Network Working Group J. Schlyter Internet-Draft Kirei AB Intended status: Standards Track 15 November 2026 Expires: 19 May 2027 JSON Web Key (JWK) for DNSSEC draft-schlyter-dnsop-dnssec-jwk-00 Abstract This document specifies how to represent DNSSEC public and private keys as JSON Web Keys (JWK). The cryptographic key material is encoded using the existing JWK key types, and the DNS-specific information needed to reconstruct the corresponding DNSKEY resource record (owner name, algorithm, protocol and flags) is carried in a new JWK parameter, "dnskey". This gives DNSSEC signers, key management systems and other tools a standardized, interoperable format for exchanging and storing DNSSEC keys. Discussion Venues This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/jschlyter/draft-schlyter-dnsop-dnssec-jwk. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. DNSSEC Keys as JSON Web Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. The "dnskey" Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Key Timing and Other Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.4. Other JWK Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5. Algorithms Without a JWK Representation . . . . . . . . . 6 2.6. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.7. Key Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Appendix A. Example Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 A.1. RSA/SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 A.2. ECDSA Curve P-256 with SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 A.3. Ed25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 A.4. ML-DSA-44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 A.5. Ed25519 with Escaped Owner Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1. Introduction DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC9364] use public key cryptography to sign DNS data. The public keys are published in the DNS as DNSKEY resource records [RFC4034], but there is no standardized format for storing or exchanging the corresponding private keys. In practice, implementations use their own formats, the most widespread being the BIND "Private-key-format" text files, which have never been formally specified. This makes it unnecessarily hard to move keys between signers, key management systems and tooling, for example when changing DNS operator or signer Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 implementation. JSON Web Key (JWK) [RFC7517] is a well-established and widely implemented JSON [RFC8259] format for representing cryptographic keys, with defined encodings for RSA, elliptic curve, Edwards curves and ML-DSA keys [RFC7518] [RFC8037] [I-D.ietf-cose-dilithium], covering the signature schemes used by DNSSEC. A JWK alone, however, does not carry the information needed to construct a DNSKEY resource record: the owner name, DNSSEC algorithm number, flags and protocol fields. This document defines a profile of JWK for DNSSEC keys. A DNSSEC key is represented as a plain JWK, with the key material encoded as specified for its JWK key type, and the DNSKEY metadata included in a new JWK parameter named "dnskey". Since the result is a valid JWK, existing JWK libraries can be used to parse and produce such keys, and applications that do not understand the "dnskey" parameter can still use the key material. 