SIDROPS T. Yoshikawa Internet-Draft Kyoto University Intended status: Informational L. Velvindron Expires: 21 February 2027 cyberstorm.mu 20 August 2026 Post-Quantum Signature Experiments and Migration Considerations for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) draft-yoshikawa-sidrops-pqc-rpki-02 Abstract This document reports experiments with post-quantum signature algorithms and analyzes migration approaches for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). The experiments compare classical, post- quantum, and composite signature candidates; generate and validate RPKI-profiled certificate, CRL, manifest, and ROA test objects; evaluate Parallel Publication and Mixed Tree migration as distinct migration structures; and evaluate the effect of larger objects on rsync, RRDP, and Erik Synchronization. The results identify implementation, interoperability, repository-distribution, and operational questions that need to be resolved before a production algorithm profile or transition procedure can be specified. This document is informational. It does not update RFC 7935 or RFC 6916, define a new RPKI algorithm profile, or authorize the use of the evaluated algorithms or Mixed Tree migration in the production RPKI. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 February 2027. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Signed Object Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Relationship to RFC 6916 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Evaluation Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Experimental Migration Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.1. Parallel Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.2. Mixed Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Evaluated Algorithm Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8.1. Current Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8.2. Composite Configuration Evaluated in This Revision . . . 9 8.3. Additional Candidate Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.4. Classical Reference Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8.5. Size Model Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8.6. Rationale for the Experimental Configurations . . . . . . 12 9. Experimental Object Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.1. Certificate and CRL Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.2. CMS Signed Object Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.3. Manifest Processing During Migration . . . . . . . . . . 15 10. Related Experimental Designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 11. Repository Distribution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11.1. Impact of Larger Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11.2. RRDP, rsync, and Erik Synchronization . . . . . . . . . 16 11.3. Transport Experiment Boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 12. Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 12.1. Results Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 12.2. Relying Party Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 13. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 16. Questions for Further Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 16.1. Algorithm Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 16.2. Migration Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 16.3. Repository Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 16.4. Operational Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 17. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Appendix A. Measurement Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.1. Reproducibility Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.2. Repeated Cryptographic Operation Timing . . . . . . . . . 28 A.3. Composite ML-DSA Operation Measurements . . . . . . . . . 29 A.4. Measured Certificate and CRL Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . 30 A.5. Synthetic Repository Size Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 A.6. Controlled Repository Scale Measurements . . . . . . . . 33 A.7. Repository Transport Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 A.8. Open Measurement Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Appendix B. Changes from -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 1. Introduction The RPKI relies on digital signatures in resource certificates, CRLs, certification requests, and CMS signed objects such as manifests and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). The deployed RPKI algorithm profile is based on RSA with SHA-256. A Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) capable of executing the required quantum algorithms would undermine the unforgeability of the RSA signatures used by the deployed RPKI profile. Preparing for that risk requires measurements and interoperable implementations before a production transition procedure can be selected. This document records that preparatory work. The cryptographic- object and migration experiments preserve existing RPKI payload formats and router-facing validated payload interfaces. The repository-distribution experiment separately compares rsync, RRDP, and Erik Synchronization under the larger object sizes. Certification Authority (CA) and Relying Party (RP) implementations require support for the additional signature algorithms. The Mixed Tree experiment additionally evaluates a certificate-path construction that is not permitted by the migration procedure in RFC 6916. Routers that consume Validated ROA Payloads (VRPs) through the RPKI-Router Protocol (RTR) or local files do not process the evaluated signatures directly. The descriptions of algorithms, encodings, validation behavior, and migration steps in this document are experimental assumptions and observations. They are not interoperability requirements for production RPKI implementations. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 2. Terminology This document uses the terminology of the RPKI architecture [RFC6480], the resource certificate profile [RFC6487], the RPKI signed object template [RFC6488], the RPKI algorithm agility procedure [RFC6916], and the RPKI algorithm profile [RFC7935]. Current Suite: The algorithm suite specified by the currently applicable production RPKI algorithm profile. At the time of writing, this is RSA-2048/SHA-256 as profiled by RFC 7935. Next Suite: A candidate algorithm suite that is implemented and tested before it becomes the Current Suite. Mixed Tree: An experimental RPKI certification hierarchy in which a parent CA using the Current Suite signs a child CA certificate whose subject public key uses the Next Suite, allowing the child subtree to use the Next Suite while its ancestors remain on the Current Suite. Parallel Publication: A migration approach in which products that correspond as defined in [RFC6916] are published under both the Current Suite and the Next Suite during a transition period. Composite Signature: A signature construction that combines multiple component algorithms into one algorithm identifier and signature value. In the LAMPS construction evaluated by this document, verification succeeds only when every component signature validates. 3. Scope The algorithm-profile analysis in this document applies to RPKI resource certificates, CRLs, certification requests, BGPsec Router Certificates [RFC8209], and the CMS signed objects that reuse the RPKI signed object template [RFC6488], including manifests [RFC9286], ROAs [RFC9582], Signed Checklists (RSC) [RFC9323], ASPA objects [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile], and Trust Anchor Key (TAK) objects [RFC9691]. The generated signed objects in this revision cover manifests and ROAs; additional object types are listed in the Implementation Status section. The CMS signed objects are treated as a single signed-object algorithm profile, as described in the following section. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 This document covers the RPKI signatures on BGPsec Router Certificates, but does not define or change the BGPsec UPDATE signature algorithm specified by [RFC8608]. For a BGPsec Router Certificate, the experiment applies only to the certificate signature made by the issuing RPKI CA. The subject public key algorithm remains governed by the BGPsec UPDATE algorithm profile and is not required to match the RPKI certificate-signature suite. This document does not specify changes to RTR, TAL formats, RRDP [RFC8182], rsync, the RPKI Certificate Policy, or the BPKI used to authenticate provisioning and publication relationships established through [RFC8183]. BPKI algorithm migration is a related operational problem, but is not evaluated by this document and need not use the same algorithm or transition schedule as RPKI repository objects. This document does not modify RRDP or rsync; it separately evaluates their transport costs, together with Erik Synchronization, under the larger object sizes used by the experiment. 4. Signed Object Coverage Manifests [RFC9286], ROAs [RFC9582], Signed Checklists [RFC9323], ASPA objects [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile], TAK objects [RFC9691], and any future object types built on the RFC 6488 template share one CMS structure, one EE certificate model, one certification infrastructure, and one repository. The evaluation model therefore treats them as one signed-object algorithm profile. Migrating, for example, ROAs to a PQC suite while leaving ASPA objects on RSA would introduce per-object-type algorithm diversity, leaving part of the RPKI signed-object set dependent on the Current Suite. Changing only the CMS signature algorithm does not change an object's eContentType or object-specific payload syntax. Some objects, notably TAK objects, may nevertheless carry public keys whose algorithms change as part of a wider trust-anchor migration and therefore require separate object-specific interoperability testing. A future standards-track profile that selects a new mandatory RPKI algorithm suite would update [RFC7935]. An object-specific RFC needs an update only if that object's payload or validation semantics also change; this document makes no such change. BGPsec UPDATE signatures are not RFC 6488 signed objects and are outside this experiment. BGPsec Router Certificates and their covering CRLs and manifests are repository products and remain part of the evaluation scope. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 5. Relationship to RFC 6916 RFC 6916 specifies a top-down algorithm transition using parallel certification hierarchies. It also states that an RPKI CA does not sign a CA certificate whose subject key corresponds to an algorithm suite different from the suite used to sign that certificate. The Mixed Tree experiment described in this document deliberately evaluates the X.509 construction excluded by RFC 6916. Objects produced by this experiment are therefore confined to test TALs and test repositories. Production use of this construction would require separate Standards Track work updating or replacing the applicable algorithm profile and migration procedure. 6. Evaluation Goals The experiments use the following evaluation goals. * Preserve the existing RPKI object and validation model when evaluating signature-algorithm changes. * Reuse existing LAMPS PKIX and CMS encodings for PQC algorithms. * Avoid new RPKI object formats unless measurements show that simple signature substitution is infeasible. * Keep routers as consumers of validated payloads, not PQC validators, while acknowledging that RP validation and repository processing change. * Apply one signature algorithm suite uniformly to all RFC 6488 signed objects rather than per-object-type algorithm choices. * Evaluate the conditional EUF-CMA guarantee provided by a composite construction when one component remains secure, subject to the assumptions of the referenced LAMPS construction. * Examine the operational effects of a prolonged period in which the Current Suite and Next Suite coexist. * Identify operational measurements needed to detect differences in validated outputs during an algorithm transition. * Keep measurement and interoperability evidence reproducible outside the protocol specification. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 7. Experimental Migration Approaches This section describes the two migration approaches evaluated in this document. The choice of signature suite is independent of this comparison. 7.1. Parallel Publication RFC 6916 specifies a top-down transition in which a parent CA adopts support for the Next Suite before its children. During phases 2 and 3, corresponding Current Suite and Next Suite product sets are maintained in parallel. RFC 6916 deliberately avoids mixed-suite CA certificates: a CA certificate signed using one suite does not carry a subject key associated with another suite. The Parallel Publication experiment publishes corresponding Current Suite and Next Suite products separately. It does not define new payload encodings for manifests, ROAs, or CRLs. As described in Section 6 of [RFC6916], RPs can retrieve product sets under both algorithm suites and compare their outputs for testing. This experiment performs that comparison using the resulting VRP sets and CCR [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr]. The experimental harness needs a mapping between corresponding products for measurement and debugging. Such a mapping can be derived from the publication point structure, object names, CA hierarchy, or an implementation-specific record. It is not proposed as a new on-wire RPKI object. 7.2. Mixed Tree A parent using the Current Suite signs a child CA certificate whose subject public key belongs to the Next Suite. The child then issues its certificates, CRLs, and CMS signed objects using the Next Suite without first requiring the parent to migrate its own CA key and product set. Production issuance would still require the parent to process the child's Next Suite certificate request and proof of possession. This experiment constructs the child CA certificate directly; it has not implemented that provisioning exchange. The Mixed Tree migration approach is independent of the selected signature suite. The evaluated repository instantiates the Next Suite with the Composite ML-DSA configuration evaluated in this revision. This construction is not permitted by the RFC 6916 transition procedure and is evaluated only as an experimental alternative under test TALs. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 Unlike the RFC 6916 procedure, a switched subtree does not maintain corresponding Current Suite and Next Suite products. This avoids duplicate repository content and the publication, configuration, and rollover work needed to keep two product sets aligned. It also permits subtrees to move independently after the necessary parent and RP support is available, rather than waiting for every ancestor to migrate its own CA key and product set. The trade-off is compatibility. Once a subtree switches, an RP that does not support the Next Suite cannot validate it through the certification path. Mixed Tree deployment therefore replaces the parallel legacy hierarchy with a requirement for sufficient RP support before each subtree is migrated. The complete certification path remains dependent on Current Suite certificate signatures above the migration boundary. +=============+==========+===============+============+=============+ | Migration |Migration | Legacy RP | Parallel | Principal | | model |ordering | compatibility | products | limitation | +=============+==========+===============+============+=============+ | RFC 6916 |Top-down | Current Suite | Required | Repository | | Parallel | | hierarchy | during | and | | Publication | | remains | transition | operational | | | | available | | duplication | +-------------+----------+---------------+------------+-------------+ | Mixed Tree |Per | Unsupported | Not | The path | | |subtree | RPs lose the | required | still | | |after | switched | within the | depends on | | |required | subtree | switched | Current | | |support | | subtree | Suite | | |is | | | ancestors | | |available | | | | +-------------+----------+---------------+------------+-------------+ Table 1 The experiment uses test repositories and test TALs. It does not define or authorize a production transition procedure. 8. Evaluated Algorithm Suites 8.1. Current Suite The Current Suite baseline used by this experiment is RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 with SHA-256 as specified by RFC 7935. This document does not set a production transition timetable. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 8.2. Composite Configuration Evaluated in This Revision The composite signature construction used by this experiment is defined in revision 19 of [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs]. The evaluated configuration is id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.45), whose identifier and component-algorithm combination are specified by that document. It combines ML-DSA-65 with ECDSA P-256 and requires both component signatures to validate. The corresponding CMS use is specified by [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs]. The choice of this composite configuration is an experimental input, not a recommendation for production deployment. The object experiment applies [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs] to composite public keys and certificate signatures, and [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs] to composite CMS SignedData. The public reference implementation has generated complete composite X.509 certificates, CRLs, ROAs, and manifests and has validated a Mixed Tree with an RSA parent and a Composite child using experimental rpki-client and Routinator extensions. The two RP processing paths share one OpenSSL and Composite provider backend, so this is not independent cryptographic interoperability evidence. Experiments with the composite suite are confined to isolated repositories under test TALs. Experimental objects, production repositories, production keys, and production TALs are deliberately kept separate. 8.3. Additional Candidate Suites ML-DSA-44 is an additional experimental configuration. It produces smaller public keys and signatures and may sign and verify faster, which matters in a system where RPs repeatedly synchronize repository state and validate large numbers of objects. This revision uses ML- DSA-65 in the composite configuration as an explicit experimental choice, not because the RPKI requires NIST security Category 3. The Rationale for the Experimental Configurations section discusses this choice and its counterarguments. ML-DSA-87 is included as a higher-security comparison candidate. It is more conservative than ML-DSA-65 but carries correspondingly larger size and performance costs. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s and SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192s are included for cryptographic-diversity comparison. Their signature algorithm, PKIX, and CMS specifications are defined by [FIPS205], [RFC9909], and [RFC9814]. They are not proposed as the initial suite in this revision because their signature sizes are substantially larger than those of ML-DSA in the evaluated configurations. FN-DSA (Falcon), MAYO, and SNOVA are additional candidates for future evaluation. They are outside the present evaluation until stable PKIX and CMS profiles are available and referenced by a future revision or separate document. FN-DSA in particular is discussed further in the Rationale for the Experimental Configurations section, because its compact signatures make it an attractive candidate for the RPKI's bulk validation model. Other Composite ML-DSA combinations specified by LAMPS remain candidates for comparison. Changing the component pair would change object sizes and cryptographic costs, but would not determine whether a deployment uses Parallel Publication or Mixed Tree migration. RP support for a selected suite remains a deployment prerequisite. 