The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)Hebrew University of JerusalemRothburg Family BuildingsEdmond J. Safra CampusJerusalem9190416Israelyossigi@cs.huji.ac.ilBoston University111 Cummington St, MCS135BostonMA02215United States of Americagoldbe@cs.bu.eduUSA National Institute of Standards and Technology100 Bureau DriveGaithersburgMD20899United States of Americakotikalapudi.sriram@nist.govFastlyAmsterdamNetherlandsjob@fastly.comWorkonline Communications114 West StJohannesburg2196South Africabenm@workonline.africa
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sidropsSecure Internet routingResource public key infrastructureThis document recommends ways to reduce the forged-origin hijack
attack surface by prudently limiting the set of IP prefixes that are
included in a Route Origin Authorization (ROA). One recommendation is to
avoid using the maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some specific
cases. The recommendations complement and extend those in RFC 7115. This
document also discusses the creation of ROAs for facilitating the use of
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation services. Considerations
related to ROAs and RPKI-based Route Origin Validation (RPKI-ROV) in the context of
destination-based Remotely Triggered Discard Route (RTDR) (elsewhere
referred to as "Remotely Triggered Black Hole") filtering are also
highlighted.
Status of This Memo
This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by
the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information
on BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any
errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
.
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Table of Contents
. Introduction
. Requirements
. Documentation Prefixes
. Suggested Reading
. Forged-Origin Sub-Prefix Hijack
. Measurements of the RPKI
. Recommendations about Minimal ROAs and maxLength
. Facilitating Ad Hoc Routing Changes and DDoS Mitigation
. Defensive De-aggregation in Response to Prefix Hijacks
. Considerations for RTDR Filtering Scenarios
. User Interface Design Recommendations
. Operational Considerations
. Security Considerations
. IANA Considerations
. References
. Normative References
. Informative References
Acknowledgments
Authors' Addresses
IntroductionThe Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) uses Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) to create a
cryptographically verifiable mapping from an IP prefix to a set of
Autonomous Systems (ASes) that are authorized to originate that prefix.
Each ROA contains a set of IP prefixes and the AS number of one of the
ASes authorized to originate all the IP prefixes in the set . The ROA is cryptographically signed by the party
that holds a certificate for the set of IP prefixes.
The ROA format also supports a maxLength attribute. According to
, "When
present, the maxLength specifies the maximum length of the IP address
prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise." Thus, rather than
requiring the ROA to list each prefix that the AS is authorized to
originate, the maxLength attribute provides a shorthand that authorizes
an AS to originate a set of IP prefixes.
However, measurements of RPKI deployments have found that the use of
the maxLength attribute in ROAs tends to lead to security problems.
In particular, measurements taken in June 2017 showed that of the
prefixes specified in ROAs that use the maxLength attribute, 84% were
vulnerable to a forged-origin sub-prefix hijack . The forged-origin prefix or sub-prefix hijack
involves inserting the legitimate AS as specified in the ROA as the
origin AS in the AS_PATH; the hijack can be launched against any IP
prefix/sub-prefix that has a ROA. Consider a prefix/sub-prefix that has
a ROA that is unused (i.e., not announced in BGP by a legitimate AS). A
forged-origin hijack involving such a prefix/sub-prefix can propagate
widely throughout the Internet. On the other hand, if the
prefix/sub-prefix were announced by the legitimate AS, then the
propagation of the forged-origin hijack is somewhat limited because of
its increased AS_PATH length relative to the legitimate announcement. Of
course, forged-origin hijacks are harmful in both cases, but the extent
of harm is greater for unannounced prefixes. See
for detailed discussion.
For this reason, this document recommends that, whenever possible,
operators SHOULD use "minimal ROAs" that authorize only
those IP prefixes that are actually originated in BGP, and no other
prefixes. Further, it recommends ways to reduce the forged-origin attack
surface by prudently limiting the address space that is included in
ROAs. One recommendation is to avoid using the maxLength attribute in
ROAs except in some specific cases. The recommendations complement and
extend those in . The document also discusses
the creation of ROAs for facilitating the use of DDoS mitigation
services. Considerations related to ROAs and RPKI-ROV in the context of
destination-based Remotely Triggered Discard Route (RTDR) (elsewhere
referred to as "Remotely Triggered Black Hole") filtering are also
highlighted.
