Network Working Group K. Singh Internet-Draft APEX Infrastructure Intended status: Experimental 15 November 2026 Expires: 19 May 2027 Binding Decisions and Settlements to Agent Action Records draft-singh-psi-agent-03 Abstract This document extends [I-D.psi-agent-01], which records what a software agent did. A record of an action does not show who said the work was to be done, what the model asked to do, what a policy engine permitted, or what was paid. This document defines four statements -- a mandate, a proposal, a decision, and a settlement -- and the rules that bind them to a chain of action records under one run identifier. Each statement is signed by its own party with its own key. A verifier that holds the statements can test, offline and without trusting the agent, whether the action chain is unbroken, whether the decision that permitted it was signed by a key other than the one named as the acting key, and whether the amount settled lay inside the limit the mandate declared. A valid envelope shows that identified parties made these statements and that the statements have not changed since they were sealed. It does not show that any statement was correct, sufficient, lawful, or true, and it makes no legal representation of any kind. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Scope of the novelty claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Relationship to [I-D.psi-agent-01] . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4. Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.5. The action record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Canonical form, algorithms, keys and numbers . . . . . . . 7 4.1. Signed bytes and identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. alg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.3. kid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.4. Dates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.5. Decimal strings and assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.6. Alternative transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. The envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6.1. Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6.2. The envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.3. The chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.4. Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.5. Keys, money and time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.6. The anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6.7. Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 11. Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1. Introduction Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 [I-D.psi-agent-01] seals a hash chain of agent actions. That answers one question: was this recorded action altered, or omitted from the chain. It does not answer the four questions an examiner of a disputed run asks first. Who said this work was to be done, and within what limits. What did the model ask to do. What did a policy engine permit. What was paid. Those four answers are normally produced by four different parties on four different systems, and none of them is in a position to sign the others. This document gives each a statement of its own, sealed on its own, and defines the checks that join them. This document is a format and a verification procedure. It is not a runtime, a permission system, a policy language, a payment protocol, an identity authority, or a legal rule. It assumes a decision engine that the agent runtime cannot write to and cannot invoke on the agent's behalf; that assumption is a deployment property and this profile cannot verify it. The status of this document is Experimental as defined in [RFC2026]. This revision corrects five things in the previous revision: the label of the author address, the date of the novelty statement, the description of the check against collusion, the definition of the anchor, and the binding of the settlement to the decision. 1.1. Scope of the novelty claim Action logs, signed allow or deny receipts, mandate and delegation credentials, Merkle transparency logs, and machine payment rails each exist separately as at the date of this document. What this document specifies, and states no prior document known to the authors as at 15 November 2026 specifies, is a settlement statement that a verifier checks against the spend limit declared in a separately signed mandate, bound to the same run as the action chain it paid for. Removing that check removes the reason for this document to exist; the remaining statements are conventional and are specified here only so that the check has inputs. 1.2. Relationship to [I-D.psi-agent-01] This document does not redefine the action record. It extends it, and Section 3.5 lists every extension and every new rule it imposes. Where this document and [I-D.psi-agent-01] differ on the action record, this document applies. 