1.1. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 1.2. Terminology This document uses DNSSEC terminology as defined in [RFC4033] and [RFC4034], and JWK terminology as defined in [RFC7517]. DNSSEC JWK: A JWK that represents a DNSSEC key and contains a "dnskey" parameter as specified in this document. Producer: An entity that creates a DNSSEC JWK, for example a key generator or a tool exporting keys from a signer. Consumer: An entity that parses a DNSSEC JWK, for example a signer importing a key. JSON Integer: A JSON number that is represented as an integer. 2. DNSSEC Keys as JSON Web Key A DNSSEC JWK is a JWK as defined in [RFC7517], consisting of: Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 1. the key material for the key, encoded using the JWK key type and parameters corresponding to the DNSSEC algorithm, as specified in Section 2.1; 2. a "dnskey" parameter, as specified in Section 2.2; and 3. optionally, other JWK parameters, as specified in Section 2.4. A DNSSEC JWK representing a private key contains both the public and private key parameters for the key type. A DNSSEC JWK representing a public key contains only the public key parameters. A public DNSSEC JWK can be derived from a private DNSSEC JWK by removing the private key parameters, as described in Section 6 of [RFC7518] and [RFC8037]. 2.1. Key Material DNSSEC algorithms are identified by the numbers registered in the "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers" registry [IANA-DNSSEC-ALG], and the specification referenced for each algorithm in that registry defines its underlying signature scheme and DNSKEY public key encoding. The key material of a DNSSEC key MUST be encoded using the JWK key type ("kty") registered in the "JSON Web Key Types" registry [IANA-JOSE] for that signature scheme, together with any key type specific parameters, such as "crv" for elliptic curve keys. For example: * RSA keys use the "RSA" key type (Section 6.3 of [RFC7518]). * ECDSA keys use the "EC" key type, with "crv" identifying the curve (Section 6.2 of [RFC7518]). * EdDSA keys use the "OKP" key type, with "crv" identifying the curve [RFC8037]. * ML-DSA keys use the "AKP" key type, with "alg" identifying the parameter set [I-D.ietf-cose-dilithium]. A DNSSEC algorithm for which no corresponding JWK representation exists cannot be represented using this specification; see Section 2.5. The JWK key types do not, in general, identify the DNSSEC algorithm; for example, the same RSA key could be used with algorithm 8 (RSASHA256) or 10 (RSASHA512). The DNSSEC algorithm is therefore always given by the "algorithm" member of the "dnskey" parameter. For RSA private keys, Producers MUST include all of the private key parameters "d", "p", "q", "dp", "dq" and "qi" (Section 6.3.2 of [RFC7518]). Producers MUST NOT include the "oth" parameter. Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 The public key field of the DNSKEY RDATA is derived from the JWK public key parameters using the encoding specified for the DNSSEC algorithm. 