Please note that the term "RPKI-based Route Origin Validation" and
the corresponding acronym "RPKI-ROV" that are used in this document mean the
same as the term "Prefix Origin Validation" used in .
One ideal place to implement the ROA-related recommendations is in
the user interfaces for configuring ROAs. Recommendations for
implementors of such user interfaces are provided in .
The practices described in this document require no changes
to the RPKI specifications and will not increase the number of signed
ROAs in the RPKI because ROAs already support lists of IP prefixes .
RequirementsThe key words "MUST", "MUST NOT",
"REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.
Documentation PrefixesThe documentation prefixes recommended in are
insufficient for use as example prefixes in this document. Therefore,
this document uses the address space defined in for
constructing example prefixes.
Note that although the examples in this document are presented
using IPv4 prefixes, all the analysis thereof and the recommendations
made are equally valid for the equivalent IPv6 cases.
Suggested ReadingIt is assumed that the reader understands BGP , RPKI , ROAs , RPKI-ROV , and BGPsec .
Forged-Origin Sub-Prefix HijackA detailed description and discussion of forged-origin sub-prefix
hijacks are presented here, especially considering the case when the
sub-prefix is not announced in BGP. The forged-origin sub-prefix hijack
is relevant to a scenario in which:
the RPKI is deployed, and
routers use RPKI-ROV to drop invalid
routes , but
BGPsec (or any similar method
to validate the truthfulness of the BGP AS_PATH attribute) is not
deployed.
Note that this set of assumptions accurately describes a substantial
and growing number of large Internet networks at the time of writing.
The forged-origin sub-prefix hijack is described here using a running example.
Consider the IP prefix 192.168.0.0/16, which is allocated to an
organization that also operates AS 64496. In BGP, AS 64496 originates
the IP prefix 192.168.0.0/16 as well as its sub-prefix 192.168.225.0/24.
Therefore, the RPKI should contain a ROA authorizing AS 64496 to
originate these two IP prefixes.
Suppose, however, the organization issues and publishes a ROA
including a maxLength value of 24:
ROA:(192.168.0.0/16-24, AS 64496)We refer to the above as a "loose ROA" since it authorizes AS 64496
to originate any sub-prefix of 192.168.0.0/16 up to and including length
/24, rather than only those prefixes that are intended to be announced
in BGP.
Because AS 64496 only originates two prefixes in BGP (192.168.0.0/16
and 192.168.225.0/24), all other prefixes authorized by the loose ROA
(for instance, 192.168.0.0/24) are vulnerable to the following
forged-origin sub-prefix hijack :
The hijacker AS 64511 sends a BGP announcement
"192.168.0.0/24: AS 64511, AS 64496", falsely claiming that AS 64511 is
a neighbor of AS 64496 and that AS 64496 originates the IP prefix
192.168.0.0/24. In fact, the IP prefix 192.168.0.0/24 is not originated
by AS 64496.The hijacker's BGP announcement is valid according to the
RPKI since the ROA (192.168.0.0/16-24, AS 64496) authorizes AS 64496 to
originate BGP routes for 192.168.0.0/24.Because AS 64496 does not actually originate a route for
192.168.0.0/24, the hijacker's route is the only route for
192.168.0.0/24. Longest-prefix-match routing ensures that the hijacker's
route to the sub-prefix 192.168.0.0/24 is always preferred over the
legitimate route to 192.168.0.0/16 originated by AS 64496.Thus, the hijacker's route propagates through the Internet, and
traffic destined for IP addresses in 192.168.0.0/24 will be delivered to
the hijacker.
The forged-origin sub-prefix hijack would have failed if a minimal
ROA as described in was used instead of the loose ROA. In this
example, a minimal ROA would be:
ROA:(192.168.0.0/16, 192.168.225.0/24, AS 64496)This ROA is "minimal" because it includes only those IP prefixes that AS 64496 originates in BGP, but no other IP prefixes .
The minimal ROA renders AS 64511's BGP announcement invalid because:
this ROA "covers" the attacker's announcement (since
192.168.0.0/24 is a sub-prefix of 192.168.0.0/16), and
there is no ROA "matching" the attacker's announcement (there is
no ROA for AS 64511 and IP prefix 192.168.0.0/24) .