2. Conventions and Terminology 2.1. Requirements Language Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2.2. Terminology Run: a bounded sequence of actions taken by one software agent against one declared objective. Run identifier: an opaque identifier, chosen before any statement is written, shared by every statement of one run. Statement: one of the four objects defined in Section 3, or the envelope of Section 5. A statement is sealed by the party that issues it and carries that party's signature. Action record: the record defined in [I-D.psi-agent-01]. It is not a statement: it carries no signature of its own, and its digest is the SHA-256 digest defined in [I-D.psi-agent-01]. Signed bytes: the byte sequence defined in Section 4.1. Seal: a signature over the signed bytes, together with the identifier of the key that produced it. Digest reference: the string "sha256:" followed by the sixty-four lowercase hexadecimal digits of a SHA-256 digest. Envelope: the object of Section 5. Issuer: the party that seals a statement. Verifier: a party that performs Section 6. 3. Statements Four statements are defined. A statement that a run does not contain is recorded in the envelope by the literal string "absent". An empty object, an empty string, and omission of the envelope field all mean "malformed", not "absent". Every statement carries: ver, the profile version, which is the string "1"; the run identifier; its own identifier field; alg; kid; and sig. 3.1. Mandate Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 { "ver": "1", "mid": , "run": , "principal": , "purpose": , "scope": [], "limits": { "max_actions": , "max_spend": , "currencies": [] }, "not_before": , "not_after": , "alg": , "kid": , "sig": } ver, mid, run, principal, alg, kid and sig are MUST. purpose, scope, limits, not_before and not_after are SHOULD. A mandate records that a key attributed to a principal signed this declaration. It does not show that the principal was entitled to make it. 3.2. Proposal { "ver": "1", "pid": , "run": , "mid": , "proposer": , "intent": , "args_digest": , "alg": , "kid": , "sig": } ver, pid, run, mid, proposer, intent, args_digest, alg, kid and sig are MUST. A proposal is what was asked for, before permission. It is not evidence that anything was executed. 3.3. Decision Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 { "ver": "1", "did": , "run": , "pid": , "verdict": "allow" | "deny" | "require_human", "policy_digest": , "decided_by": , "reason": , "alg": , "kid": , "sig": } ver, did, run, pid, verdict, policy_digest, decided_by, alg, kid and sig are MUST. reason is SHOULD. The key named by kid is the key of the decision authority. Section 6.6 tests that it is not the key named as the acting key of the actions the decision permits. "require_human" records that the policy engine referred the proposal to a person. It does not record that the person approved it. A deployment that wants to record the human outcome records it as a further decision. 3.4. Settlement A settlement is a statement that a payment was made for this run. The party that signs it SHOULD be the payment provider rather than the agent, because the agent knows only what it asked for. { "ver": "1", "sid": , "run": , "did": , "payer": , "payee": , "amount": , "asset": , "status": "initiated" | "authorised" | "captured" | "settled" | "failed" | "refunded" | "reversed" | "disputed", "ref": , "scheme": , "observed_at": , "alg": , "kid": , "sig": } Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 ver, sid, run, payer, payee, amount, asset, status, alg, kid and sig are MUST. did, ref, scheme and observed_at are SHOULD. These statuses are different claims and MUST NOT be treated as one. "authorised" records that a limit was reserved. It does not record that money moved, and a verifier MUST NOT report it as meaning so. 3.5. The action record The action record is the object defined in [I-D.psi-agent-01], which defines it as a JSON object that MUST contain event, name, and result or outputs, and MAY contain args and prev. This profile makes four changes to it and no others. a. The field prev is REQUIRED on every record of a run except the first, whose prev is the digest reference whose digest is sixty- four zero digits. [I-D.psi-agent-01] makes prev optional and does not fix the first value. b. The field did is REQUIRED on every record. It holds the digest reference of the decision the action was taken under. c. The field kid is REQUIRED on every record. It names the key of the party that executed the action. [I-D.psi-agent-01] does not define this field. d. The field at is REQUIRED on every record. It holds the RFC3339 date-time at which the executing party reports the action. The kid of an action record names the key of the party that executed the action. The record is sealed by the issuer that holds it per [I-D.psi-agent-01], and not by the named key. The name is therefore attested by the sealing party and is not a signature by the party it names. Section 6 compares names, and the comparison is only as strong as that attestation. The chain digest of an action record remains as defined in [I-D.psi-agent-01]: SHA-256 over the canonical form of the record. 