2.2. The "dnskey" Parameter The "dnskey" parameter is a JSON object holding the fields of the DNSKEY resource record that are not part of the key material, optionally along with the key tag. It contains the following members, all of which are REQUIRED unless stated otherwise: name: The owner name of the DNSKEY resource record, as a JSON string. The name MUST be fully qualified (i.e., end with a "."), and MUST be in DNS presentation format as specified in Section 5.1 of [RFC1035], with octets that are not printable ASCII, as well as ".", "\", and other special characters within a label, represented using the "\DDD" escapes. Note that, in JSON, the backslash itself is escaped, so the label "b\000rken" appears as "b\\000rken" in the serialized JWK. flags: The value of the Flags field (Section 2.1.1 of [RFC4034]), as a JSON integer in the range 0 to 65535. protocol: The value of the Protocol field (Section 2.1.2 of [RFC4034]), as a JSON integer. This MUST be 3. algorithm: The DNSSEC algorithm number (Section 2.1.3 of [RFC4034]), as a JSON integer. keytag: OPTIONAL. The key tag of the DNSKEY resource record, as computed per Appendix B of [RFC4034], as a JSON integer. The key tag is redundant, since it can be computed from the other fields and the key material. Producers SHOULD include it to make the key easy to identify for humans and tools (e.g., to match a key with a DS record or RRSIG) without performing that computation, and to allow Consumers to detect inconsistencies. Consumers MUST ignore unrecognized members of the "dnskey" object. 2.3. Key Timing and Other Metadata Key management metadata, such as the times at which a key was created or is to be published, activated, retired or removed, is out of scope for this specification. Such information is not part of the DNSKEY resource record and is therefore not included in the "dnskey" parameter. It could be specified in the future as a separate JWK parameter. Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 2.4. Other JWK Parameters Producers SHOULD include a "kid" (Key ID) parameter (Section 4.5 of [RFC7517]). When included, it is RECOMMENDED that its value be the JWK Thumbprint [RFC7638] of the key, computed using SHA-256. Note that the "kid" is not the same as the DNSSEC key tag, which is not unique and is optionally carried in the "dnskey" parameter. The "alg" parameter (Section 4.4 of [RFC7517]) is OPTIONAL, except where required by the key type. When included, it MUST be consistent with the DNSSEC algorithm. Other JWK parameters, such as "use" or "key_ops", MAY be included. Consumers MAY ignore them. 2.5. Algorithms Without a JWK Representation This specification does not define any new JWK key types or key type specific parameters. It can therefore only be used for DNSSEC algorithms whose key material already has a JWK representation, i.e., a key type registered in the "JSON Web Key Types" registry and, where applicable, a curve registered in the "JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve" registry or a parameter set identified by "alg" [IANA-JOSE]. Keys for other DNSSEC algorithms cannot be represented using this specification. At the time of writing, this includes, for example, DSA (algorithms 3 and 6), ECC-GOST (algorithm 12), SM2SM3 (algorithm 17) and ECC-GOST12 (algorithm 23). What is required is a JWK representation of the key material, not a registered JSON Web Signature algorithm matching the DNSSEC algorithm. For example, RSA/SHA-512 (algorithm 10) keys use the "RSA" key type regardless of which "alg" values are registered for use with that key type. Support for an additional DNSSEC algorithm can be added by registering a JWK representation for its key material, without updating this specification. Documents defining new DNSSEC algorithms are encouraged to specify such a representation, if one does not already exist. 2.6. Processing Rules A Consumer importing a DNSSEC JWK MUST: 1. verify that the "dnskey" parameter is present and contains all required members with values of the correct type; Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 2. verify that the JWK key type and its parameters (e.g., "crv" or "alg") are consistent with the DNSSEC algorithm; 3. construct the DNSKEY RDATA from the "flags", "protocol" and "algorithm" members and the public key material; 4. if the "keytag" member is present, compute the key tag of the resulting DNSKEY RDATA and verify that it is equal to the "keytag" member (if specified); and 5. for a private key, verify that the private key corresponds to the public key. If any of these checks fail, the Consumer MUST reject the key. 2.7. Key Sets Multiple DNSSEC JWKs, for example all the keys of a zone, MAY be represented as a JWK Set (Section 5 of [RFC7517]), where each key in the set carries its own "dnskey" parameter. 3. Examples This section shows a public DNSSEC JWK. Example private DNSSEC JWKs for a selection of DNSSEC algorithms, together with their DNSKEY resource records, are given in Appendix A. The following public key is derived from the ECDSA Curve P-256 with SHA-256 private key in Appendix A.2 by removing the private key parameter "d": { "kid": "ni1azkx1Qe3zOuUw1eRd3oNN_91av68ll49pGTLF_BM", "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "x": "9cqheie08FXlvnU17YJJm1FMUXD4rwi7-4atSdZ3og8", "y": "PR66xkQK4YKumafBX4tYV4N008RfZHQZdMxs_7ToK5A", "dnskey": { "name": "example.com.", "flags": 256, "protocol": 3, "algorithm": 13, "keytag": 9115 } } Figure 1: ECDSA Curve P-256 with SHA-256 Public Key Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 4. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to register the following parameter in the "JSON Web Key Parameters" registry [RFC7517]: Parameter Name: dnskey Parameter Description: DNSSEC DNSKEY Parameters Used with "kty" Value(s): * Parameter Information Class: Public Change Controller: IETF Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of this document 5. Security Considerations A DNSSEC JWK containing a private key is sensitive, and compromise of it allows an attacker to sign arbitrary data for the zone. Such keys MUST be protected against unauthorized access, both when stored and when transmitted. Files