8.4. Classical Reference Points To relativize the cost of PQC candidates, this document uses two compact classical algorithms as non-normative reference points: ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 [FIPS186-5], which is already used for BGPsec UPDATE signatures [RFC8608], and Ed25519 [RFC8032]. Neither is a CRQC-resistant algorithm, and neither is proposed here as an RPKI suite. They provide compact classical reference points for signature and key sizes in the classical setting: the deployed RSA-2048 profile is itself several times larger than these curves, and PQC candidates should be compared against both baselines rather than against RSA alone. 8.5. Size Model Inputs The table below records the values supplied to the first-order size model. The representations are deliberately mixed: some rows use raw public keys or fixed-width signatures, while others use representative DER values or a maximum encoded signature size. They are therefore model inputs, not a uniform comparison of SubjectPublicKeyInfo or signature encodings. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 +====================+======+===================+===================+ | Algorithm | Cat. | Key | Signature | | | | representation | representation | | | | used by model (B) | used by model | | | | | (B) | +====================+======+===================+===================+ | RSA-2048/SHA-256 | n/a | 270 | 256 | +--------------------+------+-------------------+-------------------+ | P-256/SHA-256 | n/a | 65 | ~72 | +--------------------+------+-------------------+-------------------+ | Ed25519 | n/a | 32 | 64 | +--------------------+------+-------------------+-------------------+ | ML-DSA-44 | 2 | 1312 | 2420 | +--------------------+------+-------------------+-------------------+ | ML-DSA-65 | 3 | 1952 | 3309 | +--------------------+------+-------------------+-------------------+ | ML-DSA-87 | 5 | 2592 | 4627 | +--------------------+------+-------------------+-------------------+ | FN-DSA-512 | 1 | 897 | <=666 | | (Falcon) | | | | +--------------------+------+-------------------+-------------------+ | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s | 1 | 32 | 7856 | +--------------------+------+-------------------+-------------------+ | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192s | 3 | 48 | 16224 | +--------------------+------+-------------------+-------------------+ Table 2 "Cat." is the NIST security category; "n/a" marks classical reference algorithms. The RSA-2048 key value is a representative DER RSA public-key value used by the model. The P-256 value is an uncompressed point, and the Ed25519, ML-DSA, FN-DSA, and SLH-DSA values are raw public keys. The ECDSA value is a representative DER signature size, while FN-DSA records a maximum. These choices are documented so that later models can replace them with consistently measured RPKI object encodings. Beyond static sizes, the evaluation considers the following dimensions: certificate and CRL size under the RPKI profile; CMS signed object size; signing and verification cost under the RP workload; impact on repository size and on distribution via RRDP, rsync, and Erik; CA key rollover and publication cycle impact; HSM support; and standardization and implementation maturity. The dimensions backed by measurements in this revision are identified in Appendix A. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 Two qualitative observations from the preliminary evidence inform the rationale in the next section. First, RP workload is verification dominated: an RP verifies repository objects but signs nothing as part of validation, and the deployed RSA profile is exceptionally cheap at verification, so increases in verification cost are particularly relevant to RP operation. Second, first-order size models place ML-DSA-65 near a fourfold repository size increase over the RSA baseline, ML-DSA-44 near threefold, and FN-DSA-512 well below twofold. Measurements supporting these observations, together with their conditions, caveats, and the list of dimensions not yet backed by confirmed measurements, are collected in Appendix A and are maintained in reproducible form by the experimental harness [pqc-rpki-lab]. Measured values are implementation and environment dependent and are not protocol requirements. 8.6. Rationale for the Experimental Configurations This experiment evaluates a composite suite because a global RPKI migration may benefit from not depending exclusively on a newly deployed PQC algorithm. The LAMPS construction accepts a composite signature only when both component signatures validate. Under the assumptions stated by that construction, its EUF-CMA guarantee is retained when at least one component remains EUF-CMA secure and the prehash remains collision resistant. This guarantee has a limit. A CRQC defeats the ECDSA component, so security against a quantum adversary still depends on ML-DSA-65 remaining secure. The composite suite also does not protect against failures shared by both components or by the combiner, encoding, key management, or validation implementation. It does not in general preserve strong unforgeability when only one component has that property. An implementation defect in one component can be tolerated only when the other component, the combiner, encodings, key handling, and the verification of all component signatures remain unaffected. ML-DSA-65 is used as the PQC component of the composite configuration evaluated in this revision because it has a final FIPS signature specification [FIPS204], corresponding PKIX [RFC9881] and CMS [RFC9882] algorithm identifier specifications, and implementations available in the software environment used by this experiment. This revision also chooses Category 3 as an experimental point for examining the cost of a larger security margin in a system in which another global algorithm migration could take multiple years. This is not an RPKI requirement. It is not used because it is the smallest or fastest possible signature algorithm; it is neither. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 The choice between ML-DSA-44 and ML-DSA-65 is genuinely open. The argument for ML-DSA-65 is conservatism: the RPKI is a single global system, algorithm migrations in it are slow and expensive, and a larger security margin reduces the probability of needing another migration. The argument for ML-DSA-44 is that a structural cryptanalytic break of module lattices would likely affect all ML-DSA parameter sets, so the extra category mainly protects against gradual erosion of concrete security estimates rather than against a qualitative break; under that view, the roughly 25-35% smaller keys and signatures of ML-DSA-44, or a composite configuration using ML- DSA-44, may be a better use of the size budget [Doesburg2025]. This document uses ML-DSA-65 in the composite configuration measured in this revision, keeps ML-DSA-44 in the comparison, and records the parameter-set choice as a question for further work. ML-DSA-87 provides a higher-security comparison point, but its size and performance costs make it less attractive in the evaluated repository model. FN-DSA (Falcon) is an attractive candidate on size and performance grounds: its signatures are roughly one fifth the size of ML-DSA-65 signatures, and both published RPKI analysis [Doesburg2025] and repository-scale redesign work [pqRPKI] identify Falcon as the compact lattice option. This document nevertheless treats FN-DSA as an additional configuration for future evaluation rather than one measured in the composite experiment, for the following reasons: * This document does not profile FN-DSA because it does not reference a final FN-DSA standard together with stable PKIX and CMS profiles. * Side-channel-resistant FN-DSA implementations and HSM support require separate implementation and deployment evaluation. * Availability of FN-DSA in the platforms that RPKI CAs, RIRs, HSM vendors, and validator implementations actually use is a separate question from the algorithm's intrinsic merits. This experiment does not evaluate production RPKI CA or RP support for FN-DSA. These are reasons to sequence the evaluation, not to dismiss the algorithm. FN-DSA remains in the comparison set as the compact signature candidate, and the conditions under which it should be examined further are recorded as questions for further work. Algorithm selection for the RPKI cannot be based on software benchmarks alone. HSM support for a candidate algorithm is also a deployment prerequisite for CAs that protect their signing keys in HSMs. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 9. Experimental Object Encoding 9.1. Certificate and CRL Encoding The composite certificate and CRL experiment follows the encodings in [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs]. Under that assumption, a composite subject carries id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 in the SPKI AlgorithmIdentifier with absent parameters. A certificate or CRL signed by the composite issuer uses that identifier in its signatureAlgorithm field. A child CA certificate signed by a Current Suite issuer instead retains the issuer's Current Suite signatureAlgorithm while carrying the composite identifier in the subject SPKI. The same composite SPKI and signature encodings are assumed for resource certificate requests and their proof-of-possession signatures. Pure ML-DSA certificates and CRLs used for component measurements follow [RFC9881]; they provide component-level evidence and are not proposed as a production Next Suite. These request and proof-of-possession encodings are not exercised by the implementation in this revision. The generated RPKI test objects preserve the existing keyUsage constraints. CA certificates carry keyCertSign and cRLSign, while EE certificates for signed objects carry digitalSignature and are not used as CA certificates. The experiment does not change resource extension semantics, the certificate policy OID, certificate path validation, manifest processing, or CRL processing. 