If routers ignore invalid BGP announcements, the minimal ROA above
ensures that the sub-prefix hijack will fail.
Thus, if a minimal ROA had been used, the attacker would be forced
to launch a forged-origin prefix hijack in order to attract traffic as
follows:
The hijacker AS 64511 sends a BGP announcement
"192.168.0.0/16: AS 64511, AS 64496", falsely claiming that AS 64511 is
a neighbor of AS 64496.This forged-origin prefix hijack is significantly less damaging than
the forged-origin sub-prefix hijack:
AS 64496 legitimately originates 192.168.0.0/16 in BGP, so
the hijacker AS 64511 is not presenting the only route to
192.168.0.0/16.Moreover, the path originated by AS 64511 is one hop
longer than the path originated by the legitimate origin AS 64496.As discussed in , this means that the hijacker
will attract less traffic than it would have in the forged-origin
sub-prefix hijack where the hijacker presents the only route to the
hijacked sub-prefix.
In summary, a forged-origin sub-prefix hijack has the same impact as
a regular sub-prefix hijack, despite the increased AS_PATH length of the
illegitimate route. A forged-origin sub-prefix hijack is also more
damaging than the forged-origin prefix hijack.
Measurements of the RPKINetwork measurements taken in June 2017 showed that 12% of the IP
prefixes authorized in ROAs have a maxLength value longer than their prefix
length. Of these, the vast majority (84%) were non-minimal, as they
included sub-prefixes that are not announced in BGP by the legitimate
AS and were thus vulnerable to forged-origin sub-prefix hijacks. See
for details.
These measurements suggest that operators commonly misconfigure the
maxLength attribute and unwittingly open themselves up to forged-origin
sub-prefix hijacks. That is, they are exposing a much larger attack
surface for forged-origin hijacks than necessary.
Recommendations about Minimal ROAs and maxLengthOperators SHOULD use minimal ROAs whenever possible.
A minimal ROA contains only those IP prefixes that are actually
originated by an AS in BGP and no other IP prefixes. See for an example.
In general, operators SHOULD avoid using the maxLength
attribute in their ROAs, since its inclusion will usually make the ROA
non-minimal.
One such exception may be when all more specific prefixes permitted
by the maxLength value are actually announced by the AS in the ROA. Another
exception is where: (a) the maxLength value is substantially larger compared
to the specified prefix length in the ROA, and (b) a large number of
more specific prefixes in that range are announced by the AS in the
ROA. In practice, this case should occur rarely (if at all). Operator
discretion is necessary in this case.This practice requires no changes to the RPKI specifications and need
not increase the number of signed ROAs in the RPKI because ROAs already
support lists of IP prefixes . See for further discussion of why this practice will have
minimal impact on the performance of the RPKI ecosystem.
Operators that implement these recommendations and have existing
ROAs published in the RPKI system MUST perform a review
of such objects, especially where they make use of the maxLength
attribute, to ensure that the set of included prefixes is "minimal" with
respect to the current BGP origination and routing policies. Published
ROAs MUST be replaced as necessary. Such an exercise
MUST be repeated whenever the operator makes changes to
either policy.
Facilitating Ad Hoc Routing Changes and DDoS MitigationOperational requirements may require that a route for an IP prefix
be originated on an ad hoc basis, with little or no prior warning. An
example of such a situation arises when an operator wishes to make use
of DDoS mitigation services that use BGP to redirect traffic via a
"scrubbing center".
In order to ensure that such ad hoc routing changes are effective,
a ROA validating the new route should exist. However, a difficulty
arises due to the fact that newly created objects in the RPKI are made
visible to relying parties considerably more slowly than routing
updates in BGP.
Ideally, it would not be necessary to pre-create the ROA, which
validates the ad hoc route, and instead create it "on the fly" as
required. However, this is practical only if the latency imposed by
the propagation of RPKI data is guaranteed to be within acceptable
limits in the circumstances. For time-critical interventions such as
responding to a DDoS attack, this is unlikely to be the case.