containing private keys SHOULD only be readable by the entities that need them. When a private key is transported over an untrusted channel or stored in an untrusted location, it SHOULD be encrypted, for example using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516]. Producers MUST take care not to accidentally publish a private DNSSEC JWK when a public key was intended. Consumers that only need the public key SHOULD discard any private key parameters. The "dnskey" parameter is not cryptographically bound to the key material. An attacker able to modify a DNSSEC JWK could change, for example, the owner name or flags, causing the key to be used for a different zone or in a different role than intended. The key tag check in the processing rules (when the "keytag" member is present) detects accidental inconsistencies, but not deliberate modification, since an attacker can recompute the key tag. The integrity of DNSSEC JWKs MUST therefore be ensured by other means, such as an authenticated transport or a digital signature over the key. The security considerations of [RFC7517], [RFC7518], [RFC8037] and [RFC4034] also apply. 6. References 6.1. Normative References Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 [IANA-DNSSEC-ALG] IANA, "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers", n.d., . [IANA-JOSE] IANA, "JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)", n.d., . [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, November 1987, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005, . [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, . [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, . [RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September 2015, . [RFC8037] Liusvaara, I., "CFRG Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Signatures in JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)", RFC 8037, DOI 10.17487/RFC8037, January 2017, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, . Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 6.2. Informative References [I-D.ietf-cose-dilithium] Prorock, M. and O. Steele, "ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-cose- dilithium-11, 15 November 2025, . [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, . [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, . [RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu, "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020, . [RFC9364] Hoffman, P., "DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)", BCP 237, RFC 9364, DOI 10.17487/RFC9364, February 2023, . Appendix A. Example Keys This appendix contains example private DNSSEC JWKs, each followed by the DNSKEY resource record it corresponds to. The keys were generated for this document and are not to be used for any other purpose. Long lines are wrapped using the single backslash strategy described in [RFC8792]. The owner name of the last example, "b\000rken.example.com.", has a zero octet in its first label. In DNS presentation format this octet is written "\000", and because the backslash is escaped again in JSON, it appears as "b\\000rken" in the serialized