4. Canonical form, algorithms, keys and numbers 4.1. Signed bytes and identifiers The signed bytes of a statement are the canonical form, per [RFC8785], of the statement with two members removed: sig, and the statement's own identifier member, which is mid, pid, did, sid or eid as applicable. Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 The identifier of a statement is the digest reference of its signed bytes. The alg and kid members are present in the statement and are covered by the signature. A statement whose alg or kid is altered after signing MUST fail verification. The signed bytes of an envelope exclude a third member, anchor. The anchor is evidence about the envelope and is not part of what the envelope asserts, so including it would make the envelope identifier depend on a tree that contains the envelope identifier. A signature is computed over the signed bytes. The value of sig is base64url without padding [RFC4648]. 4.2. alg Every sealed object names its algorithm. "ed25519" MUST be implemented [RFC8032]. "ml-dsa-65" MAY be implemented [FIPS204]. An unknown alg value is not a defect in the statement: a verifier reports algorithm_unavailable for that object, does not attempt to verify its signature, and reports the result of its other checks separately. 4.3. kid kid names the key. Its form is outside this profile. A verifier resolves it by whatever means its deployment provides. Statements are distinguished by the value of kid and not by a description of who signed. 4.4. Dates Dates are RFC3339 date-times with an explicit offset [RFC3339]. Precision to the second is sufficient. A verifier MUST accept fractional seconds and MUST NOT require them. 4.5. Decimal strings and assets A decimal string is an optional minus sign, then digits, then at most one full stop, then more digits. No exponent, no floating point value, no leading or trailing space. Comparison of two decimal strings is by integer part first and then by fractional part padded to equal length. asset and the entries of limits.currencies are compared as exact case-sensitive strings. asset is an ISO 4217 alphabetic code where one exists and an upper-case ticker otherwise. 4.6. Alternative transports Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 A deployment MAY instead attach an HTTP Message Signature [RFC9421] to the transport that carries a statement. That signature attests to the message and not to the statement. A verifier that holds only the statement MUST NOT rely on it. 5. The envelope { "ver": "1", "eid": , "run": , "mandate": , "proposal": , "decision": , "action_root": , "settlement": , "replaces": , "issued": , "anchor": { "merkle_profile": "RFC6962-SHA256", "leaf_index": , "tree_size": , "audit_path": [], "root": }, "alg": , "kid": , "sig": } ver, eid, run, mandate, proposal, decision, action_root, settlement, issued, alg, kid and sig are MUST. anchor and replaces are MAY. The run identifier is assigned before any statement is written and is never derived from anything sealed later. It is an opaque string with at least 128 bits of unpredictability, encoded in lowercase hexadecimal. A value that a verifier could compute from the statements is not a run identifier. The run identifier is not an authentication credential and MUST NOT be treated as proof of authority. action_root names the head of the chain: the record whose digest no other record of the run carries as its prev. A run MAY contain more than one chain. An envelope names one chain; a verifier given records of another chain reports them as an additional chain and not as an error. Where the run has no action chain, action_root is the literal string "absent" and no record is walked. The envelope is itself a sealed statement, sealed by the party that assembles the run. Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 One run has one current envelope. When a settlement arrives after an envelope was issued, the holder issues a second envelope whose "replaces" member carries the eid of the first. Both verify, and the later issued time wins. "replaces" is MAY and, when present, MUST be a digest reference. The anchor of an envelope follows the Merkle commitment profile [I-D.merkle]. The leaf of the tree is the 32-byte digest that the eid carries, that is the sixty-four hexadecimal digits of the eid decoded to bytes, and not the UTF-8 encoding of the digest reference string. The tree is the Merkle Tree Hash of Section 2.1.1 of [RFC9162]: a leaf hash is SHA-256(0x00 || leaf) and an interior node is SHA-256(0x01 || left || right). The tree of the anchor holds at most 256 leaves and ends with the leaf of this envelope. The member audit_path is the inclusion path of that leaf, bottom-up, as an array of lowercase hexadecimal digests, and leaf_index and tree_size are the index of the leaf and the size of the tree. The member merkle_profile names the profile the anchor is checked under and its value is "RFC6962-SHA256"; an anchor that names another profile, or names none, is not checked under [I-D.merkle]. A verifier that is given an anchor MUST check the path against the root with the algorithm of Section 2.1.3.2 of [RFC9162], and MUST check the root against a tree head it trusts. 