9.2. CMS Signed Object Encoding The composite CMS experiment combines [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs] with the RPKI signed object template in [RFC6488], as updated by [RFC9589]. The assumed SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm is id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 with absent parameters. The SignedData digestAlgorithms set includes id- sha512, and the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm is id-sha512. The parameters are absent in both AlgorithmIdentifiers, and the message- digest signed attribute contains the SHA-512 digest of the eContent. The experiment retains the signedAttrs restrictions from the existing RPKI signed object profile: one content-type attribute, one message- digest attribute, and one signing-time attribute, with no binary- signing-time or other signed attributes. The eContentType, eContent, and object-specific validation rules remain unchanged. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 The implementation generated and validated complete Composite ROA and manifest SignedData using these encodings, together with the certificates and CRLs required for repository validation. Experimental rpki-client and Routinator extensions processed the resulting repository. Interoperability with a cryptographic implementation independent of the shared OpenSSL and Composite provider remains open work. 9.3. Manifest Processing During Migration A manifest covers the products of one CA instance at one publication point, as specified by [RFC9286] and updated by [RFC9981]. The manifest is signed with a one-time-use EE certificate issued by that CA. Its fileList contains the certificates issued and published by that CA, the CA's current CRL, and signed objects whose embedded EE certificates were issued by that CA. The relevant RP check is therefore issuer and publication-scope consistency, not equality between the manifest signing key and product keys. An RP validates the manifest EE certificate under the associated CA, verifies each listed certificate, CRL, or signed object under that same CA instance as required by its object profile, and checks the publication point, file name, and file hash according to [RFC9286]. A shared publication point can contain products from multiple CA instances during key rollover, but each manifest covers only its associated CA instance. Mixed Tree migration and composite signatures do not change these checks. This document therefore introduces no additional requirement for the manifest EE key to equal a key used by a listed product, and it does not weaken the existing RP checks that bind every listed product to the manifest's CA scope. 10. Related Experimental Designs The cryptographic-object and Mixed Tree experiments preserve the existing X.509 resource-certificate and CMS signed-object model while changing signature algorithms and, in the Mixed Tree case, the certification path. The Null Scheme [I-D.doesburg-sidrops-nullscheme] preserves the signed-object structure but replaces the one-time-use EE key pair and CMS signature with a public key derived from the message digest and an empty signature, reducing redundant cryptographic cost. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 pqRPKI [pqRPKI] instead introduces a Merkle Tree Ladder and restructures manifest, delegation, and bulk-verification processing. It is an alternative repository architecture rather than a direct algorithm substitution. Comparing these object-design alternatives requires separate measurements; the cryptographic-object experiments in this document cover only the structure-preserving approach. 11. Repository Distribution Considerations 11.1. Impact of Larger Objects Changing the signature suite affects more than cryptographic processing. Larger certificates, CRLs, manifests, and signed objects increase the bytes transferred during initial repository synchronization and in updates that contain those objects. The captured 1,000-ROA Composite repository occupied 9,797,552 object bytes, compared with 1,768,736 bytes for its RSA rollback state, a 5.54-fold increase. Transport scalability is therefore a deployment constraint that needs evaluation independently of algorithm correctness and RP validation time. 11.2. RRDP, rsync, and Erik Synchronization RRDP [RFC8182] distributes snapshots and a journal of deltas. An RP obtains a complete snapshot when the notification file no longer offers a contiguous delta chain from the RP's serial, or when the session identifier changes. A polling RP can receive intermediate publication states that it does not ultimately use. An rsync synchronization first exchanges repository metadata and then transfers changed files; even an unchanged repository therefore has a cost that grows with the file list. Erik Synchronization [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol] is an RPKI- specific replication protocol using Merkle trees, content- addressable naming, and HTTP. An RP compares ErikIndex and ErikPartition objects and fetches selected objects by hash. Snapshot and segment prefetching can reduce the request cost of cache bootstrap and catch-up. This document does not specify Erik or require it for PQC deployment; it evaluates Erik alongside RRDP and rsync as a candidate response to repository expansion. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 11.3. Transport Experiment Boundary Appendix A compares initial synchronization, an unchanged repository, one ROA replacement, and 10% ROA churn for RSA-2048, pure ML-DSA-65, and the evaluated Composite suite. It combines an actual local rsync run with calculated RRDP and Erik response-body sizes over the same deterministic corpus, calibrated to the measured object counts and repository sizes. The corpus preserves measured object counts and repository sizes but is not a cryptographically valid RPKI repository. The comparison is consequently evidence about byte growth, transferred bytes, and request counts, not a production- network throughput result. 12. Experimental Results 12.1. Results Summary OpenSSL 3.6.2 and the evaluated Composite provider generated complete certificate, CRL, manifest, and ROA sets for pure ML-DSA-65, Composite ML-DSA, and a Mixed Tree with an RSA parent and a Composite child. Experimental rpki-client and Routinator extensions validated each repository and produced the same two VRPs as the RSA baseline. An experimental Krill extension then created a Composite child below an RSA parent, published and replaced ROAs, and rolled the child back to RSA. Both experimental RPs derived the expected VRPs at each stage. The primary repeated cryptographic-operation benchmarks measure key generation, signing, and verification without X.509, CMS, repository transfer, or RP processing. Those rows use ten independent runs and give the median and sample standard deviation. Additional Composite ML-DSA operation measurements and their conditions are identified separately in Appendix A. Repository ratios are separate synthetic estimates derived from explicit object counts and measured key and signature sizes. Appendix A records the complete methods, results, and limitations. The two RP extensions use the same OpenSSL and Composite provider backend. The experiment therefore demonstrates two RP processing paths, but not independent cryptographic interoperability or production readiness. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 12.2. Relying Party Evaluation The experiment extended rpki-client and Routinator to recognize the id-ml-dsa-65 and id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 identifiers and to delegate their cryptographic operations to OpenSSL providers. Each RP processed four complete repositories: the RSA baseline, pure ML- DSA-65, Composite ML-DSA, and a Mixed Tree with an RSA parent and a Composite child. For every repository, the test covered certificate- path and CRL validation, manifest and CMS validation, ROA processing, and VRP production. The Mixed Tree test additionally verified that the issuer signature algorithm and subject SPKI algorithm are processed independently. The RSA parent's public key verifies the signature on the child CA certificate, while the Next Suite public key carried in that certificate's SPKI is used to validate signatures issued by the child. When an experiment validates both Current Suite and Next Suite products, it separately compares their validated outputs. For ROAs, the comparison uses equality of the canonical VRP sets by prefix, maxLength, and origin AS. When both runs use the same CCR version and hash algorithm, equal ROAPayloadState hashes indicate equality of those canonical VRP sets under the collision-resistance assumption of the CCR digest [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr]. The experiment parsed actual rpki-client CCR DER for the RSA, pure ML-DSA-65, Composite, and Mixed Tree repositories and recomputed every embedded collection hash. All four ROAPayloadState hashes were equal, while ManifestState differed as expected. TrustAnchorState is compared separately and also differed. This result uses one RP implementation that produced CCR output. ROAPayloadState does not preserve per-VRP certificate-chain or publication provenance, so comparing the certificate chain and publication source associated with each VRP requires additional experiment records. Differences in validated outputs are recorded as an experimental result rather than silently merged. This document does not require routers to support PQC. Routers receive validated payloads through RTR or local export formats, and the semantic content of that output is intended to be unchanged by the algorithm migration. 