JWK. A.1. RSA/SHA-256 The following private key uses RSA/SHA-256 (algorithm 8, mnemonic RSASHA256), with owner name "example.com." and key tag 49458: Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ { "kid": "jScRJOUR4SgZYG33jZLNS2rCnBVUweOV8vJczsU0eJ0", "kty": "RSA", "n": "xxNpapt2fBfaMG5rW1rJYRTT2lLRvh3MMlWaKNxW44Q494NSaT0b8sHFBrkn\ OqWjA1cRoeHVRdoartG6IlZlZnnCju6FhXb1mWk6IpSlj8fUNjrowPqTbGyw2FA00j3n\ l0UJbhwwDp9HiFj-uAm0pX_oMYmEEkTNHrjW4eb6REPg8-EboU5PcDZx_HHiCPVkyc4C\ XKRf5ZEBhYnPIYcxuwei_rKj8QOheszdHDcbw6ysg9GG8yB9Q3P0AvgwDoPevUTL18yJ\ u-DMaHWpSJ2H2tQ45Jqy0lmdF3dImQUipXswc51RM09cGZe8i3nH2GqjM-1GzfFtAdZ3\ M5plbCfndw", "e": "AQAB", "d": "A2xPIG3ags-KlgRoCyxlKkRIUK8I4grmhnak9A8dEJENXunFD0zLzLsa1X7c\ ilK4mieZ0YQUSnAYJY__2KeBdQ28VABAKOdyDKvCO9ljfJsg7oSWMpWvo3ckL7jQiubu\ mWuVLTpsQLjp0XhHFPuk8NphfNL5A7MA9ezGurnhufrxaOf2dD6sKU9afePsnEfNS2Ex\ VmgGcJE5WzFnso1s0tAROWj2SkTJwSENqEx2vjSMySJAWBkG7otL5NDm4xXkuALrxx1C\ CTVJR5y5SGypSZOYDE7VFj-E9KE2E2L7aReZ7omoYXTWvgPy6XO4Y9pDR8Sq0W7O9yTs\ gvUe_u_xYQ", "p": "-3yQvGcP2er34X2QGI99uUoALS0E1SQNEny-xFP-QM82ootCTTEQMkT399BH\ l-d4DKPLpxssCLUm-KVntR4NetqDSWEqS9h3gsrkT8g6luhcFTJWnsYgiWTvFZwqMT_j\ ofRFsgvpuEDN_SeGXAFLpl3APMV1Qx6eF4vKcG1f-CE", "q": "yqYMqT0IO1Kx_XXEzLjSqG_Ew8MclvTuvp7CEjITedoNvTaVJAPs-jxN4_ea\ xT9Mrx88iXYvyS8WKB2SLu4x9wvu4NhmgcCUrh3fqCkBkpgU81qPLrjfRmnpp5h0cZK0\ puMHFcejv8bSH8Gstz6tPDXlNeZnOAF1j6Nxds-LDJc", "dp": "b_UsmjNnoyQv5nr3w3deCTcgjPwVwq2iBDD03IJoFoIpWIOWqLbG9xotKm3\ W8ZFiqH3jFCnMmLPM_bTlToRqi97rw6c2JT3hNqEMs1f4fWZEWEtotJaPtZrxtTUos3Q\ 16svMm08iZZy0F5eZASyyeQYTpvphEdh3mRPqs9J9fwE", "dq": "HGtzJRzpFaDAU4J7qhZVfMfH-YhYbxdEkDklkHWzY4hgGuQXwGhIiMOCTPF\ BpF3_PCQOUlzf0MAoxFF5WdmP6kyjIKdYoOPINi78WdH-ZXesoIBXyj6lGXPrD9UCp5b\ ifPEj4jsQTOnuOAPqW_yPQP1x-sAoQ6N4wD80v2vV3Vs", "qi": "M-N7jYUpFWAqAUYgC7eZDGi0Pab-fpY01GvLxhYmclq1SdXpG4wOPIozXOd\ dRpMqYTKKgFksBsQRb2hNXkUxrHrNx5FzsUpzDk7F4RqfXjS-lT4ASO1BTeDdr_FVoLM\ 8UnWHlFxmC5ZkUiL0W31i4TA9PMwGmjOaYCW213C6Gm0", "dnskey": { "name": "example.com.", "flags": 256, "protocol": 3, "algorithm": 8, "keytag": 49458 } } Figure 2: RSA/SHA-256 Private Key The corresponding DNSKEY resource record is: Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 example.com. IN DNSKEY 256 3 8 ( AwEAAccTaWqbdnwX2jBua1tayWEU09pS0b4dzDJVmijcVuOEOPeDUmk9 G/LBxQa5JzqlowNXEaHh1UXaGq7RuiJWZWZ5wo7uhYV29ZlpOiKUpY/H 1DY66MD6k2xssNhQNNI955dFCW4cMA6fR4hY/rgJtKV/6DGJhBJEzR64 1uHm+kRD4PPhG6FOT3A2cfxx4gj1ZMnOAlykX+WRAYWJzyGHMbsHov6y o/EDoXrM3Rw3G8OsrIPRhvMgfUNz9AL4MA6D3r1Ey9fMibvgzGh1qUid h9rUOOSastJZnRd3SJkFIqV7MHOdUTNPXBmXvIt5x9hqozPtRs3xbQHW dzOaZWwn53c= ) Figure 3: RSA/SHA-256 DNSKEY Resource Record A.2. ECDSA Curve P-256 with SHA-256 The following private key uses ECDSA Curve P-256 with SHA-256 (algorithm 13, mnemonic ECDSAP256SHA256), with owner name "example.com." and key tag 9115: { "kid": "ni1azkx1Qe3zOuUw1eRd3oNN_91av68ll49pGTLF_BM", "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "x": "9cqheie08FXlvnU17YJJm1FMUXD4rwi7-4atSdZ3og8", "y": "PR66xkQK4YKumafBX4tYV4N008RfZHQZdMxs_7ToK5A", "d": "ZaTVn0mC1OgwzCvuQ1V3qf6z-6mMjDStD2QzzUQoHxA", "dnskey": { "name": "example.com.", "flags": 256, "protocol": 3, "algorithm": 13, "keytag": 