==================================================+ | Abbreviations | Definition | | and Terms | | +================+==================================================+ | Signature | one or more data elements resulting from the | | | signature process (clause 3.12 of | | | [ISO14888-1]). Note: In the standard (to | | | provide terminological compatibility with | | | the current native standard documentation | | | and with the published scientific and | | | technical works), the terms "digital | | | signature", "electronic signature", and | | | "electronic digital signature" are synonyms. | +----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | Signature key | set of private data elements specific to an | | | entity and usable only by this entity in the | | | signature process (clause 3.13 of | | | [ISO14888-1]). Note: Sometimes called a | | | private key. | +----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | Verification | set of public data elements which is | | key | mathematically related to an entity's | | | signature key and which is used by the | | | verifier in the verification process (clause | | | 3.16 of [ISO14888-1]). Note: Sometimes | | | called a public key. | +----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | ASN.1 | Abstract Syntax Notation One, as defined in | | | [X.680]. | +----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | BER | Basic Encoding Rules, as defined in [X.690]. | +----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | HMAC_GOSTR3411 | Hashed-Based Message Authentication Code. A | | | function for calculating a Message | | | Authentication Code (MAC) based on the GOST | | | R 34.11-2012 hash function (see [RFC6986]) | | | with 512-bit output in accordance with | | | [RFC2104]. | +----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ Table 2: Abbreviations and Definition 4. PFX The transport key container (PFX) is designed for secure storage and data transfer that does not contain state secrets. The scope of this document is to use the transport key container to protect private keys and certificates by password. Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 5] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 4.1. Structure of PFX In accordance with [RFC7292] the transport key container has the following structure: PFX ::= SEQUENCE { version INTEGER {v3(3)}(v3,...), authSafe ContentInfo, macData MacData OPTIONAL } The fields of PFX have the following meanings: * version is the syntax version number; * authSafe contains the data of type ContentInfo. In the case of password integrity mode the content field has a Data type and contains a BER-encoded value of AuthenticatedSafe structure; * macData has a MacData type and in the case of password integrity mode the macData field should contain the information about algorithm and parameters for a password key generation. The integrity control is ensured by using the HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_512 algorithm. When processing a transport key container, this field should be checked first. 4.2. AuthenticatedSafe The AuthenticatedSafe structure is a sequence of ContentInfo values (see [RFC5652]): AuthenticatedSafe ::= SEQUENCE OF ContentInfo - Data if unencrypted - EncryptedData if password-encrypted - EnvelopedData if public key-encrypted 4.2.1. Unencrypted Data If the data is not encrypted then the content field is the BER- encoded value of the SafeContents structure. The contentType field is set to the id-data type. Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 6] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 4.2.2. Password-encrypted data In the case of password integrity mode the data is represented as EncryptedData structure. The EncryptedData structure in ASN.1 format is presented according to [RFC5652]. The encryption algorithm and parameters have the following values: ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { encryptionAlgorithmOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, parameters PBES2-params } The PBES2-params type is defined in [RFC9337]. The content should be encrypted according to the encryption algorithm in the PBES2 scheme, described in [RFC9337]. The following identifier must be specified in EncryptedData.EncryptedContentInfo.contentEncryptionAlgorithm.encr yptionAlgorithmOID field: { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-5(5) pbes2(13) } The encrypted content is specified in EncryptedData.EncryptedContentInfo.encryptedContent field. 