Thus, the ROA in question will usually need to be created well in
advance of the routing intervention, but such a ROA will be
non-minimal, since it includes an IP prefix that is sometimes (but not
always) originated in BGP.
In this case, the ROA SHOULD only include:
the set of IP prefixes that are always originated in BGP,
and
the set of IP prefixes that are sometimes, but not always,
originated in BGP.
The ROA SHOULD NOT include any IP prefixes that the
operator knows will not be originated in BGP. In general, the ROA
SHOULD NOT make use of the maxLength attribute unless
doing so has no impact on the set of included prefixes.
The running example is now extended to illustrate one situation
where it is not possible to issue a minimal ROA.
Consider the following scenario prior to the deployment of RPKI.
Suppose AS 64496 announced 192.168.0.0/16 and has a contract with a
DDoS mitigation service provider that
holds AS 64500. Further, assume that the DDoS mitigation service
contract applies to all IP addresses covered by 192.168.0.0/22. When
a DDoS attack is detected and reported by AS 64496, AS 64500
immediately originates 192.168.0.0/22, thus attracting all the DDoS
traffic to itself. The traffic is scrubbed at AS 64500 and then sent
back to AS 64496 over a backhaul link. Notice that, during a DDoS
attack, the DDoS mitigation service provider AS 64500 originates a /22
prefix that is longer than AS 64496's /16 prefix, so all the
traffic (destined to addresses in 192.168.0.0/22) that normally goes
to AS 64496 goes to AS 64500 instead. In some deployments, the
origination of the /22 route is performed by AS 64496 and announced
only to AS 64500, which then announces transit for that prefix. This
variation does not change the properties considered here.
First, suppose the RPKI only had the minimal ROA for AS 64496, as
described in . However, if there is no ROA
authorizing AS 64500 to announce the /22 prefix, then the DDoS
mitigation (and traffic scrubbing) scheme would not work. That is, if
AS 64500 originates the /22 prefix in BGP during DDoS attacks, the
announcement would be invalid .
Therefore, the RPKI should have two ROAs: one for AS 64496 and one
for AS 64500.
ROA:(192.168.0.0/16, 192.168.225.0/24, AS 64496)ROA:(192.168.0.0/22, AS 64500)Neither ROA uses the maxLength attribute, but the second ROA is
not "minimal" because it contains a /22 prefix that is not originated
by anyone in BGP during normal operations. The /22 prefix is only
originated by AS 64500 as part of its DDoS mitigation service during a
DDoS attack.
Notice, however, that this scheme does not come without risks.
Namely, all IP addresses in 192.168.0.0/22 are vulnerable to a
forged-origin sub-prefix hijack during normal operations when the /22
prefix is not originated. (The hijacker AS 64511 would send the BGP
announcement "192.168.0.0/22: AS 64511, AS 64500", falsely claiming
that AS 64511 is a neighbor of AS 64500 and falsely claiming that AS
64500 originates 192.168.0.0/22.)
In some situations, the DDoS mitigation service at AS 64500 might
want to limit the amount of DDoS traffic that it attracts and scrubs.
Suppose that a DDoS attack only targets IP addresses in
192.168.0.0/24. Then, the DDoS mitigation service at AS 64500 only
wants to attract the traffic designated for the /24 prefix that is
under attack, but not the entire /22 prefix. To allow for this, the
RPKI should have two ROAs: one for AS 64496 and one for AS 64500.
ROA:(192.168.0.0/16, 192.168.225.0/24, AS 64496)ROA:(192.168.0.0/22-24, AS 64500)The second ROA uses the maxLength attribute because it is designed
to explicitly enable AS 64500 to originate any /24 sub-prefix of
192.168.0.0/22.
As before, the second ROA is not "minimal" because it contains
prefixes that are not originated by anyone in BGP during normal
operations. Also, all IP addresses in 192.168.0.0/22 are
vulnerable to a forged-origin sub-prefix hijack during normal
operations when the /22 prefix is not originated.
The use of the maxLength attribute in this second ROA also comes with additional
risk. While it permits the DDoS mitigation service at AS 64500 to
originate prefix 192.168.0.0/24 during a DDoS attack in that space, it
also makes the other /24 prefixes covered by the /22 prefix (i.e.,
192.168.1.0/24, 192.168.2.0/24, and 192.168.3.0/24) vulnerable to
forged-origin sub-prefix attacks.