9115 } } Figure 4: ECDSA Curve P-256 with SHA-256 Private Key The corresponding DNSKEY resource record is: example.com. IN DNSKEY 256 3 13 ( 9cqheie08FXlvnU17YJJm1FMUXD4rwi7+4atSdZ3og89HrrGRArhgq6Z p8Ffi1hXg3TTxF9kdBl0zGz/tOgrkA== ) Figure 5: ECDSA Curve P-256 with SHA-256 DNSKEY Resource Record A.3. Ed25519 The following private key uses Ed25519 (algorithm 15, mnemonic ED25519), with owner name "example.com." and key tag 63713: Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 { "kid": "sddEIwsSByQMb2_YrSxRWGFZoIZSxVP9SWB7_IZ4X5Q", "kty": "OKP", "crv": "Ed25519", "x": "xX2gT6qJ76coFM3_pAUBxfBZYGnfSZqbNvbZFI428Ao", "d": "Dz9KOncZ00D1WiPEJR_Ec_WXR7YuCbdhUO_H9AERYvw", "dnskey": { "name": "example.com.", "flags": 256, "protocol": 3, "algorithm": 15, "keytag": 63713 } } Figure 6: Ed25519 Private Key The corresponding DNSKEY resource record is: example.com. IN DNSKEY 256 3 15 ( xX2gT6qJ76coFM3/pAUBxfBZYGnfSZqbNvbZFI428Ao= ) Figure 7: Ed25519 DNSKEY Resource Record A.4. ML-DSA-44 The following private key uses ML-DSA-44 (algorithm 18, mnemonic MLDSA44), with owner name "example.com." and key tag 59828: Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ { "kid": "XqS8KAWB0Sc42bmWeKxan98eQKcHS4DVOHGc_kr_68E", "kty": "AKP", "alg": "ML-DSA-44", "pub": "17K0clSq4NtF55MNSpjSyX2PE5fReJ2voXAksxbpvslPyZRtQvGbeadBO7\ qjPnFJy0LtURVpOsBB-suYit61_g4dhjEYSZW1ksOX0ilOLhT5CqQUujgmiZrEP0zMrL\ wm6agyuVEY1ctDPL75ZgsAE44IF_YediyidMNq1VTrIqrBFi5KsBrLoeOMTv2PgLZbMz\ 0PcuVd_nHOnB67mInnxWEGwP1zgDoq7P6v3teqPLLO2lTRK9jNNqeM-XWUO0er0l6ICs\ RS5XQu0ejRqCr6huWQx1jBWuTShA2SvKGlCQ9ASWWX_KfYuVE_GhvabpUKqpjeRnUH1K\ T1pPBZkhZYLDVy9i7aiQWrNYFnDEoCd3oz4Mpylf2PT_bRoKOnaD1l9fX3_GDaAj6CbF\ -SFEwC99G6EHWYdVPqk2f8122ZC3-pnNRa_biDbUPkWfUYffBYR5cJoB6mg1k1-nBGCZ\ DNPcG6QBupS6sd3kGsZ6szGdysoGBI1MTu8n7hOpwX0FOPQw8tZC3CQVZg3niHfY2KvH\ JSOXjAQuQoX0MZhGxEEmJCl2hEwQ5Va6IVtacZ5Z0MayqW05hZBx_cws3nUkp77a5U6F\ sxjoVOj-Ky8-36yXGRKCcKr9HlBEw6T9r9n_MfkHhLjo5FlhRKDa9YZRHT2ZYrnqla8Z\ e05fxg8rHtFd46W-9fib3HnZEFHZsoFudPpUUx79wcvnTUSIV_R2vNWPIcC2U7O3ak4H\ amVZowJxhVXMY_dIWaq6uSXwI4YcqM0Pe62yhx9n1VMm10URNa1F9KG6aRGPuyyKMO7J\ OS7z-XcGbJrdXHEMxkexUU0hfZWMcBfD6Q_SDATmdLkEhuk3CjGgAdMvRzl55JBnSefk\ d_oLdFCPil8jeDErg8Jb04jKCw__dHi69CtxZn7arJfEaxKWQ-WG5bBVoMIRlG1PNuZ1\ vtWGD6BCoxXZgmFk1qkjfDWl-_SVSQpb1N8ki5XEqud4S2BWcxZqxCRbW0sIKgnpMj5i\ 8geMW3Z4NEbe_XNq06NwLUmwiYRJAKYYMzl7xEGbMNepegs4fBkRR0xNQbU-Mql3rLbw\ 6nXbZbs55Z5wHnaVfe9vLURVnDGncSK1IE47XCGfFoixTtC8C4AbPm6C3NQ-nA6fQXRM\ 2YFb0byIINi7Ej8E-s0bG2hd1aKxuNu_PtkzZw8JWhgLTxktCLELj6u9_MKyRRjjLuoK\ XgyQTKhEeACD87DNLQuLavZ7w1W5SUAl3HsKePqA46Lb_rUTKIUdYHgZjpSTZRrnh-wC\ UfkiujDp9R32Km1yeEzz3SBTkxdt-jJKUSvZSXCjbdNKUUqGeR8Os28BRbCatkZRtKAx\ OymWEaKhxIiRYnWYdooxFAYLpEQ0ht9RUioc6IswmFwhb45u0XjdVnswSg1Mr7qIKig0\ LxepqiauWNtjAIPSw1j99WbD9dYqQoVnvJ6ozpXKoPNUdLC_qPM5olCrTfzyCDvo7vvB\ BV4Y_hU3DuyyYFZtg_8GshGq7EPKKbVMzQD4gVokZe8LRlFcx-QfMSTwnv_3OTCatYsp\ oUWaALzlA46TjJZ49y6w5O5f2q5m2fhXP8l_xCtJWfS_i2HXhDPoawM11ukZHE2L9Iez\ kFwQjP1qwksM633LfPUfhNDtaHuV6uscUzwG8NlwI9kqcIJYN7Wbpst9TlawqHwgOGKu\ jzFbpZJejt76Z5NpoiAnZhUfFqll-fgeznbMBwtVhp5NuXhM8FyDCzJCyDEg", "priv": "AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8", "dnskey": { "name": "example.com.", "flags": 