4.3. SafeContents and SafeBag In accordance with [RFC7292] the SafeContents structure is a sequence of SafeBag: SafeContents ::= SEQUENCE OF SafeBag In accordance with [RFC7292] the SafeBag structure holds one piece of information: keys, certificates, crls, which is identified by an object identifier. SafeBag ::= SEQUENCE { bagId BAG-TYPE.id ({PKCS12BagSet}) bagValue [0] EXPLICIT BAG-TYPE.Type({PKCS12BagSet}{@bagId}) bagAttributes SET OF PKCS12Attribute OPTIONAL } The fields of SafeBag have the following meanings: * bagId is an object identifier, it defines the type of object; Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 7] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 * bagValue is the value of an object; * bagAttributes contains the users names, the keys identifiers and other additional information. It is optional. This document describes the 2 object types of SafeBag structure: * pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag, * certBag. In the case of password integrity mode the private key has the following structure: pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag BAG-TYPE ::= { PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag IDENTIFIED BY {bagtypes 2} } The bagValue field contains the key and information about it in the encrypted form in the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structure. A certBag contains a certificate of a certain type. Object identifiers are used to distinguish between different certificate types. certBag BAG-TYPE ::= { CertBag IDENTIFIED BY { bagtypes 3 } } If the certificate is not encrypted, the CertBag structure is placed in the Data structure (see [RFC5652]). If the certificate is encrypted, the CertBag structure is placed in the EncryptedData structure (see [RFC5652]). 5. GOST R 34.10–2012 key representation This section describes the GOST R 34.10–2012 private keys representation for asymmetric key pairs. The masked keys should be used to ensure the protection of private keys from leaks through the side channels when reading and performing operations with keys. 5.1. Masking GOST R 34.10–2012 keys The masking algorithm is defined by the basic cryptographic transformation operation of the algorithm: multiplication in the F_q field for GOST R 34.10–2012 keys. Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 8] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 Let be a sequence of k masks M_1, M_2, ..., M_k. Let M_i() denote the operation of imposing the i-th mask and M_i^-1() denote the operation of removing the i-th mask, 1 <= i <= k. Let be a key K. The masked key K_M is obtained by applying the masking operation k times: K_M = M_K (...(M_2(M_1(K)...). Unmasking is performed by applying the removing operation k times, but in reverse order: K = M_1^-1(...(M_(k-1)^-1(M_k^-1(K_M))...). The masked key is represented as the sequence I = K_M||M_1||M_2||...||M_kt. Let the key K have n binary bits, then the sequence I is represented in the memory as a (k + 1)*n-binary bit sequence. The I sequence is represented in little-endian format. It is possible to use an unmasked private key (i.e., k = 0, K_M = K). The masking operation is the multiplication of the key by the inverse of the mask: K_M = K * M^-1 mod Q, where the Q value is taken from the key parameters. The operation of removing the mask is the multiplication of the masked key by the mask: K = K_M * M mod Q. The public key is specified by a pair of coordinates (x, y) defined in GOST R 34.10–2012, presented in the following format: * a public key corresponding to the GOST R 34.10–2012 algorithm with a key length of 256 bits has the GostR3410–2012-256-PublicKey representation. It is specified by a 64-byte string, where the first 32 bytes contain the little-endian representation of the x coordinate, and the last 32 bytes contain the little-endian representation of the y coordinate; * a public key corresponding to the GOST R 34.10–2012 algorithm with a key length of 512 bits has the GostR3410–2012-512-PublicKey representation. It is specified by a 128-byte string, where the first 64 bytes contain the little-endian representation of the x coordinate, and the last 64 bytes contain the little-endian representation of the y coordinate. The public keys GostR3410-2012-256-PublicKey and GostR3410-2012-512-PublicKey must be DER-encoded as an octet string in accordance with [RFC9215] (section 4.3): GostR3410–2012-256-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING (64), Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 9] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 GostR3410–2012-512-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING (128). 