6. Verification A verifier is given the envelope and any subset of the statements. It performs the steps below. Each step yields one result. The result vocabulary is: ok, absent, invalid, algorithm_unavailable, key_unresolved, not_anchored. A step that yields invalid also yields one reason code. The reason codes used below are id_mismatch, envelope_ref_mismatch, held_but_envelope_says_absent, chain_broken, run_mismatch, decision_pid_mismatch, proposal_mid_mismatch, action_did_mismatch, settlement_did_mismatch, denied_but_executed, decision_key_is_action_key, mandate_key_is_decision_key, mandate_key_is_action_key, currency_not_permitted, over_spend, over_actions, outside_window, inclusion_failed, signature_invalid. 6.1. Statements 1. For each statement held, recompute the signed bytes and the digest reference, and compare the digest reference with the identifier member of the statement. Fail with id_mismatch. 2. Compare the identifier member of each statement held with the corresponding member of the envelope. Fail with envelope_ref_mismatch. Where the envelope names "absent" and the verifier holds the statement, fail with held_but_envelope_says_absent. Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 3. Verify sig over the signed bytes under alg and kid. Where the verifier does not implement the alg, report algorithm_unavailable and do not verify the signature. Where the verifier cannot resolve the kid, report key_unresolved. Otherwise, where the signature does not verify, fail with signature_invalid. 6.2. The envelope 4. Recompute the signed bytes of the envelope and compare the digest reference with eid. Fail with id_mismatch. 6.3. The chain 5. Where the envelope names action_root "absent", there is no chain to walk and no record is walked, and the result is absent. Otherwise, starting from the record whose digest reference is action_root, follow prev to the record whose prev is the digest reference whose digest is sixty-four zero digits. The digest of each record walked MUST be the digest reference that the next record names in prev, and the digest of the head record MUST be action_root. Fail with chain_broken if no such record is reached, if a record repeats, if the chain does not terminate, or if a record walked lacks a field required by Section 3.5. Holding only the head is not verification of the run. 6.4. Bindings 6. Every statement held MUST carry the run identifier of the envelope. Fail with run_mismatch. 7. The pid of the decision MUST equal the pid of the proposal. Fail with decision_pid_mismatch. 8. The mid of the proposal MUST equal the mid of the mandate. Fail with proposal_mid_mismatch. 9. The did of every record walked MUST equal the decision named by the envelope. Fail with action_did_mismatch. 10. Where the settlement is held and its did is not "absent", the did of the settlement MUST equal the decision named by the envelope. Fail with settlement_did_mismatch. 11. Where the decision is held and its verdict is "deny", the envelope MUST name action_root "absent" and MUST name the settlement "absent". Fail with denied_but_executed. 6.5. Keys, money and time Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 12. The kid of the decision MUST differ from the kid of every record walked. Fail with decision_key_is_action_key. The kid of the mandate MUST differ from the kid of the decision and from the kid of every record walked. Fail with mandate_key_is_decision_key or mandate_key_is_action_key. Where a deployment permits two roles to share a key, the verifier reports the pair as a warning naming both roles. This compares names. The kid of a statement is signed by the party that issued it; the kid of an action record is attested by the party that sealed it, as Section 3.5 says. 13. Where the settlement and the mandate are both held and the mandate declares limits.max_spend and limits.currencies: the asset of the settlement MUST appear in currencies, and the amount MUST NOT exceed max_spend. Fail with currency_not_permitted or over_spend. 14. Where the mandate declares limits.max_actions, the number of records walked MUST NOT exceed it. Fail with over_actions. 15. Where the mandate declares not_before and not_after, the field at of every record walked MUST fall inside that window. Fail with outside_window. These are times reported by the party that executed the action, and Section 8 says what that is worth. 6.6. The anchor 16. Where the envelope carries an anchor, verify the inclusion path against the root with the algorithm of Section 2.1.3.2 of [RFC9162] and check the root against a tree head the verifier trusts. Fail with inclusion_failed. Where no anchor is present the result is not_anchored. 