256, "protocol": 3, "algorithm": 18, "keytag": 59828 } } Figure 8: ML-DSA-44 Private Key The corresponding DNSKEY resource record is: Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 example.com. IN DNSKEY 256 3 18 ( 17K0clSq4NtF55MNSpjSyX2PE5fReJ2voXAksxbpvslPyZRtQvGbeadB O7qjPnFJy0LtURVpOsBB+suYit61/g4dhjEYSZW1ksOX0ilOLhT5CqQU ujgmiZrEP0zMrLwm6agyuVEY1ctDPL75ZgsAE44IF/YediyidMNq1VTr IqrBFi5KsBrLoeOMTv2PgLZbMz0PcuVd/nHOnB67mInnxWEGwP1zgDoq 7P6v3teqPLLO2lTRK9jNNqeM+XWUO0er0l6ICsRS5XQu0ejRqCr6huWQ x1jBWuTShA2SvKGlCQ9ASWWX/KfYuVE/GhvabpUKqpjeRnUH1KT1pPBZ khZYLDVy9i7aiQWrNYFnDEoCd3oz4Mpylf2PT/bRoKOnaD1l9fX3/GDa Aj6CbF+SFEwC99G6EHWYdVPqk2f8122ZC3+pnNRa/biDbUPkWfUYffBY R5cJoB6mg1k1+nBGCZDNPcG6QBupS6sd3kGsZ6szGdysoGBI1MTu8n7h OpwX0FOPQw8tZC3CQVZg3niHfY2KvHJSOXjAQuQoX0MZhGxEEmJCl2hE wQ5Va6IVtacZ5Z0MayqW05hZBx/cws3nUkp77a5U6FsxjoVOj+Ky8+36 yXGRKCcKr9HlBEw6T9r9n/MfkHhLjo5FlhRKDa9YZRHT2ZYrnqla8Ze0 5fxg8rHtFd46W+9fib3HnZEFHZsoFudPpUUx79wcvnTUSIV/R2vNWPIc C2U7O3ak4HamVZowJxhVXMY/dIWaq6uSXwI4YcqM0Pe62yhx9n1VMm10 URNa1F9KG6aRGPuyyKMO7JOS7z+XcGbJrdXHEMxkexUU0hfZWMcBfD6Q /SDATmdLkEhuk3CjGgAdMvRzl55JBnSefkd/oLdFCPil8jeDErg8Jb04 jKCw//dHi69CtxZn7arJfEaxKWQ+WG5bBVoMIRlG1PNuZ1vtWGD6BCox XZgmFk1qkjfDWl+/SVSQpb1N8ki5XEqud4S2BWcxZqxCRbW0sIKgnpMj 5i8geMW3Z4NEbe/XNq06NwLUmwiYRJAKYYMzl7xEGbMNepegs4fBkRR0 xNQbU+Mql3rLbw6nXbZbs55Z5wHnaVfe9vLURVnDGncSK1IE47XCGfFo ixTtC8C4AbPm6C3NQ+nA6fQXRM2YFb0byIINi7Ej8E+s0bG2hd1aKxuN u/PtkzZw8JWhgLTxktCLELj6u9/MKyRRjjLuoKXgyQTKhEeACD87DNLQ uLavZ7w1W5SUAl3HsKePqA46Lb/rUTKIUdYHgZjpSTZRrnh+wCUfkiuj Dp9R32Km1yeEzz3SBTkxdt+jJKUSvZSXCjbdNKUUqGeR8Os28BRbCatk ZRtKAxOymWEaKhxIiRYnWYdooxFAYLpEQ0ht9RUioc6IswmFwhb45u0X jdVnswSg1Mr7qIKig0LxepqiauWNtjAIPSw1j99WbD9dYqQoVnvJ6ozp XKoPNUdLC/qPM5olCrTfzyCDvo7vvBBV4Y/hU3DuyyYFZtg/8GshGq7E PKKbVMzQD4gVokZe8LRlFcx+QfMSTwnv/3OTCatYspoUWaALzlA46TjJ Z49y6w5O5f2q5m2fhXP8l/xCtJWfS/i2HXhDPoawM11ukZHE2L9IezkF wQjP1qwksM633LfPUfhNDtaHuV6uscUzwG8NlwI9kqcIJYN7Wbpst9Tl awqHwgOGKujzFbpZJejt76Z5NpoiAnZhUfFqll+fgeznbMBwtVhp5NuX hM8FyDCzJCyDEg== ) Figure 9: ML-DSA-44 DNSKEY Resource Record A.5. Ed25519 with Escaped Owner Name The following private key uses Ed25519 (algorithm 15, mnemonic ED25519), with owner name "b\000rken.example.com." and key tag 17078: Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft JWK for DNSSEC November 2026 { "kid": "uJYXQ0ZhGzTiAt0jgXgPDWKExUB3cls1NXInBRsqYU0", "kty": "OKP", "crv": "Ed25519", "x": "w_VxpL9dTguTG_ivgqZFa9lkjiPkR-g15ktPAhuTIt8", "d": "NQ4G7dnYiYJMO2UYGqG82Rn2zsX24P6lfiteOBR78PA", "dnskey": { "name": "b\\000rken.example.com.", "flags": 256, "protocol": 3, "algorithm": 15, "keytag": 17078 } } Figure 10: Ed25519 with Escaped Owner Name Private Key The corresponding DNSKEY resource record is: b\000rken.example.com. IN DNSKEY 256 3 15 ( w/VxpL9dTguTG/ivgqZFa9lkjiPkR+g15ktPAhuTIt8= ) Figure 11: Ed25519 with Escaped Owner Name DNSKEY Resource Record Acknowledgements The author thanks Paul Hoffman (ICANN) and Johan Stenstam (Swedish Internet Foundation) for valuable insights. Author's Address Jakob Schlyter Kirei AB Email: jakob@kirei.se Schlyter Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 16]