5.2. KeyBag structure for GOST R 34.10–2012 key In accordance with [RFC7292] a KeyBag is defined as information about a private key represented as a following structure PrivateKeyInfo: KeyBag := PrivateKeyInfo In accordance with [RFC5958], information about a private key is presented in the following form: PrivateKeyInfo := OneAsymmetricKey 5.3. OneAsymmetricKey structure In accordance with [RFC5958] the OneAsymmetricKey has the following structure: OneAsymmetricKey::= SEQUENCE { version Version, privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier, privateKey PrivateKey, attributes [0] Attributes OPTIONAL, ..., [[2:publicKey [1] PublicKey OPTIONAL]], ... } Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1) } (v1, ..., v2) PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING PublicKey ::= BIT STRING Attributes ::= SET OF Attribute The fields have the following meanings: * version identifies the version of OneAsymmetricKey. If publicKey is present, then version is set to v2 else version is set to v1. * privateKeyAlgorithm identifies the private-key algorithm and optionally contains parameters associated with the asymmetric key pair. For GOST R 34.10–2012 private keys the identifiers of the corresponding public keys are used, they are presented in the [RFC9215]. The use of identifiers and public key parameters is presented in the [RFC9215]. Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 10] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 * privateKey is an OCTET STRING that contains the value of the masked private key I. * attributes are OPTIONAL. It contains information corresponding to the public key (e.g., certificates). * publicKey contains the value of the public key GostR3410–2012-256-PublicKey or GostR3410–2012-512-PublicKey encoded in a BIT STRING. It is an optional field. 5.4. EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structure for GOST R 34.10–2012 key In accordance with [RFC7292] the encrypted information of the private key is presented as the PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag structure: PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag::= EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo In accordance with [RFC5958] the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo has the following structure: EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { encryptionAlgorithm EncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, encryptedData EncryptedData } EncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier EncryptedData ::= OCTET STRING The fields have the following meanings: * encryptionAlgorithm identifies the algorithm under which the private key information is encrypted. Encryption must use PBES2 scheme. The algorithm and parameters of this scheme are presented in [RFC9337]. * encryptedData is the DER-encoded PrivateKeyInfo structure. 6. GOST R 34.10–2012 certificate representation In accordance with [RFC7292] a CertBag is defined as information about a certificate and represented as the following structure: CertBag ::= SEQUENCE { certId BAG-TYPE.id ({CertTypes}), certValue [0] EXPLICIT BAG-TYPE.Type ({CertTypes}{@certId}) } Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 11] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 The fields have the following meanings: * certId identifies the type of certificate. * certValue contains certificate. 7. Security Mechanisms Let the sender and receiver have a pre-agreed password P. The sender generates a password key using the PBKDF2 algorithm in accordance with [RFC9337] and uses it to encrypt the transmitted private key. The recipient independently generates a password key using the same PBKDF2 diversification algorithm in accordance with [RFC9337] and uses it to extract the private key from the PFX. The same password P is used to encrypt different sections of the PFX, but different random initializing value S with a length of 8 to 32 bytes, where S and P are the input parameters of the PBKDF2 function. The password must be encoded in Unicode UTF-8 and fed into the PBKDF2 algorithm as a P parameter. The integrity of PFX is ensured by using the HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_512 algorithm in accordance with [RFC7836]. For checking the integrity of PFX with the HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_512 algorithm the key for this algorithm is also generated by using the PBKDF2 algorithm in accordance with [RFC9337] with the same value of the P parameter and a different initializing value S with a length of 8 to 32 bytes. The dkLen parameter for the PBKDF2 algorithm is set to 96 bytes. The key for the HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_512 algorithm must be the last 32 bytes of the 96-byte sequence generated by the PBKDF2 algorithm. The PBKDF2 algorithm parameters S and c are saved in macData.Salt and macData.iterations fileds respectively. The HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_512 function is calculated from the content field of the authSafe structure field. The authSafe structure field is a PFX structure field. The value of the calculated checksum is saved in the macData.mac.digest field. The macData.mac.digestAlgorithm.algorithm field contains the following algorithm identifier: id-tc26-gost3411-12-512 :: = { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1) algorithms (1) digest(2) gost3411–2012-512(3) } The macData.mac.digestAlgorithm.parameters field isn't used and and should be completely absent. Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 12] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 8. Security Considerations For information on security considerations for generating the transport key containers, see [RFC7292]. 9. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions. 10. ASN.1 Modules PKCS-12RU { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1) modules(0) pkcs-12ruSyntax(5) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS GostR3410–2012-PublicKey FROM GostR3410–2012-PKISyntax { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1) modules(0) gostR3410–2012-PKISyntax(2) }; END 11. References 11.1. Normative References [GostPkcs12] Potashnikov, A., Karelina, E., Pianov, S., and A. Naumenko, "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security. The transport key containers.", R 1323565.1.041–2022. Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology (In Russian). [ISO14888-1] ISO/IEC, "Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signatures with appendix - Part 1: General.", ISO/ IEC 14888-1, 2008. [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, . Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 13] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, . [RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010, . [RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012: Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August 2013, . [RFC7292] Moriarty, K., Ed., Nystrom, M., Parkinson, S., Rusch, A., and M. Scott, "PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax v1.1", RFC 7292, DOI 10.17487/RFC7292, July 2014, . [RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V., Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012", RFC 7836, DOI 10.17487/RFC7836, March 2016, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC9215] Baryshkov, D., Ed., Nikolaev, V., and A. Chelpanov, "Using GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012 Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", RFC 9215, DOI 10.17487/RFC9215, March 2022, . [RFC9337] Karelina, E., Ed., "Generating Password-Based Keys Using the GOST Algorithms", RFC 9337, DOI 10.17487/RFC9337, December 2022, . [X.680] ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One: Specification of Basic Notation.", ITU-T, Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002, 2002. Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 14] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 [X.690] ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER).", ITU-T, Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC International Standard 8825-1:2008, November 2008. Appendix A. Examples This section contains examples of using GOST cryptographic algorithms to create a PFX. A.1. Test data In all examples the following data is used. A.1.1. Test certificate This section contains a test certififcate in BASE64 format. MIICLjCCAdugAwIBAgIEAYy6hDAKBggqhQMHAQEDAjA4MQ0wCwYDVQQKEwRUSzI2 MScwJQYDVQQDEx5DQSBUSzI2OiBHT1NUIDM0LjEwLTEyIDI1Ni1iaXQwHhcNMDEw MTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNNDkxMjMxMDAwMDAwWjA7MQ0wCwYDVQQKEwRUSzI2MSowKAYD VQQDEyFPUklHSU5BVE9SOiBHT1NUIDM0LjEwLTEyIDUxMi1iaXQwgaAwFwYIKoUD BwEBAQIwCwYJKoUDBwECAQIBA4GEAASBgLSLt1q8KQ4YZVxioU+1LV9QhE7MHR9g BEh7S1yVNGlqt7+rNG5VFqmrPM74rbUsOlhV8M+zZKprXdk35Oz8lSW/n2oIUHZx ikXIH/SSHj4rv3K/Puvz7hYTQSZl/xPdp78nUmjrEa6d5wfX8biEy2z0dgufFvAk Mw1Ua4gdXqDOo4GHMIGEMGMGA1UdIwRcMFqAFKxsDkxEZqJCluKfCTslZvPLpFMq oTykOjA4MQ0wCwYDVQQKEwRUSzI2MScwJQYDVQQDEx5DQSBUSzI2OiBHT1NUIDM0 LjEwLTEyIDI1Ni1iaXSCBAGMuoEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFH4GVwmYDK1rCKhX7nkAWDrJ 16CkMAoGCCqFAwcBAQMCA0EACl6p8dAbpi9Hk+3mgMyI0WIh17IrlrSp/mB0F7Zz Mt8XUD1Dwz3JrrnxeXnfMvOA5BdUJ9hCyDgMVAGs/IcEEA== A.1.2. Test key This section contains a test key bytes in hexadecimal. 0xF95A5D44C5245F63F2E7DF8E782C1924EADCB8D06C52D91023179786154CBDB1 561B4DF759D69F67EE1FBD5B68800E134BAA12818DA4F3AC75B0E5E6F9256911 A.2. The example of a PFX with a password-protected key and unencrypted certificate. In this example the PKCS8SHroudedKeybag structure is used to store the key, which is placed in the Data structure. The certBag structure is used to store the certificate, which is placed in the Data structure. A following password is used to encrypt the key and control the integrity. The password is in hexadecimal. Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 15] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 0xD09FD0B0D180D0BED0BBD18C20D0B4D0BBD18F20504658 The key encryption algorithm identifier: 1.2.643.7.1.1.5.2.2 A.2.1. PFX in BASE64 format MIIFKwIBAzCCBMQGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCBLUEggSxMIIErTCCAswGCSqGSIb3DQEH AaCCAr0EggK5MIICtTCCArEGCyqGSIb3DQEMCgEDoIICSjCCAkYGCiqGSIb3DQEJ FgGgggI2BIICMjCCAi4wggHboAMCAQICBAGMuoQwCgYIKoUDBwEBAwIwODENMAsG A1UEChMEVEsyNjEnMCUGA1UEAxMeQ0EgVEsyNjogR09TVCAzNC4xMC0xMiAyNTYt Yml0MB4XDTAxMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoXDTQ5MTIzMTAwMDAwMFowOzENMAsGA1UEChME VEsyNjEqMCgGA1UEAxMhT1JJR0lOQVRPUjogR09TVCAzNC4xMC0xMiA1MTItYml0 MIGgMBcGCCqFAwcBAQECMAsGCSqFAwcBAgECAQOBhAAEgYC0i7davCkOGGVcYqFP tS1fUIROzB0fYARIe0tclTRpare/qzRuVRapqzzO+K21LDpYVfDPs2Sqa13ZN+Ts /JUlv59qCFB2cYpFyB/0kh4+K79yvz7r8+4WE0EmZf8T3ae/J1Jo6xGunecH1/G4 hMts9HYLnxbwJDMNVGuIHV6gzqOBhzCBhDBjBgNVHSMEXDBagBSsbA5MRGaiQpbi nwk7JWbzy6RTKqE8pDowODENMAsGA1UEChMEVEsyNjEnMCUGA1UEAxMeQ0EgVEsy NjogR09TVCAzNC4xMC0xMiAyNTYtYml0ggQBjLqBMB0GA1UdDgQWBBR+BlcJmAyt awioV+55AFg6ydegpDAKBggqhQMHAQEDAgNBAApeqfHQG6YvR5Pt5oDMiNFiIdey K5a0qf5gdBe2czLfF1A9Q8M9ya658Xl53zLzgOQXVCfYQsg4DFQBrPyHBBAxVDAj BgkqhkiG9w0BCRUxFgQUeVV0+dS25MICJChpmGc/8AoUwE0wLQYJKoZIhvcNAQkU MSAeHgBwADEAMgBGAHIAaQBlAG4AZABsAHkATgBhAG0AZTCCAdkGCSqGSIb3DQEH AaCCAcoEggHGMIIBwjCCAb4GCyqGSIb3DQEMCgECoIIBVzCCAVMwWQYJKoZIhvcN AQUNMEwwKQYJKoZIhvcNAQUMMBwECKf4N7NMwugqAgIIADAMBggqhQMHAQEEAgUA MB8GCSqFAwcBAQUCAjASBBAlmt2WDfaPJlsAs0mLKglzBIH1DMvEacbbWRNDVSnX JLWygYrKoipdOjDA/2HEnBZ34uFOLNheUqiKpCPoFpbR2GBiVYVTVK9ibiczgaca EQYzDXtcS0QCZOxpKWfteAlbdJLC/SqPurPYyKi0MVRUPROhbisFASDT38HDH1Dh 0dL5f6ga4aPWLrWbbgWERFOoOPyh4DotlPF37AQOwiEjsbyyRHq3HgbWiaxQRuAh eqHOn4QVGY92/HFvJ7u3TcnQdLWhTe/lh1RHLNF3RnXtN9if9zC23laDZOiWZplU yLrUiTCbHrtn1RppPDmLFNMt9dJ7KKgCkOi7Zm5nhqPChbywX13wcfYxVDAjBgkq hkiG9w0BCRUxFgQUeVV0+dS25MICJChpmGc/8AoUwE0wLQYJKoZIhvcNAQkUMSAe HgBwADEAMgBGAHIAaQBlAG4AZABsAHkATgBhAG0AZTBeME4wCgYIKoUDBwEBAgME QAkBKw4ihn7pSIYTEhu0bcvTPZjI3WgVxCkUVlOsc80G69EKFEOTnObGJGSKJ51U KkOsXF0a7+VBZf3BcVVQh9UECIVEtO+VpuskAgIIAA== A.2.2. PFX in ASN.1 format 0 1323:SEQUENCE: 4 1: INTEGER: 3 7 1220: SEQUENCE: 11 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:data [1.2.840.113549.1.7.1] 22 1205: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): 26 1201: OCTET STRING: 30 1197: SEQUENCE: 34 716: SEQUENCE: 38 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:data [1.2.840.113549.1.7.1] Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 16] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 49 701: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): 53 697: OCTET STRING: 57 693: SEQUENCE: 61 689: SEQUENCE: 65 11: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:pkcs-12-certBag : [1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.3] 78 586: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): 82 582: SEQUENCE: 86 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:x509Certificate : [1.2.840.113549.1.9.22.1] 98 566: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): 102 562: OCTET STRING: 106 558: SEQUENCE: 110 475: SEQUENCE: 114 3: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): 116 1: INTEGER:2 119 4: INTEGER:26000004 125 10: SEQUENCE: 127 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER: : [1.2.643.7.1.1.3.2] 137 56: SEQUENCE: 139 13: SET: 141 11: SEQUENCE: 143 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER: : organizationName [2.5.4.10] 148 4: PRINTABLE STRING:'TK26' 154 39: SET: 156 37: SEQUENCE: 158 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:commonName : [2.5.4.3] 163 30: PRINTABLE STRING: : 'CA TK26: GOST 34.10-12 256-bit' 195 30: SEQUENCE: 197 13: UTC TIME:'010101000000Z' 212 13: UTC TIME:'491231000000Z' 227 59: SEQUENCE: 229 13: SET: 231 11: SEQUENCE: 233 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER: : organizationName [2.5.4.10] 238 4: PRINTABLE STRING:'TK26' 244 42: SET: 246 40: SEQUENCE: 248 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:commonName : [2.5.4.3] 253 33: PRINTABLE STRING: : 'ORIGINATOR: : GOST 34.10-12 512-bit' Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 17] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 288 160: SEQUENCE: 291 23: SEQUENCE: 293 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER: : [1.2.643.7.1.1.1.2] 303 11: SEQUENCE: 305 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER: : [1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.1] 316 132: BIT STRING UnusedBits:0: 320 128: OCTET STRING: : B48BB75ABC290E18655C62A : 14FB52D5F50844ECC1D1F60 : 04487B4B5C9534696AB7BFA : B346E5516A9AB3CCEF8ADB5 : 2C3A5855F0CFB364AA6B5DD : 937E4ECFC9525BF9F6A0850 : 76718A45C81FF4921E3E2BB : F72BF3EEBF3EE1613412665 : FF13DDA7BF275268EB11AE9 : DE707D7F1B884CB6CF4760B : 9F16F024330D546B881D5EA0CE 451 135: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (3): 454 132: SEQUENCE: 457 99: SEQUENCE: 459 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER: : authorityKeyIdentifier [2.5.29.35] 464 92: OCTET STRING: 466 90: SEQUENCE: 468 20: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): : AC6C0E4C4466A24296E2 : 9F093B2566F3CBA4532A 490 60: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (1): 492 58: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (4): 