Defensive De-aggregation in Response to Prefix HijacksWhen responding to certain classes of prefix hijack (in particular,
the forged-origin sub-prefix hijack described above), it may be
desirable for the victim to perform "defensive de-aggregation",
i.e., to begin originating more-specific prefixes in order to compete
with the hijack routes for selection as the best path in networks that
are not performing RPKI-ROV .
In topologies where at least one AS on every path between the
victim and hijacker filters RPKI-ROV invalid prefixes, it may be the case
that the existence of a minimal ROA issued by the victim prevents the
defensive more-specific prefixes from being propagated to the networks
topologically close to the attacker, thus hampering the effectiveness
of this response.
Nevertheless, this document recommends that, where possible, network
operators publish minimal ROAs even in the face of this risk. This is
because:
Minimal ROAs offer the best possible protection against the
immediate impact of such an attack, rendering the need for such a
response less likely;
Increasing RPKI-ROV adoption by network operators will, over time,
decrease the size of the neighborhoods in which this risk exists;
and
Other methods for reducing the size of such neighborhoods are
available to potential victims, such as establishing direct External
BGP (EBGP) adjacencies with networks from whom the defensive routes
would otherwise be hidden.
Considerations for RTDR Filtering ScenariosConsiderations related to ROAs and RPKI-ROV for the case of destination-based RTDR
(elsewhere referred to as "Remotely Triggered Black
Hole") filtering are addressed here. In RTDR filtering, highly specific
prefixes (greater than /24 in IPv4 and greater than /48 in IPv6, or
possibly even /32 in IPv4 and /128 in IPv6) are announced in BGP. These
announcements are tagged with the well-known BGP community defined by
. For the reasons set out
above, it is obviously not desirable to use a large
maxLength value or include any such highly specific prefixes in the ROAs to
accommodate destination-based RTDR filtering.
As a result, RPKI-ROV is a poor fit for the
validation of RTDR routes.
Specification of new procedures to address this use case through the use
of the RPKI is outside the scope of this document.
Therefore:
Operators SHOULD NOT create non-minimal ROAs
(by either creating additional ROAs or using the maxLength attribute)
for the purpose of advertising RTDR routes; and
Operators providing a means for operators of neighboring
autonomous systems to advertise RTDR routes via BGP MUST NOT make the creation of non-minimal ROAs a pre-requisite for
its use.
User Interface Design RecommendationsMost operator interaction with the RPKI system when creating or
modifying ROAs will occur via a user interface that abstracts the
underlying encoding, signing, and publishing operations.
This document recommends that designers and/or providers of such user
interfaces SHOULD provide warnings to draw the user's
attention to the risks of creating non-minimal ROAs in general and using
the maxLength attribute in particular.
Warnings provided by such a system may vary in nature from generic
warnings based purely on the inclusion of the maxLength attribute to
customised guidance based on the observable BGP routing policy of the
operator in question. The choices made in this respect are expected to
be dependent on the target user audience of the implementation.
Operational ConsiderationsThe recommendations specified in this document (in particular, those
in ) involve trade-offs between
operational agility and security.
Operators adopting the recommended practice of issuing minimal ROAs
will, by definition, need to make changes to their existing set of issued
ROAs in order to effect changes to the set of prefixes that are
originated in BGP.
Even in the case of routing changes that are planned in advance,
existing procedures may need to be updated to incorporate changes to
issued ROAs and may require additional time allowed for those changes
to propagate.
Operators are encouraged to carefully review the issues highlighted
(especially those in Sections and ) in light of their specific operational
requirements. Failure to do so could, in the worst case, result in a
self-inflicted denial of service.
The recommendations made in are
likely to be more onerous for operators utilising large IP address space
allocations from which many more-specific advertisements are made in
BGP. Operators of such networks are encouraged to seek opportunities to
automate the required procedures in order to minimise manual operational
burden.
Security ConsiderationsThis document makes recommendations regarding the use of RPKI-ROV
as defined in and, as such,
introduces no additional security considerations beyond those specified
therein.
IANA ConsiderationsThis document has no IANA actions.