13. Implementation Status This section records the status of the experiments at the time of posting this Internet-Draft, using the reporting pattern described in [RFC7942]. It is intended to assist IETF discussion and is to be removed before publication as an RFC. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 18] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 pqc-rpki-lab is a research prototype used for the experiments described in this document. The lists below distinguish the implemented experimental coverage from remaining work. Implemented: * Generation of complete pure ML-DSA-65 and Composite certificates, CRLs, manifests, and ROAs, including a Mixed Tree repository with an RSA parent and a Composite child. * Experimental rpki-client and Routinator extensions that validate the RSA, pure ML-DSA-65, Composite, and Mixed Tree repositories and produce the expected VRPs. * Experimental Krill issuance, publication, one-ROA replacement, and RSA rollback for a Composite child below an RSA parent. * Object generation and validation, repository-size and scale experiments, RP-cache experiments, and rsync/RRDP/Erik transport accounting described in Appendix A. * Fifteen negative cases for cryptographic and profile failures, seven cases for repository-operation failures, tests showing that removal of one child publication point leaves sibling VRPs unaffected, and CCR output comparisons. Not yet implemented or incomplete: * Composite certificate requests and proof of possession, BGPsec Router Certificates, and Composite ASPA, RSC, and TAK objects. * Independent cryptographic interoperability and a second RP implementation capable of producing CCR output. * Re-signing of a multi-CA corpus modeled on the public RPKI and production-network RRDP, rsync, and Erik measurements. * HSM support, long-running RP resource use, and additional candidate suites. The highest-priority gaps are independent cryptographic interoperability and validation over a multi-CA corpus modeled on the public RPKI that can be re-signed under each evaluated configuration. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 19] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 14. Security Considerations This document addresses forgery of RPKI signatures in the presence of a CRQC. Existing considerations for CA compromise, repository compromise, operational misissuance, BGP policy mistakes, and route leaks are unchanged. A rollback to the Current Suite is a recovery mechanism only while that suite remains trustworthy and policy permits its use. After the Current Suite becomes forgeable, or after a deployment adopts a policy that permits only the Next Suite, such a rollback is a downgrade rather than recovery. Divergent algorithm policies and downgrade behavior are primary concerns during a long transition. Divergent suite-selection policies across the RP population can cause different RPs to derive different VRP sets from the same repository; this is a systemic risk of the transition period itself, and it persists for as long as classical and post-quantum algorithm suites coexist. Parallel Publication can produce different validation results between the Current Suite and Next Suite branches. For example, the RSA branch and the PQC branch might contain different ROA payloads, stale manifests, or different CRL state. The experiment detects and reports these cases rather than silently selecting one branch; see the Experimental Migration Approaches section. A Mixed Tree rooted in a Current Suite trust anchor is not quantum resistant as a complete certification path. Validation of the certification path depends on every certificate signature along it, including signatures made under the Current Suite. If an adversary can forge a Current Suite certificate signature above the migration boundary, the adversary can substitute a different Next Suite child key and construct a forged subtree. Mixed Tree migration is therefore suitable only while Current Suite certificate signatures remain trustworthy. It does not provide a recovery procedure after those signatures become forgeable, nor does it by itself establish a quantum-resistant trust anchor. Achieving end-to-end post-quantum security ultimately requires removing dependence on the Current Suite from the complete certification path. Trust-anchor migration and establishment of such a path are separate concerns from the Mixed Tree migration evaluated here. Larger public keys, signatures, certificates, CRLs, and CMS objects increase the network and processing resources required for repository retrieval and validation. A hostile or misbehaving publication point can impose disproportionate transfer and CPU cost on RPs, and PQC Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 20] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 object sizes raise the ceiling of that cost. Resource limits and operational measurements of object size, object count, validation time, and memory use therefore belong in a production readiness evaluation. Production-network measurements of RRDP, rsync, and Erik Synchronization under projected repository sizes and churn rates are needed before large-scale deployment. HSM implementations of PQC algorithms are newer than their software counterparts and may lag in side-channel hardening, fault-attack resistance, and certification. A CA key that is protected against extraction but is used by an implementation that leaks sensitive information through side channels does not receive the intended level of protection. Side-channel resistance is algorithm- and implementation-dependent and requires separate evaluation for each candidate and platform. ML-DSA supports both deterministic and randomized signing. Signatures generated using either mode are interoperable. The experiment uses the signing mode selected by the implementation and does not compare the two modes. Randomized signing can make implementations easier to harden against fault and hardware side- channel attacks [RFC9881]. Algorithm confusion is possible if AlgorithmIdentifier parameters, SignerInfo digestAlgorithm, CMS signed attributes, or certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo encodings are inconsistently handled. The experimental validation criteria reject malformed AlgorithmIdentifier encodings and follow the parameter rules of the referenced LAMPS specifications. The LAMPS composite construction provides a conditional EUF-CMA guarantee only when every component is verified, at least one component remains EUF-CMA secure, and the prehash remains collision resistant. It does not generally preserve SUF-CMA from only one strongly unforgeable component. The experiment follows the component-key separation rules in [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs]; reuse as standalone keys or in other composite combinations can enable stripping and cross-protocol attacks. A defect in one component is tolerated only if the other component and the combiner, parser, encoding, key management, and verification of all component signatures are unaffected. A shared implementation defect or compromise of both component keys is not mitigated by the composite construction. After a CRQC breaks ECDSA, the composite suite's unforgeability depends on ML-DSA-65. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 21] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 15. IANA Considerations This document requests no IANA actions. It reuses algorithm identifiers defined by the referenced LAMPS specifications and defines no new RPKI object type, file extension, or content type. 16. Questions for Further Work The following questions require additional SIDROPS discussion and implementation evidence. The results reported here do not select a production suite or transition procedure. 16.1. Algorithm Configurations * Whether ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, or another candidate provides an appropriate balance of object size, signing and validation cost, security margin, and implementation availability for a future standards-track profile. * Under what conditions FN-DSA should be promoted from a future evaluation candidate: completion of the FN-DSA standard, stable PKIX/CMS conventions, evidence of side-channel-resistant implementations, and HSM availability. 16.2. Migration Design * Under what operational and compatibility conditions Parallel Publication or Mixed Tree migration provides an acceptable migration path. * How RP readiness can be measured reliably before migrating a subtree in a production Mixed Tree deployment. * How to define a transition timetable and readiness metrics, and whether that work should update or replace RFC 6916. * How the EE subject public-key algorithm, the CA signature on the EE certificate, and the CMS signature algorithm should be related under a future Next Suite, including whether a null-signature construction should replace the current one-time-use EE model. * How provisioning and publication software will roll the BPKI trust anchors and EE certificates used for existing relationships, including relationships established through [RFC8183], before those protocols depend on a PQC algorithm. The procedure needs overlap, rollback, and recovery behavior and can be prepared independently of the final RPKI object-signature algorithm choice. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 22] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 16.3. Repository Distribution * Whether RRDP and rsync remain operationally sufficient at projected PQC repository sizes, topology, polling intervals, and churn rates, or whether deployment requires a more selective mechanism such as Erik Synchronization. 16.4. Operational Readiness * Which PQC signature algorithms RIR CA teams and their HSM vendors plan to support, on what firmware, API, certification, and deployment timelines. 