494 56: SEQUENCE: 496 13: SET: 498 11: SEQUENCE: 500 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER: : organizationName : [2.5.4.10] 505 4: PRINTABLE STRING:'TK26' 511 39: SET: 513 37: SEQUENCE: 515 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER: : commonName [2.5.4.3] 520 30: PRINTABLE STRING: : 'CA TK26: GOST ' : '34.10-12 256-bit' 552 4: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (2): : 018CBA81 Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 18] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 558 29: SEQUENCE: 560 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER: : subjectKeyIdentifier [2.5.29.14] 565 22: OCTET STRING: 567 20: OCTET STRING: : 7E065709980CAD6B08A8 : 57EE7900583AC9D7A0A4 589 10: SEQUENCE: 591 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.643.7.1.1.3.2] 601 65: BIT STRING UnusedBits:0: : 0A5EA9F1D01BA62F4793EDE680CC88D1 : 6221D7B22B96B4A9FE607417B67332DF : 17503D43C33DC9AEB9F17979DF32F380 : E4175427D842C8380C5401ACFC870410 668 84: SET: 670 35: SEQUENCE: 672 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:localKeyID : [1.2.840.113549.1.9.21] 683 22: SET: 685 20: OCTET STRING: : 795574F9D4B6E4C20224 : 286998673FF00A14C04D 707 45: SEQUENCE: 709 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:friendlyName : [1.2.840.113549.1.9.20] 720 32: SET: 722 30: BMP STRING:'p12FriendlyName' 754 473: SEQUENCE: 758 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:data [1.2.840.113549.1.7.1] 769 458: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): 773 454: OCTET STRING: 777 450: SEQUENCE: 781 446: SEQUENCE: 785 11: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:pkcs-12-pkcs-8ShroudedKeyBag : [1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.2] 798 343: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): 802 339: SEQUENCE: 806 89: SEQUENCE: 808 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.840.113549.1.5.13] 819 76: SEQUENCE: 821 41: SEQUENCE: 823 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER: : [1.2.840.113549.1.5.12] 834 28: SEQUENCE: 836 8: OCTET STRING:'A7F837B34CC2E82A' 846 2: INTEGER:2048 850 12: SEQUENCE: 852 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER: Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 19] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 : [1.2.643.7.1.1.4.2] 862 0: NULL: 864 31: SEQUENCE: 866 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.643.7.1.1.5.2.2] 877 18: SEQUENCE: 879 16: OCTET STRING: : 259ADD960DF68F265B00B3498B2A0973 897 245: OCTET STRING: : 0CCBC469C6DB5913435529D724B5B281 : 8ACAA22A5D3A30C0FF61C49C1677E2E1 : 4E2CD85E52A88AA423E81696D1D86062 : 55855354AF626E273381A71A1106330D : 7B5C4B440264EC692967ED78095B7492 : C2FD2A8FBAB3D8C8A8B43154543D13A1 : 6E2B050120D3DFC1C31F50E1D1D2F97F : A81AE1A3D62EB59B6E05844453A838FC : A1E03A2D94F177EC040EC22123B1BCB2 : 447AB71E06D689AC5046E0217AA1CE9F : 8415198F76FC716F27BBB74DC9D074B5 : A14DEFE58754472CD1774675ED37D89F : F730B6DE568364E896669954C8BAD489 : 309B1EBB67D51A693C398B14D32DF5D2 : 7B28A80290E8BB666E6786A3C285BCB0 : 5F5DF071F6 1145 84: SET: 1147 35: SEQUENCE: 1149 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:localKeyID : [1.2.840.113549.1.9.21] 1160 22: SET: 1162 20: OCTET STRING: : 795574F9D4B6E4C20224286998673FF00A14C04D 1184 45: SEQUENCE: 1186 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:friendlyName : [1.2.840.113549.1.9.20] 1197 32: SET: 1199 30: BMP STRING:'p12FriendlyName' 1231 94: SEQUENCE: 1233 78: SEQUENCE: 1235 10: SEQUENCE: 1237 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.643.7.1.1.2.3] 1247 64: OCTET STRING: : 09012B0E22867EE9488613121BB46DCB : D33D98C8DD6815C429145653AC73CD06 : EBD10A1443939CE6C624648A279D542A : 43AC5C5D1AEFE54165FDC171555087D5 1313 8: OCTET STRING:'8544B4EF95A6EB24' 1323 2: INTEGER:2048 Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 20] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 A.2.3. Decrypted key value in BASE64 format MIHiAgEBMBcGCCqFAwcBAQECMAsGCSqFAwcBAgECAQRAEWkl+eblsHWs86SNgRKq SxMOgGhbvR/uZ5/WWfdNG1axvUwVhpcXIxDZUmzQuNzqJBkseI7f5/JjXyTFRF1a +YGBgQG0i7davCkOGGVcYqFPtS1fUIROzB0fYARIe0tclTRpare/qzRuVRapqzzO +K21LDpYVfDPs2Sqa13ZN+Ts/JUlv59qCFB2cYpFyB/0kh4+K79yvz7r8+4WE0Em Zf8T3ae/J1Jo6xGunecH1/G4hMts9HYLnxbwJDMNVGuIHV6gzg== A.2.4. Decrypted key value in ASN.1 format 0 226:SEQUENCE : 3 1: INTEGER : 1 6 23: SEQUENCE : 8 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : [1.2.643.7.1.1.1.2] 18 11: SEQUENCE : 20 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : [1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.1] 31 64: OCTET STRING : : 116925F9E6E5B075ACF3A48D8112AA4B130E80685BBD1FEE679FD6 : 59F74D1B56B1BD4C158697172310D9526CD0B8DCEA24192C788EDF : E7F2635F24C5445D5AF9 97 129: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (1) : : 01B48BB75ABC290E18655C62A14FB52D5F50844ECC1D1F6004487B : 4B5C9534696AB7BFAB346E5516A9AB3CCEF8ADB52C3A5855F0CFB3 : 64AA6B5DD937E4ECFC9525BF9F6A085076718A45C81FF4921E3E2B : BF72BF3EEBF3EE1613412665FF13DDA7BF275268EB11AE9DE707D7 : F1B884CB6CF4760B9F16F024330D546B881D5EA0CE A.3. The example of a PFX with a password-protected key and a password- protected certificate. In this example the PKCS8SHroudedKeybag structure is used to store the key, which is placed in the Data structure (see [RFC5652]). The certBag structure is used to store the certificate, which is placed in the EncryptedData structure (see [RFC5652]). A following password is used to encrypt the key and control the integrity. The password is in hexadecimal. 