ReferencesNormative ReferencesAddress Allocation for Private InternetsThis document describes address allocation for private internets. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement LevelsIn many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)This document discusses the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is an inter-Autonomous System routing protocol.The primary function of a BGP speaking system is to exchange network reachability information with other BGP systems. This network reachability information includes information on the list of Autonomous Systems (ASes) that reachability information traverses. This information is sufficient for constructing a graph of AS connectivity for this reachability from which routing loops may be pruned, and, at the AS level, some policy decisions may be enforced.BGP-4 provides a set of mechanisms for supporting Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR). These mechanisms include support for advertising a set of destinations as an IP prefix, and eliminating the concept of network "class" within BGP. BGP-4 also introduces mechanisms that allow aggregation of routes, including aggregation of AS paths.This document obsoletes RFC 1771. [STANDARDS-TRACK]An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet RoutingThis document describes an architecture for an infrastructure to support improved security of Internet routing. The foundation of this architecture is a Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) that represents the allocation hierarchy of IP address space and Autonomous System (AS) numbers; and a distributed repository system for storing and disseminating the data objects that comprise the RPKI, as well as other signed objects necessary for improved routing security. As an initial application of this architecture, the document describes how a legitimate holder of IP address space can explicitly and verifiably authorize one or more ASes to originate routes to that address space. Such verifiable authorizations could be used, for example, to more securely construct BGP route filters. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. [STANDARDS-TRACK]BGP Prefix Origin ValidationTo help reduce well-known threats against BGP including prefix mis- announcing and monkey-in-the-middle attacks, one of the security requirements is the ability to validate the origination Autonomous System (AS) of BGP routes. More specifically, one needs to validate that the AS number claiming to originate an address prefix (as derived from the AS_PATH attribute of the BGP route) is in fact authorized by the prefix holder to do so. This document describes a simple validation mechanism to partially satisfy this requirement. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Origin Validation Operation Based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)Deployment of BGP origin validation that is based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) has many operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and present those that are most critical. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation continues to be deployed and the dynamics are better understood.Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key WordsRFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.Informative ReferencesAre We There Yet? On RPKI's Deployment and SecurityNDSS 2017MaxLength Considered Harmful to the RPKICoNEXT '17Rethinking security for internet routingCommunications of the ACMIPv4 Address Blocks Reserved for DocumentationThree IPv4 unicast address blocks are reserved for use in examples in specifications and other documents. This document describes the use of these blocks. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.Use Cases and Interpretations of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects for Issuers and Relying PartiesThis document describes a number of use cases together with directions and interpretations for organizations and relying parties when creating or encountering Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) object scenarios in the public RPKI. All of these items are discussed here in relation to the Internet routing system.BLACKHOLE CommunityThis document describes the use of a well-known Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) community for destination-based blackholing in IP networks. This well-known advisory transitive BGP community named "BLACKHOLE" allows an origin Autonomous System (AS) to specify that a neighboring network should discard any traffic destined towards the tagged IP prefix.BGPsec Protocol SpecificationThis document describes BGPsec, an extension to the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that provides security for the path of Autonomous Systems (ASes) through which a BGP UPDATE message passes. BGPsec is implemented via an optional non-transitive BGP path attribute that carries digital signatures produced by each AS that propagates the UPDATE message. The digital signatures provide confidence that every AS on the path of ASes listed in the UPDATE message has explicitly authorized the advertisement of the route.AcknowledgmentsThe authors would like to thank the following people for their review
and contributions to this document: and
. Thanks are also due to
, , , , , , , , and
for comments and suggestions, to for the
Gen-ART review, to for the ART-ART
review, to for the Routing Area Directorate
review, and to for the Security Area
Directorate review.
Authors' AddressesHebrew University of JerusalemRothburg Family BuildingsEdmond J. Safra CampusJerusalem9190416Israelyossigi@cs.huji.ac.ilBoston University111 Cummington St, MCS135BostonMA02215United States of Americagoldbe@cs.bu.eduUSA National Institute of Standards and Technology100 Bureau DriveGaithersburgMD20899United States of Americakotikalapudi.sriram@nist.govFastlyAmsterdamNetherlandsjob@fastly.comWorkonline Communications114 West StJohannesburg2196South Africabenm@workonline.africa