17. Informative References [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, February 2012, . [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, . [RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012, . [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April 2013, . [RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935, August 2016, . [RFC8182] Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., and R. Austein, "The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)", RFC 8182, DOI 10.17487/RFC8182, July 2017, . Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 23] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 [RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests", RFC 8209, DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017, . [RFC9286] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 9286, DOI 10.17487/RFC9286, June 2022, . [RFC9582] Snijders, J., Maddison, B., Lepinski, M., Kong, D., and S. Kent, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 9582, DOI 10.17487/RFC9582, May 2024, . [RFC9589] Snijders, J. and T. Harrison, "On the Use of the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Signing-Time Attribute in Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signed Objects", RFC 9589, DOI 10.17487/RFC9589, May 2024, . [RFC9691] Martinez, C., Michaelson, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, T., and R. Austein, "A Profile for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Keys (TAKs)", RFC 9691, DOI 10.17487/RFC9691, December 2024, . [RFC9881] Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B. E. Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)", RFC 9881, DOI 10.17487/RFC9881, October 2025, . [RFC9882] Salter, B., Raine, A., and D. Van Geest, "Use of the ML- DSA Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 9882, DOI 10.17487/RFC9882, October 2025, . [RFC9981] Harrison, T., Michaelson, G., and J. Snijders, "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Manifest Number Handling", RFC 9981, DOI 10.17487/RFC9981, May 2026, . [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs] Ounsworth, M., Gray, J., Pala, M., Klaussner, J., and S. Fluhrer, "Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 24] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 Algorithm (ML-DSA) for use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-19, 21 April 2026, . [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs] Ounsworth, M., Gray, J., Klaussner, J., and D. Van Geest, "Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for use in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- lamps-cms-composite-sigs-05, 22 May 2026, . [FIPS204] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module- Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", FIPS 204, August 2024, . [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, . [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, . [RFC8183] Austein, R., "An Out-of-Band Setup Protocol for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Production Services", RFC 8183, DOI 10.17487/RFC8183, July 2017, . [RFC8608] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8608, DOI 10.17487/RFC8608, June 2019, . [RFC9323] Snijders, J., Harrison, T., and B. Maddison, "A Profile for RPKI Signed Checklists (RSCs)", RFC 9323, DOI 10.17487/RFC9323, November 2022, . Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 25] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 [RFC9814] Housley, R., Fluhrer, S., Kampanakis, P., and B. Westerbaan, "Use of the SLH-DSA Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 9814, DOI 10.17487/RFC9814, July 2025, . [RFC9842] Meenan, P., Ed. and Y. Weiss, Ed., "Compression Dictionary Transport", RFC 9842, DOI 10.17487/RFC9842, September 2025, . [RFC9909] Bashiri, K., Fluhrer, S., Gazdag, S., Van Geest, D., and S. Kousidis, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Algorithm Identifiers for the Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH-DSA)", RFC 9909, DOI 10.17487/RFC9909, December 2025, . [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr] Snijders, J., Bakker, B., Bruijnzeels, T., and T. Buehler, "A Profile for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Canonical Cache Representation (CCR)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr-11, 1 July 2026, . [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile] Snijders, J., Azimov, A., Uskov, E., Bush, R., Housley, R., and B. Maddison, "A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-29, 29 July 2026, . [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol] Snijders, J., Bruijnzeels, T., Harrison, T., and W. Ohgai, "The Erik Synchronization Protocol for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-erik- protocol-07, 16 August 2026, . Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 26] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 [I-D.doesburg-sidrops-nullscheme] Doesburg, D., "Null Scheme for Signed Objects in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", Expired and archived, Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- doesburg-sidrops-nullscheme-00, 5 October 2025, . [FIPS186-5] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS 186-5, February 2023, . [FIPS205] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard", FIPS 205, August 2024, . [Doesburg2025] Doesburg, D., "Post-Quantum Cryptography for the RPKI", June 2025, . [pqRPKI] Li, W., Li, Y., and T. Chung, "pqRPKI: A Practical RPKI Architecture for the Post-Quantum Era", arXiv 2603.06968, March 2026, . [pqc-rpki-lab] Yoshikawa, T., "pqc-rpki-lab experimental evidence snapshot", 20 August 2026, . Appendix A. Measurement Details This appendix records measurements referenced by the Size Model Inputs, Experimental Results, and Implementation Status sections. All values were produced by the experimental harness [pqc-rpki-lab], which contains the corresponding scripts, raw outputs, and environment metadata. The harness remains the durable record. A.1. Reproducibility Metadata The evidence snapshot cited by this revision is the GitHub release draft-yoshikawa-sidrops-pqc-rpki-02 of [pqc-rpki-lab]. The repository contains the scripts, raw outputs, and additional environment metadata used for the measurements in this appendix. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 27] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 The cryptographic-operation measurements were performed on an Apple M4 running macOS 26.5.2 with OpenSSL 3.6.2 and liboqs 0.15.0. The primary algorithm benchmark was compiled with optimization level -O2, while the Composite ML-DSA benchmark was compiled with -O3. The latter implements revision 19 of [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs]. The X.509, CMS, and RP experiments used OpenSSL 3.6.2 and the experimental Composite implementation recorded in the evidence snapshot. End-to-end validation was also exercised on a 12-vCPU x86-64 host using rpki-client 9.8. The RSA, pure ML-DSA-65, Composite, and Mixed Tree repositories all produced the expected VRPs. A.2. Repeated Cryptographic Operation Timing This experiment compares the raw signing and verification cost of the evaluated algorithms independently of X.509, CMS, repository transfer, and RP processing. In particular, verification performance is relevant to RPs, which repeatedly validate large numbers of repository objects. The table reports the median and sample standard deviation across ten repetitions of 1,000 operations on a fixed 32-byte message. Values are wall-clock seconds per 1,000 operations. +===========+=============+============+===============+==========+ | Algorithm | Sign median | Sign stdev | Verify median | Verify | | | | | | stdev | +===========+=============+============+===============+==========+ | RSA-2048/ | 0.340326 | 0.002114 | 0.009792 | 0.000057 | | SHA-256 | | | | | +-----------+-------------+------------+---------------+----------+ | P-256/ | 0.012660 | 0.000332 | 0.034535 | 0.005361 | | SHA-256 | | | | | +-----------+-------------+------------+---------------+----------+ | Ed25519 | 0.016657 | 0.006613 | 0.040442 | 0.018694 | +-----------+-------------+------------+---------------+----------+ | ML-DSA-44 | 0.249238 | 0.029970 | 0.047798 | 0.002460 | +-----------+-------------+------------+---------------+----------+ | ML-DSA-65 | 0.405729 | 0.017570 | 0.073411 | 0.014139 | +-----------+-------------+------------+---------------+----------+ | ML-DSA-87 | 0.477243 | 0.012468 | 0.115963 | 0.001536 | +-----------+-------------+------------+---------------+----------+ Table 3 Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 28] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 The measurements show that RSA-2048 is substantially faster at verification than the other evaluated algorithms in this environment. ML-DSA verification cost increases with the parameter set, with ML- DSA-65 requiring about 7.5 times the RSA verification time and ML- DSA-87 about 11.8 times. Signing shows a different pattern: ML- DSA-44 is faster than RSA-2048, while ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87 are somewhat slower. These measurements isolate cryptographic operations and therefore do not represent complete RP-validation performance. Their main implication for the RPKI is that algorithm selection should consider verification cost separately from signing cost, because RP workloads are verification dominated. The benchmark also covers 512-byte, 2-KiB, and 8-KiB messages and records key-generation timing, variance, and process peak RSS. Those raw results remain in the evidence snapshot rather than being duplicated here. A.3. Composite ML-DSA Operation Measurements This experiment measures the additional cryptographic cost of combining ML-DSA with a classical signature algorithm in the Composite construction. It compares signing and verification time, public-key size, signature size, and the resulting synthetic repository-size ratio across the evaluated Composite configurations. The following single-run measurements execute 100,000 signing operations and 100,000 verification operations for each configuration. They include message-representative construction, ML- DSA context binding, both component signature operations, raw key and signature concatenation, and verification of all component signatures. The ML-DSA-87 configuration uses P-384 because revision 19 of [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs] does not define ML-DSA-87 with P-256. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 29] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 +===========+==========+==========+========+=========+============+ | Composite | Sign | Verify | PubKey | Mean | Repository | | | (s/100k) | (s/100k) | (B) | sig (B) | ratio | +===========+==========+==========+========+=========+============+ | ML-DSA-44 | 26.0 | 8.3 | 1377 | 2491 | 3.16 | | + P-256 | | | | | | +-----------+----------+----------+--------+---------+------------+ | ML-DSA-65 | 45.6 | 11.9 | 2017 | 3380 | 4.09 | | + P-256 | | | | | | +-----------+----------+----------+--------+---------+------------+ | ML-DSA-87 | 59.4 | 32.8 | 2689 | 4730 | 5.40 | | + P-384 | | | | | | +-----------+----------+----------+--------+---------+------------+ Table 4 The measurements show that both cryptographic cost and object size increase with the ML-DSA parameter set. For the evaluated ML-DSA-65 + P-256 configuration, the classical component adds relatively little to the repository-size ratio compared with ML-DSA-65 alone, while verification must still perform both component checks. These measurements isolate the Composite cryptographic operations. They exclude key generation, file I/O, X.509, CMS, RP processing, and HSM latency, and the repository ratios are synthetic model outputs rather than complete-repository measurements. A.4. Measured Certificate and CRL Sizes This experiment measures the size impact of the evaluated signature algorithms when applied to RPKI-profiled certificates and CRLs. It provides measured object sizes for comparison with the repository- size models and transport experiments in the following sections. RFC 6487-profiled certificates, including RFC 3779 resource extensions, and CRLs were generated with OpenSSL 3.6.2. The RSA, P-256, Ed25519, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA rows use the OpenSSL default provider. The FN-DSA-512 row uses the experimental provider described below. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 30] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 +=========================+=============+=============+=========+ | Algorithm | CA cert (B) | EE cert (B) | CRL (B) | +=========================+=============+=============+=========+ | RSA-2048/SHA-256 | 1038 | 984 | 381 | +-------------------------+-------------+-------------+---------+ | P-256/SHA-256 | 641 | 587 | 187 | +-------------------------+-------------+-------------+---------+ | Ed25519 | 578 | 524 | 170 | +-------------------------+-------------+-------------+---------+ | ML-DSA-44 | 4238 | 4184 | 2541 | +-------------------------+-------------+-------------+---------+ | ML-DSA-65 | 5767 | 5713 | 3430 | +-------------------------+-------------+-------------+---------+ | ML-DSA-87 | 7725 | 7671 | 4748 | +-------------------------+-------------+-------------+---------+ | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s | 8390 | 8336 | 7977 | +-------------------------+-------------+-------------+---------+ | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192s | 16774 | 16720 | 16345 | +-------------------------+-------------+-------------+---------+ | FN-DSA-512 (Falcon-512) | 2048 | 1991 | 764 | +-------------------------+-------------+-------------+---------+ Table 5 The P-256 and Ed25519 rows use the same RFC 6487 structure and resource extensions as the other rows, but are classical comparison algorithms rather than RFC 7935 suites. The FN-DSA-512 row uses the experimental Falcon-512 OID and encoding from oqs-provider 0.11.0-rc1 with liboqs 0.15.0; it is a measured experimental encoding, not a final FN-DSA PKIX profile. Falcon signatures are variable length, so its certificate and CRL sizes can vary between runs. The measurements show that certificate and CRL size varies substantially among the candidate algorithms. ML-DSA increases object size by several times relative to RSA-2048, while the evaluated SLH-DSA configurations produce substantially larger objects. FN-DSA-512 is comparatively compact in this experiment, although its measured encoding is not a final FN-DSA profile. These differences directly contribute to the repository-size and transport costs evaluated in the following sections. A.5. Synthetic Repository Size Model This model estimates how the measured key and signature sizes translate into repository growth when applied across a representative set of RPKI objects. It is intended as a first-order comparison between candidate algorithms rather than as a prediction of the size of the global RPKI. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 31] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 The synthetic corpus contains 10 CA certificates, 100 EE certificates, 10 CRLs, 10 manifests, and 100 ROAs. Its base payload assumptions are 1500, 1500, 600, 1500, and 200 bytes, respectively. For certificates, the model adds both a public-key input and a signature input to the base payload. For CRLs, manifests, and ROAs, it adds the signature input. The resulting object sizes are multiplied by the corresponding object counts and summed. The repository ratio is then normalized to the RSA-2048 baseline. Transport encoding and cache overhead are not included. +=============================+==================+ | Algorithm | Repository ratio | +=============================+==================+ | Ed25519 | 0.76 | +-----------------------------+------------------+ | P-256 | 0.78 | +-----------------------------+------------------+ | RSA-2048 | 1.00 | +-----------------------------+------------------+ | FN-DSA-512 | 1.55 | +-----------------------------+------------------+ | ML-DSA-44 | 3.08 | +-----------------------------+------------------+ | ML-DSA-65 | 4.01 | +-----------------------------+------------------+ | ML-DSA-65 + P-256 Composite | 4.09 | +-----------------------------+------------------+ | ML-DSA-87 | 5.28 | +-----------------------------+------------------+ | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s | 6.85 | +-----------------------------+------------------+ | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192s | 13.38 | +-----------------------------+------------------+ Table 6 As a consistency check, the same formula was applied to the standalone repository object counts: one CA certificate, two EE certificates, one CRL, one manifest, and one ROA. The measured medians are the four required products of the standalone repositories generated by the end-to-end experiment identified in the Reproducibility Metadata section. The error below is (predicted - measured) divided by measured. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 32] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 +=================+======================+============+========+ | Suite | Model prediction (B) | Measured | Model | | | | median (B) | error | +=================+======================+============+========+ | RSA-2048 | 9146 | 4843 | +88.8% | +-----------------+----------------------+------------+--------+ | ML-DSA-65 + | 33131 | 28855 | +14.8% | | P-256 Composite | | | | +-----------------+----------------------+------------+--------+ Table 7 For these counts, the model predicts a Composite-to-RSA ratio of 3.62, whereas the measured ratio is 5.96. The difference results primarily from the fixed base-payload assumptions, which overestimate the small RSA repository. The model shows that repository growth is strongly dependent on signature and public-key size. ML-DSA-44 and ML-DSA-65 produce approximately three- and four-fold increases over the RSA baseline in this corpus, while the evaluated Composite configuration is close to ML-DSA-65 because the additional P-256 component is small relative to the ML-DSA component. SLH-DSA produces substantially larger estimates, whereas FN-DSA remains comparatively compact. These ratios depend on the assumed object mix and base payload sizes and must not be treated as measured repository-wide growth factors. The measured repository experiments below provide more representative evidence for the configurations that were implemented. A.6. Controlled Repository Scale Measurements This experiment examines how object generation and RP validation behave as the number of RPKI objects and child CAs increases. A public Routinator cache snapshot was used only as a reference for the scale of the deployed RPKI; the performance measurements themselves use controlled repositories. The reference snapshot, collected with Routinator 0.15.2 using RRDP, contained 550,210 objects across 54,960 publication points and produced 980,019 VRPs. The ARIN trust anchor was unavailable during collection, so these values do not represent the complete global RPKI. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 33] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 A controlled Krill experiment used one RSA parent and one Composite child. Complete repository generation was repeated 30 times for 1, 10, and 100 ROAs and 10 times for 1,000 ROAs. Each repository size was also validated 100 times with a fresh validator cache using the experimental rpki-client and Routinator implementations. Both RPs produced the expected VRPs in every run. +======+====================+=================+==================+ | ROAs | Generation samples | Generation wall | Generation wall | | | | median (s) | sample stdev (s) | +======+====================+=================+==================+ | 1 | 30 | 6.990 | 0.244 | +------+--------------------+-----------------+------------------+ | 10 | 30 | 7.675 | 0.348 | +------+--------------------+-----------------+------------------+ | 100 | 30 | 19.360 | 0.519 | +------+--------------------+-----------------+------------------+ | 1000 | 10 | 141.530 | 2.436 | +------+--------------------+-----------------+------------------+ Table 8 The captured 1,000-ROA Composite repository contained 1,008 files occupying 9,797,596 bytes. Its RRDP snapshot was 13,145,809 bytes uncompressed and 9,190,012 bytes with deterministic gzip. The same repository was used to compare validation with a fresh cache, an unchanged repository, and a one-ROA update, with 30 repetitions per RP and condition. The update changed the ROA, manifest, and CRL. rpki-client wall time medians were 0.86, 0.86, and 0.85 seconds, respectively; Routinator medians were 2.26, 1.99, and 2.30 seconds. The OS page cache was not controlled, so these results do not demonstrate a general incremental- validation speedup. A separate synthetic topology used one RSA parent and 100 Composite child CAs, each publishing one ROA. The repository contained 403 objects and produced 100 VRPs with both experimental RPs. Removing one child publication point reduced the result to 99 VRPs without affecting the remaining children. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 34] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 The results show that the prototype continues to produce the expected VRPs as the controlled repository grows, while repository generation cost increases substantially with the number of ROAs. The cache experiment does not show a consistent reduction in validation time after a small update, and the 100-child experiment confirms that failure of one child publication point does not invalidate sibling results. These experiments characterize controlled scaling behavior; they do not measure performance on the complete public RPKI or over production repository transport. A.7. Repository Transport Measurements This experiment evaluates how larger RPKI objects affect repository synchronization under rsync, RRDP, and Erik Synchronization. It compares initial synchronization, an unchanged repository, a one-ROA update, and 10% ROA churn for RSA-2048, ML-DSA-65, and the evaluated Composite configuration. The experiment reused the measured 1,000-ROA repository size and object count. Each state contained 1,008 files: two certificates, three CRLs, three manifests, and 1,000 ROAs. The RSA and Composite totals were taken from captured repositories, while the ML-DSA-65 total was derived from measured certificate, CRL, manifest, and ROA sizes. For each transition, five local rsync runs started from the same cache state. RRDP values are calculated from notification, snapshot, and delta response bodies. Erik values use a simplified single- partition model with one ErikIndex, one ErikPartition, and the required objects fetched by hash. Protocol headers, TLS, connection setup, and Compression Dictionary Transport [RFC9842] are not included. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 35] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 +===========+===========+===============+============+============+ | Algorithm | State | Local rsync | RRDP | Erik | | | | exchanged (B) | response | response | | | | | bodies (B) | bodies (B) | +===========+===========+===============+============+============+ | RSA-2048 | Initial | 1,897,870 | 2,444,873 | 1,769,082 | +-----------+-----------+---------------+------------+------------+ | RSA-2048 | Unchanged | 60,562 | 184 | 113 | +-----------+-----------+---------------+------------+------------+ | RSA-2048 | One ROA | 203,695 | 191,067 | 143,259 | | | update | | | | +-----------+-----------+---------------+------------+------------+ | RSA-2048 | 10% ROA | 370,906 | 413,520 | 303,738 | | | churn | | | | +-----------+-----------+---------------+------------+------------+ | ML-DSA-65 | Initial | 9,752,914 | 12,916,933 | 9,624,126 | +-----------+-----------+---------------+------------+------------+ | ML-DSA-65 | Unchanged | 60,562 | 184 | 113 | +-----------+-----------+---------------+------------+------------+ | ML-DSA-65 | One ROA | 222,370 | 215,967 | 161,934 | | | update | | | | +-----------+-----------+---------------+------------+------------+ | ML-DSA-65 | 10% ROA | 1,163,068 | 1,469,604 | 1,095,900 | | | churn | | | | +-----------+-----------+---------------+------------+------------+ | Composite | Initial | 9,926,678 | 13,147,301 | 9,797,898 | +-----------+-----------+---------------+------------+------------+ | Composite | Unchanged | 60,562 | 184 | 113 | +-----------+-----------+---------------+------------+------------+ | Composite | One ROA | 169,476 | 145,451 | 109,048 | | | update | | | | +-----------+-----------+---------------+------------+------------+ | Composite | 10% ROA | 1,133,142 | 1,429,580 | 1,065,982 | | | churn | | | | +-----------+-----------+---------------+------------+------------+ Table 9 The simplified Erik model required 1,010 requests for initial synchronization, one for an unchanged repository, five for a one-ROA update, and 104 for 10% churn. With snapshot prefetch, the modeled initial object transfer was consolidated into one bulk response of 1,768,736 bytes for RSA, 9,623,780 bytes for ML-DSA-65, and 9,797,552 bytes for Composite. The results show that larger signatures substantially increase transfer volume during initial synchronization and repository churn, while the cost of an unchanged repository remains small for RRDP and Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 36] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 the modeled Erik case. Selective synchronization also avoids retransmitting most unchanged object data in the update scenarios. Repository distribution therefore becomes a more significant consideration as RPKI object sizes increase. These results do not establish the relative production performance of the three protocols. The rsync measurements were local, while the RRDP and Erik results are response-body models rather than measurements from production servers. Network latency, HTTP behavior, compression effects, and retrieval of obsolete intermediate states remain to be evaluated. A.8. Open Measurement Tasks The following dimensions are not yet backed by confirmed measurements and are deliberately recorded as open tasks rather than numbers: * CA key rollover, publication cycle, and full validation across the evaluated configurations over a multi-CA corpus modeled on the public RPKI that can be re-signed under each evaluated configuration. The controlled single-child and synthetic 100-child results do not reproduce public RPKI topology. * Production RRDP, rsync, and Erik transfer, churn, polling- interval, and cache behavior. The generated bodies and local runs do not measure WAN behavior or obsolete intermediate-state transfer. * Long-running validator memory and cache growth. The current results record process peak RSS for bounded executions only. * HSM performance and support. Appendix B. Changes from -01 This section is to be removed before publication as an RFC. * Changed the intended status from Standards Track to Informational and reframed the document as an experiment report rather than an RPKI algorithm profile. * Replaced interoperability requirements with experimental assumptions, observed behavior, and production-readiness questions. * Added an explicit relationship to RFC 6916 and confined the Mixed Tree construction not permitted by RFC 6916 to test TALs and repositories. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 37] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 * Distinguished RFC 6916 correspondence between products from equality of validated VRP results and separated CCR ROAPayloadState comparison from TrustAnchorState and comparison of certificate chains and publication sources. * Clarified the conditional EUF-CMA guarantee and SUF-CMA limitation of the evaluated composite construction. * Treated composite signatures, Mixed Tree migration, and Parallel Publication as independent design axes. * Added repeated-run statistics, explicit synthetic-corpus inputs and formulas, tool versions, and compiler flags. * Added Composite ML-DSA operation measurements, based on revision 19, for ML-DSA-44 with P-256, ML-DSA-65 with P-256, and ML-DSA-87 with P-384. * Added experimental Krill Composite-child issuance, publication, one-ROA update, and rollback evidence validated by both experimental RPs. * Added 15 cryptographic/profile and seven operational negative cases. * Added a public-cache aggregate profile, repeated Krill measurements through 1,000 ROAs, a 1,000-ROA comparison under different cache conditions, and a 100-publication-point test showing that removal of one child publication point leaves sibling VRPs unaffected. * Added actual rpki-client CCR DER parsing and verified equal ROAPayloadState hashes while keeping ManifestState, TrustAnchorState, and provenance separate. * Added an rsync, RRDP, and Erik repository-transport comparison, with measured and modeled results explicitly distinguished. * Kept a future production algorithm profile and transition procedure as separate standards work informed by these results. Acknowledgements The authors thank Job Snijders, Dirk Doesburg, and Ties de Kock for their reviews and comments. The authors also thank the SIDROPS and LAMPS communities for the specifications and implementation work that make this experiment possible. Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 38] Internet-Draft PQC for RPKI August 2026 Authors' Addresses Tomoki Yoshikawa Kyoto University Japan Email: yoshikawa.tomoki.67i@st.kyoto-u.ac.jp Loganaden Velvindron cyberstorm.mu Mauritius Email: logan@cyberstorm.mu Yoshikawa & Velvindron Expires 21 February 2027 [Page 39]