0xD09FD0B0D180D0BED0BBD18C20D0B4D0BBD18F20504658 The key encryption algorithm identifier: 1.2.643.7.1.1.5.1.1 The certificate encryption algorithm identifier: 1.2.643.7.1.1.5.1.2 Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 21] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 A.3.1. PFX in BASE64 format MIIFjAIBAzCCBSUGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCBRYEggUSMIIFDjCCA0EGCSqGSIb3DQEH BqCCAzIwggMuAgEAMIIDJwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMFUGCSqGSIb3DQEFDTBIMCkGCSqG SIb3DQEFDDAcBAgUuSVGsSwGjQICCAAwDAYIKoUDBwEBBAIFADAbBgkqhQMHAQEF AQIwDgQM9Hk3dagtS48+G/x+gIICwWGPqxxN+sTrKbruRf9R5Ya9cf5AtO1frqMn f1eULfmZmTg/BdE51QQ+Vbnh3v1kmspr6h2+e4Wli+ndEeCWG6A6X/G22h/RAHW2 YrVmf6cCWxW+YrqzT4h/8RQL/9haunD5LmHPLVsYrEai0OwbgXayDSwARVJQLQYq sLNmZK5ViN+fRiS5wszVJ3AtVq8EuPt41aQEKwPy2gmH4S6WmnQRC6W7aoqmIifF PJENJNn5K2M1J6zNESs6bFtYNKMArNqtvv3rioY6eAaaLy6AV6ljsekmqodHmQjv Y4eEioJs0xhpXhZY69PXT+ZBeHv6MSheBhwXqxAd1DqtPTafMjNK8rqKCap9TtPG vONvo5W9dgwegxRRQzlum8dzV4m1W9Aq4W7t8/UcxDWRz3k6ijFPlGaA9+8ZMTEO RHhBRvM6OY2/VNNxbgxWfGYuPxpSi3YnCZIPmBEe5lU/Xv7KjzFusGM38F8YR61k 4/QNpKI1QUv714YKfaUQznshGGzILv1NGID62pl1+JI3vuawi2mDMrmkuM9QFU9v /kRP+c2uBHDuOGEUUSNhF08p7+w3vxplatGWXH9fmIsPBdk2f3wkn+rwoqrEuijM I/bCAylU/M0DMKhAo9j31UYSZdi4fsfRWYDJMq/8FPn96tuo+oCpbqv3NUwpZM/8 Li4xqgTHtYw/+fRG0/P6XadNEiII/TYjenLfVHXjAHOVJsVeCu/t3EsMYHQddNCh rFk/Ic2PdIQOyB4/enpW0qrKegSbyZNuF1WI4zl4mI89L8dTQBUkhy45yQXZlDD8 k1ErYdtdEsPtz/4zuSpbnmwCEIRoOuSXtGuJP+tbcWEXRKM2UBgi3qBjpn7DU18M tsrRM9pDdadl8mT/Vfh9+B8dZBZVxgQu70lMPEGexbUkYHuFCCnyi9J0V92StbIz Elxla1VebjCCAcUGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCAbYEggGyMIIBrjCCAaoGCyqGSIb3DQEM CgECoIIBQzCCAT8wVQYJKoZIhvcNAQUNMEgwKQYJKoZIhvcNAQUMMBwECP0EQk0O 1twvAgIIADAMBggqhQMHAQEEAgUAMBsGCSqFAwcBAQUBATAOBAzwxSqgAAAAAAAA AAAEgeUqj9mI3RDfK5hMd0EeYws7foZK/5ANr2wUhP5qnDjAZgn76lExJ+wuvlnS 9PChfWVugvdl/9XJgQvvr9Cu4pOh4ICXplchcy0dGk/MzItHRVC5wK2nTxwQ4kKT kG9xhLFzoD16dhtqX0+/dQg9G8pE5EzCBIYRXLm1Arcz9k7KVsTJuNMjFrr7EQuu Tr80ATSQOtsq50zpFyrpznVPGCrOdIjpymZxNdvw48bZxqTtRVDxCYATOGqz0pwH ClWULHD9LIajLMB2GhBKyQw6ujIlltJs0T+WNdX/AT2FLi1LFSS3+Cj9MVQwIwYJ KoZIhvcNAQkVMRYEFHlVdPnUtuTCAiQoaZhnP/AKFMBNMC0GCSqGSIb3DQEJFDEg Hh4AcAAxADIARgByAGkAZQBuAGQAbAB5AE4AYQBtAGUwXjBOMAoGCCqFAwcBAQID BEDp4e22JmXdnvR0xA99yQuzQuJ8pxBeOpsLm2dZQqt3Fje5zqW1uk/7VOcfV5r2 bKm8nsLOs2rPT8hBOoeAZvOIBAjGIUHw6IjG2QICCAA= A.3.2. PFX in ASN.1 format 0 1420:SEQUENCE: 4 1: INTEGER:3 7 1317: SEQUENCE: 11 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:data [1.2.840.113549.1.7.1] 22 1302: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): 26 1298: OCTET STRING: 30 1294: SEQUENCE: 34 833: SEQUENCE: 38 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:encryptedData [1.2.840.113549.1.7.6] 49 818: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): 53 814: SEQUENCE: 57 1: INTEGER:0 60 807: SEQUENCE: Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 22] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 64 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:data [1.2.840.113549.1.7.1] 75 85: SEQUENCE: 77 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.840.113549.1.5.13] 88 72: SEQUENCE: 90 41: SEQUENCE: 92 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.840.113549.1.5.12] 103 28: SEQUENCE: 105 8: OCTET STRING:'14B92546B12C068D' 115 2: INTEGER:2048 119 12: SEQUENCE: 121 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.643.7.1.1.4.2] 131 0: NULL: 133 27: SEQUENCE: 135 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.643.7.1.1.5.1.2] 146 14: SEQUENCE: 148 12: OCTET STRING: : F4793775A82D4B8F3E1BFC7E 162 705: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): : 618FAB1C4DFAC4EB29BAEE45FF51E586BD7 : 1FE40B4ED5FAEA3277F57942DF99999383F : 05D139D5043E55B9E1DEFD649ACA6BEA1DB : E7B85A58BE9DD11E0961BA03A5FF1B6DA1F : D10075B662B5667FA7025B15BE62BAB34F8 : 87FF1140BFFD85ABA70F92E61CF2D5B18AC : 46A2D0EC1B8176B20D2C004552502D062AB : 0B36664AE5588DF9F4624B9C2CCD527702D : 56AF04B8FB78D5A4042B03F2DA0987E12E9 : 69A74110BA5BB6A8AA62227C53C910D24D9 : F92B633527ACCD112B3A6C5B5834A300ACD : AADBEFDEB8A863A78069A2F2E8057A963B1 : E926AA87479908EF6387848A826CD318695 : E1658EBD3D74FE641787BFA31285E061C17 : AB101DD43AAD3D369F32334AF2BA8A09AA7 : D4ED3C6BCE36FA395BD760C1E8314514339 : 6E9BC7735789B55BD02AE16EEDF3F51CC43 : 591CF793A8A314F946680F7EF1931310E44 : 784146F33A398DBF54D3716E0C567C662E3 : F1A528B762709920F98111EE6553F5EFECA : 8F316EB06337F05F1847AD64E3F40DA4A23 : 5414BFBD7860A7DA510CE7B21186CC82EFD : 4D1880FADA9975F89237BEE6B08B698332B : 9A4B8CF50154F6FFE444FF9CDAE0470EE38 : 6114512361174F29EFEC37BF1A656AD1965 : C7F5F988B0F05D9367F7C249FEAF0A2AAC4 : BA28CC23F6C2032954FCCD0330A840A3D8F : 7D5461265D8B87EC7D15980C932AFFC14F9 : FDEADBA8FA80A96EABF7354C2964CFFC2E2 : E31AA04C7B58C3FF9F446D3F3FA5DA74D12 Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 23] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 : 2208FD36237A72DF5475E300739526C55E0 : AEFEDDC4B0C60741D74D0A1AC593F21CD8F : 74840EC81E3F7A7A56D2AACA7A049BC9936 : E175588E33978988F3D2FC753401524872E : 39C905D99430FC93512B61DB5D12C3EDCFF : E33B92A5B9E6C021084683AE497B46B893F : EB5B71611744A336501822DEA063A67EC35 : 35F0CB6CAD133DA4375A765F264FF55F87D : F81F1D641655C6042EEF494C3C419EC5B52 : 4607B850829F28BD27457DD92B5B233125C : 656B555E6E 871 453: SEQUENCE: 875 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:data [1.2.840.113549.1.7.1] 886 438: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): 890 434: OCTET STRING: 894 430: SEQUENCE: 898 426: SEQUENCE: 902 11: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:pkcs-12-pkcs-8ShroudedKeyBag [1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.2] 915 323: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (0): 919 319: SEQUENCE: 923 85: SEQUENCE: 925 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.840.113549.1.5.13] 936 72: SEQUENCE: 938 41: SEQUENCE: 940 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.840.113549.1.5.12] 951 28: SEQUENCE: 953 8: OCTET STRING: : FD04424D0ED6DC2F 963 2: INTEGER:2048 967 12: SEQUENCE: 969 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.643.7.1.1.4.2] 979 0: NULL: 981 27: SEQUENCE: 983 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.643.7.1.1.5.1.1] 994 14: SEQUENCE: 996 12: OCTET STRING: : F0C52AA00000000000000000 1010 229: OCTET STRING: : 2A8FD988DD10DF2B984C77411E630B3B7E864AFF900DAF6C1484FE6A9C38C : 06609FBEA513127EC2EBE59D2F4F0A17D656E82F765FFD5C9810BEFAFD0AE : E293A1E08097A65721732D1D1A4FCCCC8B474550B9C0ADA74F1C10E242939 : 06F7184B173A03D7A761B6A5F4FBF75083D1BCA44E44CC20486115CB9B502 : B733F64ECA56C4C9B8D32316BAFB110BAE4EBF340134903ADB2AE74CE9172 : AE9CE754F182ACE7488E9CA667135DBF0E3C6D9C6A4ED4550F1098013386A : B3D29C070A55942C70FD2C86A32CC0761A104AC90C3ABA322596D26CD13F9 : 635D5FF013D852E2D4B1524B7F828FD 1242 84: SET: 1244 35: SEQUENCE: Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 24] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 1246 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:localKeyID [1.2.840.113549.1.9.21] 1257 22: SET: 1259 20: OCTET STRING: : 795574F9D4B6E4C20224286998673FF00A14C04D 1281 45: SEQUENCE: 1283 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:friendlyName [1.2.840.113549.1.9.20] 1294 32: SET: 1296 30: BMP STRING:'p12FriendlyName' 1328 94: SEQUENCE: 1330 78: SEQUENCE: 1332 10: SEQUENCE: 1334 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER:[1.2.643.7.1.1.2.3] 1344 64: OCTET STRING: : E9E1EDB62665DD9EF474C40F7DC90BB342E27CA7105E3A9B0B9B675942AB771637B9CEA5B5BA4FFB54E71F57 : 9AF66CA9BC9EC2CEB36ACF4FC8413A878066F388 1410 8: OCTET STRING:'C62141F0E888C6D9' 1420 2: INTEGER:2048 A.3.3. Decrypted key value in BASE64 format MIHiAgEBMBcGCCqFAwcBAQECMAsGCSqFAwcBAgECAQRAEWkl+eblsHWs86SNgRKq SxMOgGhbvR/uZ5/WWfdNG1axvUwVhpcXIxDZUmzQuNzqJBkseI7f5/JjXyTFRF1a +YGBgQG0i7davCkOGGVcYqFPtS1fUIROzB0fYARIe0tclTRpare/qzRuVRapqzzO +K21LDpYVfDPs2Sqa13ZN+Ts/JUlv59qCFB2cYpFyB/0kh4+K79yvz7r8+4WE0Em Zf8T3ae/J1Jo6xGunecH1/G4hMts9HYLnxbwJDMNVGuIHV6gzg== A.3.4. Decrypted key value in ASN.1 format 0 226:SEQUENCE : 3 1: INTEGER : 1 6 23: SEQUENCE : 8 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : [1.2.643.7.1.1.1.2] 18 11: SEQUENCE : 20 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : [1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.1] 31 64: OCTET STRING : : 116925F9E6E5B075ACF3A48D8112AA4B130E80685BBD1FEE679FD6 : 59F74D1B56B1BD4C158697172310D9526CD0B8DCEA24192C788EDF : E7F2635F24C5445D5AF9 97 129: CONTEXT SPECIFIC (1) : : 01B48BB75ABC290E18655C62A14FB52D5F50844ECC1D1F6004487B : 4B5C9534696AB7BFAB346E5516A9AB3CCEF8ADB52C3A5855F0CFB3 : 64AA6B5DD937E4ECFC9525BF9F6A085076718A45C81FF4921E3E2B : BF72BF3EEBF3EE1613412665FF13DDA7BF275268EB11AE9DE707D7 : F1B884CB6CF4760B9F16F024330D546B881D5EA0CE Author's Address Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 25] Internet-Draft GOST The transport key containers September 2023 Ekaterina Karelina (editor) InfoTeCS 2B stroenie 1, ul. Otradnaya Moscow 127273 Russian Federation Email: Ekaterina.Karelina@infotecs.ru Karelina Expires 17 March 2024 [Page 26]