6.7. Reporting A statement named in the envelope but not provided is reported absent. A statement reported absent is not reported false. The verifier reports the subset it held, and reports each step. The checks on keys, money and time are the reason this document exists. A verifier that skips them has verified a bundle, not a run. 7. Privacy The purpose and scope fields of a mandate, and the reason field of a decision, carry personal and confidential data. For a field of low entropy the issuer SHOULD record a commitment instead of the value: the digest of the value concatenated with a salt of at least 128 bits, the salt held by the principal. Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 Digests permit correlation across runs that share a run identifier. An envelope is disclosable in more settings than the statements it names, not all of them. Statements MUST NOT contain secrets, credentials, or payment card data. 8. Security Considerations A runtime that is compromised, or an honest runtime whose parties are colluding, can produce an envelope that satisfies every step of Section 6 for a run that did not happen as recorded. This profile detects alteration of, and unrecorded omission from, the records it was given. It does not detect a record that was never written, and it does not detect a set of statements all signed by parties acting together. Three things outside this profile carry the weight a reader may place on the format. An anchor shows that an envelope existed in a tree the verifier already trusts. [I-D.psi-agent-01] provides a receipt over a sealed digest and a chain of such receipts, and defines no witness: a deployment that wants a second and independent party to witness a run must add one outside this profile. The independence of the decision engine is a deployment property, restated here because a separate key is not by itself a separate operator. The field at of an action record is the time the executing party reports. It is attested by no other party, and a verifier cannot check the clock of the party that wrote it. A run whose actions report times out of order, or outside the window of the mandate, still verifies under every step but the window check itself, and that check compares reported times with a declared window rather than with any trusted clock. An envelope records what its issuer knew. A settlement that occurred and was not included is not detectable by this profile. The ref field of a settlement describes an external transaction and can be reused to describe a payment made for a different run. Section 6 checks it against the mandate, not against the payment system. Where the scheme named by scheme permits a third party to confirm ref, a verifier that cares about the payment confirms it and says whether it did. Compromise of a signing key lets a party issue statements after the fact under an identity that verifiers trust. Deployments MUST define rotation and revocation, and a verifier checking historical material MUST record what key status it assumed at what time. Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 A digest of low-entropy content can be reversed by guessing. Section 7 requires salted commitments for that reason. 9. IANA Considerations This document requests no IANA actions. The enumerated values it defines are closed within this profile: the verdict values, the settlement status values, the alg values, the merkle profile value of the anchor, and the statement types. A profile that extends one of them carries a different value of ver. A verifier MUST report an unknown enumerated value as invalid and MUST NOT guess its meaning. 10. References 10.1. Normative References [FIPS204] NIST, "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", FIPS 204, August 2024, . [I-D.merkle] Singh, K., "PSI Merkle Commitment Profile (RFC6962-SHA256)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-singh-psi-merkle-01, 13 October 2026, . [I-D.psi-agent-01] Singh, K., "PSI Receipts for AI Agent Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-singh-psi-agent-01, 13 October 2026, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and Newman, C., "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, . [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, . [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, . Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft PSI Agent November 2026 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020, . [RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162, December 2021, . 10.2. Informative References [RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, DOI 10.17487/RFC2026, October 1996, . [RFC9421] Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421, February 2024, . 11. Author's Address Kawaljeet Singh APEX Infrastructure Melbourne, Victoria, Australia Email: kawaljeet.singh3008@gmail.com URL: https://ai-governance-standard.com Singh Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 15]